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Abstract 
This study provides an ex-post evaluation of the EU copyright framework as provided by EU 
Directive 29/2001 on Copyright in the Information Society (InfoSoc Directive) and related 
legislation, focusing on four key criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and relevance. 
The evaluation finds that the EU copyright framework scores poorly on all four accounts. Of 
the four main goals pursued by the InfoSoc, only the alignment with international legislation 
can be said to have been fully achieved. The wider framework on copyright still generates 
costs by inhibiting content production, distribution and creation and generating productive, 
allocative and dynamic inefficiencies. Several problems also remain in terms of both internal 
and external coherence. Finally, despite its overall importance and relevance as a domain of 
legislation in the fields of content and media, the EU copyright framework is outdated in 
light of technological developments. Policy options to reform the current framework are 
provided in the CEPS companion study on the functioning and efficiency of the Digital 
Single Market in the field of copyright (CEPS Special Report No. 121/November 2015). 
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Executive Summary 
Background 
Since the diffusion of the Internet in the mid-1990s, governments around the world have 
sought to adapt copyright legislation to the new opportunities and challenges posed by the 
“network of networks”. The gradual digitisation of information and the Internet’s end-to-end 
design have made the exchange of content (including copyrighted content) much easier for 
end-users, with both positive and negative consequences. On the one hand, the new 
environment enables unprecedented communication, knowledge-sharing and even the 
creation of new content by end-users. On the other hand, attempts by right-holders to 
preserve control of their copyrighted works have so far been systematically frustrated. After 
the adoption of two World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Treaties in 1996, the 
European Union has launched a far-reaching policy debate on the need for new copyright 
legislation, which culminated in the adoption, in 2001, of the Information Society (InfoSoc) 
Directive.  
The InfoSoc Directive had the following major objectives: 
 To align EU legislation with international law, especially after the 1996 WIPO Treaties 
that inter alia addressed the issue of Technological Protection Measures (TPMs) and 
introduced a ’three-step test’ that confines the implementation of exceptions and 
limitations to special cases that do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the protected 
work and do not cause an unreasonable prejudice for the legitimate interests of the 
copyright holder; 
 To strengthen intellectual property protection in light of technological developments 
that led to the emergence of the Internet as a major distribution channel for content; 
 To reduce the existing disparities between national legal systems in terms of the basic 
definition of copyright, the scope of the rights to reproduction, communication, and 
distribution, the exceptions and limitations allowed, and the enforcement methods and 
practices; and 
 To ensure an adequate level of remuneration and compensation of authors and 
performers. 
More than a decade down the road, it is fair to state that the first objective has largely been 
achieved, with the other objectives having only been partially achieved, and in some 
instances, arguably not achieved at all. The InfoSoc Directive managed to introduce, at least 
partially and not without exceptions, the three-step test into the legal system of the EU 
Member States, and led to a very broad definition of intellectual property rights coupled 
with the effective endorsement of TPMs as a viable way to enforce copyright, enabling at the 
same time a system of copyright protection through the prosecution of actors that 
circumvent TPMs.  
The same cannot be said for the other objectives, however. On the one hand, the InfoSoc 
Directive introduced common definitions and marked an important step towards the 
harmonisation of copyright legislation in the Member States, and gave the possibility to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to develop, over time, a stream of decisions 
aimed at harmonising at least the interpretation of exceptions and limitations throughout the 
Union. In this respect, it is fair to state that the Directive has represented an important step 
forward in the harmonisation of the legal framework for copyright applied in EU Member 
States. However, there are a number of outstanding problems in the InfoSoc Directive, which 
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deserve careful analysis. Among these, enforcement certainly represents a particularly weak 
part of the protection system envisaged by the EU legislator, mostly due to an excessive 
reliance on TPMs, which in the end did not develop into the predominant approach for 
protecting online content, contrary to expectations when the InfoSoc Directive was first 
enacted. This led to a situation in which the remaining enforcement option in the InfoSoc 
Directive was recourse to injunctions against intermediaries whose services are used by third 
parties to infringe copyright (Article 8(3)), a remedy that proved to be inconsistent with the 
‘mere conduit’ principle established in Articles 12-15 of the 2000 e-Commerce Directive, and 
was gradually marginalised, in particular due to difficulties in obtaining access to justice and 
in identifying infringers. Likewise, the objective of reducing fragmentation in the copyright 
regimes of the Member States was not fully achieved due to a number of factors; notably, 
although the InfoSoc Directive was rooted in Article 114 TFEU, its objective of deepening the 
Internal Market ended up being subordinated to the necessity of adapting EU legislation to 
reflect the WIPO Treaties, and strengthening copyright protection. As a result, the EU today 
is still characterised by 28 different copyright systems. Furthermore, the implementation and 
scope of exceptions and limitations in Member States vary significantly, which causes harm 
to certain categories of copyright holders and end-users.  
Finally, the InfoSoc Directive was not successful in securing an adequate level of 
remuneration and compensation for the majority of authors and performers. The balance of 
powers between authors and performers, on the one hand, and distributors on the other 
hand, is such that reliance on market forces for the determination of a fair remuneration and 
compensation is likely to be a desirable choice only for those ‘happy few’ whose works enjoy 
a significant degree of success, with the vast majority likely to be under-remunerated. 
To sum up, only one out of the four initial objectives of the InfoSoc Directive can be 
considered as having been fully achieved. Furthermore, the additional EU instruments 
introduced in the interim to address certain gaps in the EU legal framework on copyright 
do not appear to have satisfactorily responded to the other initial objectives of the InfoSoc 
Directive. In addition, technology and user behaviour have rapidly evolved since 2001, and 
so have the business models of the copyright-intensive industries. Accordingly, many of the 
basic problems that underpinned the objectives of the InfoSoc Directive have also evolved, 
and new problems have emerged. However, two important new Directives concerning 
copyright were introduced in the recent past, namely the Orphan Works Directive and the 
Directive on Collective Rights Management, although it is too early to reasonably 
evaluate their full effect.    
How efficient is the present EU copyright framework structure? 
Concerning the efficiency of the intervention, there are serious doubts about cost-
effectiveness, where the assessment is negative overall since most of the intended objectives 
were not reached, also in consideration of the significant technological changes that have 
emerged since the adoption of the Directives. Moreover, the Directive has also not been 
successful in eliminating the need to negotiate licences under 28 different legal regimes. A 
recent study (KEA & Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2012) estimated that commercial users that 
provide services in more than one country and offer more than one million titles face 
transaction costs up to €260,000 per year and require about six employees to deal with 
licensing issues; in particular, the identification of relevant right-holders may require up to 
six months and negotiations to clear rights may take up to two years. This costly and 
bureaucratic process, in an EU copyright intensive industry still dominated by micro-
enterprises, might be considered as a serious shortfall in the legislative objectives of EU 
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copyright law. Furthermore, the failure of Member States to implement a consistent set of 
copyright exceptions and limitations, at least for those that have a significant impact on 
cross-border activities, has also led to a system that is inefficient for specific categories of 
users, affecting in particular research and innovation and the viability of new products and 
services that could target the whole EU Internal Market (e.g. social networks).  
Finally, the EU acquis on copyright seems to have ensured benefits for only certain categories 
of authors, performers and end-users. This means that, as things stand, the InfoSoc 
Directive and related legislation are, when taken together, limited in terms of their 
measurable general positive effect on industry and consumers and lack overall efficiency.  
‘Internal’ coherence: what are the remaining gaps and fragmentation in the 
application of the existing EU copyright framework? 
The major remaining gaps that emerge from our analysis are related to: 
 Absence of clarity as regards the compatibility of the InfoSoc Directive and IPRED with 
other legislation, most notably on fundamental rights, data protection, and e-commerce; 
 Absence of a clear legal framework for the remuneration and compensation of authors 
and performers, due to the absence of clear provisions in the InfoSoc Directive;  
 Uncertainty as regards the responsibility of online intermediaries, which have today 
become central in the distribution of content, and who are increasingly able to monitor 
traffic flowing through their servers; 
 Absence of clear rules on geo-blocking practices, characterised by a sound distinction 
between practices that respond to lawful and legitimate business need, and practices that 
should be considered as discriminatory and detrimental to end-users (e.g. the deliberate 
blocking of service portability);  
 Uncertainty over the applicability of private international law such as on which criteria 
apply to the determination of the applicable law in the case of copyright infringements 
occurring online; 
 Uncertainty as regards the applicability of the exhaustion principle to making content 
available on intangible media, in particular concerning borderline cases such as 
‘download-to-own’; 
 Lack of flexibility and adaptability to new uses (e.g. mass digitisation, text and data 
mining, e-lending, e-learning and user-generated content); 
 Lack of clarity on the implementation of specific exceptions (e.g. the exception covering 
parody, caricature and pastiche and the exceptions for the purpose of libraries and 
similar institutions); and 
 Lack of clear rules on access to justice and evidence to be used in civil proceedings.  
 
The main sources of fragmentation are summarised below: 
 Divergent definitions on key aspects of copyright law, including the definition of 
derivative works/transformative uses and the authorship of copyrighted works; 
 Divergent implementation and interpretation of exceptions and limitations across EU 
Member States, with some countries now even introducing new exceptions not originally 
envisaged by the InfoSoc Directive (e.g. in the UK on text and data mining);  
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 Limited consideration of the cross-border effects of specific exception, including inter 
alia the exceptions for private copying, but also the exceptions for teaching and scientific 
research, and in relation to certain cases concerning the freedom of panorama; 
 Divergent enforcement practices in Member States, with some countries relying on 
administrative procedures to counter infringing behaviour, others relying on codes of 
conduct and other voluntary measures, and others relying on neither of the two; and 
 Different approaches to the remuneration and compensation of authors through 
private copying levies. The disparate national treatment of exceptions, as well as the 
related levy systems, have so far raised significant national barriers and led to distortions 
of cross-border trade within the Internal Market. 
What are the economic costs and other quantified costs incurred by citizens, 
society and stakeholders due to the remaining gaps and fragmentation?  
There are several sources of cost that can be identified.  
 While authors often manage to reduce their transaction costs by relying on collective 
rights organisations, distributors face direct costs in the form of substantive compliance 
costs and transaction costs due to the need to negotiate licenses on a country-by-country 
basis with one or more counter-parties.  
 The territoriality of copyright offerings limits content availability and portability and 
generates costs for end-users and businesses. It harms competition and drives losses in 
terms of unrealised EU-wide consumer surplus. This type of market inefficiency reduces 
price competition and ultimately leads to suboptimal quantities being sold on the 
market. 
 Another source of direct costs is the existing uncertainty about the rights and 
obligations of different types of industry players, as well as over-enforcement 
mechanisms.  
 Inefficiency is generated by a confusing and contradictory interpretation of certain 
exceptions and limitations, as well as by the interaction between the use of TPMs and 
available exceptions and limitations. The current situation hinders the possibility for 
libraries to engage in e-lending, for example, and for researchers to engage in productive 
data processing for research and teaching purposes; this, in turn, leads to foregone 
benefits for society as a whole. 
 In the era of big data and data-driven innovation and new business models, the absence 
of legal certainty on text and data mining can also be hugely detrimental to the 
development of new offers and services, which in turn limits benefits to society through a 
direct negative impact on so-called ‘dynamic efficiency’ (e.g. innovation and the 
development of new welfare-enhancing products and services). 
 Furthermore, the lack of a level playing field between ‘traditional’ distributors and 
online intermediaries (especially in the audiovisual sector) can lead to insufficient 
incentives for the creation of content from the outset, which in turn would translate into a 
lack of dynamic efficiency. This problem can also account for a lack of adequate funding 
and exposure for ‘niche’ content. 
 The significantly superior bargaining strength of specific players (especially online 
intermediaries) could lead to unequal contractual conditions and consequently 
undesirable welfare losses in the contracts concluded between authors and 
intermediaries.  
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 Finally, the absence of a fully integrated Single Market for creative content 
dramatically reduces the value that end-users derive from Internet access. The greater 
the amount of content that can be circulated among all users in the EU, the greater the 
value of the EU Digital Single Market as a whole.  
Although it is difficult to estimate these costs in terms of GDP, available data sets show that 
a fully integrated Digital Single Market could contribute between €260 billion and €520 
billion to European GDP. The long-term growth impact of the digital reform effort already 
undertaken has been estimated at above 1%, and further efforts in line with the Digital 
Agenda for Europe targets are expected to generate an additional 2.1% of GDP growth.  
What are the existing gaps that could be addressed through better application 
and implementation of the existing Directive and wider legislative 
framework? 
Among the main gaps we identified, only a narrow subset could be partly filled if the 
existing acquis were clarified and made more consistent in terms of both interpretation 
and implementation. This is perhaps the case for the compatibility of the InfoSoc and IPRED 
Directives with other legislation, most notably on fundamental rights, data protection and e-
commerce, for which non-legislative documents and clarification efforts could probably 
address some outstanding problems without requiring legislative reform. Similarly, the lack 
of flexibility and adaptability of exceptions and limitations to new uses (mass digitisation, 
text and data mining, e-lending, e-learning, user-generated content) could be partly 
remedied if, for example, text and data mining were directly included in the scope of the 
mandatory exception for transient copies. Moreover, the lack of clarity on the 
implementation of specific exceptions (e.g. the exception for parody, caricature and pastiche) 
could be remedied, at least partly, through more coordinated and consistent implementation. 
That said, there are many gaps that would require legislative intervention. These include 
the absence of a clear legal framework for the remuneration and compensation of authors 
and performers, which is due to the absence of clear provisions in the InfoSoc Directive; the 
existing uncertainty as regards the responsibility of online intermediaries; the lack of clear 
rules on geo-blocking practices; the uncertainty as regards private international law aspects 
such as the criteria to apply for the determination of the applicable law in the case of 
copyright infringements occurring online; the partial uncertainty as regards the applicability 
of the exhaustion principle to the making available of ‘download-to-own’ content on 
intangible media; and the lack of clear rules on access to justice and collection of evidence to 
be used in civil proceedings. As is apparent from the ongoing debate on copyright reform at 
EU level, all these are issues that only legislative intervention could begin to remedy 
effectively. 
Is the EU legislative framework in line with technological developments? 
As clarified throughout this report, the EU legislative framework, and in particular the 
InfoSoc Directive, can be considered as increasingly outdated in light of technological 
developments: not only are the original exceptions and limitations (envisaged as a closed 
set) now increasingly misaligned with technological developments, they also potentially 
limit the development of welfare-enhancing uses of information. Moreover, enforcement 
mechanisms outlined in the InfoSoc and IPRED Directives have been largely overtaken by 
technology and countries today hardly ever rely on civil litigation to enforce copyright laws.  
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Most notably, the lack of certainty over the application of a number of exceptions, including 
the one on text and data mining, represents an outstanding oversight in the EU acquis on 
copyright. For example, when it comes to libraries and similar institutions, the current set of 
exceptions and limitations does not cover e-lending and hampers mass digitisation projects, 
let alone new options for the ‘online’ consultation of digitised content. Similarly, unevenly 
implemented exceptions for teaching and research potentially impinge on the provision of 
pan-European e-learning services as well as on the creation of a truly integrated European 
Research Area. The creation of user-generated content and more simply the sharing of 
pictures on social networks encounter substantial obstacles in the fragmentation and 
uncertainty of the current EU copyright framework. 
In summary, the relevance of the overall approach adopted by the InfoSoc Directive and 
its subsequent legislation deserve urgent and careful adaptation to address the problems 
and gaps identified in the scope of the rights and exceptions, the existing emphasis on 
‘copy’ rights rather than authorship and also to address the insufficiencies concerning 
enforcement.  
What are the likely efficiency losses associated with the current inadequacy of 
the InfoSoc Directive?  
Our Study identifies a number of inefficiencies associated with the current inadequacy of the 
InfoSoc Directive. Generally speaking, such inefficiencies can be divided into the following 
categories: 
 Productive inefficiency. Current legislation in the field of copyright increases costs for 
content producers and distributors, and also limits the availability of content for end-
users. In particular, inefficient enforcement limits incentives to produce and distribute 
new valuable content for right-holders. In addition, current rules do not encourage those 
users who would make use of such content to create user-generated content or to engage 
in text and data-mining activities. This means that overall content production is 
hampered by an unnecessarily complex and restrictive acquis, and this might explain the 
differences in the relative performance of the EU vis-à-vis its global competitors in 
specific areas. There are good reasons to believe that both the production and the 
dissemination of knowledge would greatly benefit from the availability of more up-to-
date rules, which would couple greater effectiveness in enforcement with more user-
friendly provisions on content consumption, re-use and transformation.  
 Allocative inefficiency. Legal fragmentation and limits to the availability of content in 
the Internal Market fundamentally reduce the value of the Internet for European end-
users, because the end-to-end design of the internet (i.e., the ability of each user to 
communicate and exchange files with every other user) cannot be fully exploited to share 
and access all types of content. The untapped consumer and producer surplus brought 
on by the lack of availability of content and by widespread copyright infringement 
account for reductions in allocative efficiency that reverberate on the value of digital 
content available online, and hence also on the value of Internet access for end-users. 
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that all price discrimination 
in the Single Market should be prohibited: as noted throughout this Study, there are 
several instances of price-discrimination, even those based on geo-blocking practices, 
which can be considered as welfare-enhancing, not welfare-reducing. The difficulty in 
the reform exercise consists precisely in singling out welfare-reducing practices and 
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curbing them while treating pro-competitive, welfare-enhancing forms of price 
discrimination as perfectly viable business solutions.  
 Dynamic inefficiency. Typical examples are the dissuasive effects of piracy and 
ineffective enforcement, and also the impact of current uncertainty and existing legal 
constraints on fast growing new forms of content production such as user-generated 
content and text and data mining. Importantly, the reduction in quantity and quality of 
content available to end-users can also lead to a reduction in the demand for improved 
Internet connectivity and bandwidth, and could thus also end up stifling incentives to 
deploy broadband networks due to a sustained slowdown in demand from end-users.  
Finally, and even more importantly, it is undeniable that, whatever the negative impact 
associated with the sources of inefficiency identified, it is only likely to increase over time as 
the Internet permeates a growing number of activities and carries an ever-larger share of 
copyrighted creative content.  
Summary table 
The table below summarises the results of our ex-post evaluation on the InfoSoc Directive 
and its related instruments and is based on four key criteria, namely effectiveness, efficiency, 
coherence and relevance. The table provides a score from • (lowest) to ••••• (highest) for 
each evaluation criterion, while the cell on the right end of the table includes a brief 
illustration of the motivation behind the decision to attribute a specific score.  
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Summary ex-post evaluation 
Criterion 
Score 
(1 to 5) 
Motivation 
Effectiveness •• 
Of the four main goals pursued by the InfoSoc, only one can be 
said to have been fully achieved (alignment with international 
legislation), and even in that case there are exceptions and 
divergences (e.g. the three-step test, making available right). The 
other goals have only partly been achieved, and technological 
evolution makes them even harder to achieve today.  
Efficiency • 
The InfoSoc Directive is inefficient because it could only partially 
achieve its initial goals (i.e. the failure to achieve intended 
benefits translates into low cost-effectiveness). Furthermore, the 
wider framework on copyright still generates costs in terms of its 
inhibiting factor for content production, distribution and creation, 
generating productive, allocative and dynamic inefficiencies. Some 
instruments, such as the Directives on Orphan Works and 
Collective Rights Management, are too recent to evaluate in full. 
Coherence ••• 
While the InfoSoc has achieved an unprecedented level of 
coherence in the European Union’s legislation on copyright, and 
has been complemented by additional instruments (e.g. the 
Orphan Works and Collective Rights Management Directives), 
several problems remain in terms of both internal and external 
coherence.  
Relevance •• 
Despite its overall importance and relevance as a domain of 
legislation in the fields of content and media, the EU copyright 
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Introduction  
1. Copyright in the digital era  
Over the past two decades, the emergence of the digital economy and the diffusion of the 
Internet have created significant new opportunities to create, disseminate and consume 
content, at the same time challenging the ways in which content production has been 
traditionally promoted and incentivised in industrialised legal systems. After all, that an 
environment in which every action implies a copy would create tensions in a system 
conceived for analogue, not digital copies, was to be expected. Since the mid-1990s, the 
debate on the future of copyright law has been hectic to say the least: some scholars, in light 
of the digital nature of information exchanged on the Internet and of the Internet’s end-to-
end design have simply doomed copyright law to death (Barlow, 1994). Other scholars 
thought that the digital environment would give authors enhanced possibilities to control 
content consumption through micro-payments, and predicted that the Internet would soon 
become a ‘celestial juke-box’ (Goldstein, 1994). And authoritative scholars argued that only 
technology would be an effective way to achieve effective law enforcement, since on the 
Internet it is ‘code’, and not ‘law’, that defines what is possible (Lessig, 1996). 
A few years after the birth of the Web, it seemed fair to state that the prophets of the ‘death 
of copyright’ were right, and the advocates of the ‘celestial jukebox’ had simply gotten it 
wrong. The reason was simple, and related to the combination of three factors. First, content 
was flowing in digitised form over the Web, and for the first time the copy was identical to 
the original – some authors even started to state that on the Web, the ‘license is the product’, 
meaning that access rights are what count, and the product itself does not exist anymore 
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(Gomulkiewicz, 1998). Second, the end-to-end architecture allowed end-users to exchange 
files (regardless of whether they were copyrighted or not) without having to pass any filter, 
as the pipe was ‘dumb’ and the ‘code’ of cyberspace allowed them to do it. Third, broadband 
connections were becoming more widespread, and increased connectivity made it easier for 
end-users to share content on the Web by shipping large files.  
The result of all this was that copyright owners lost control of the use and distribution of 
their content on the Web, and users started to create a huge and uncontrollable secondary 
market for digital content. At the extreme, content owners would have been able to sell only 
one copy of their product: once sold, the digital copy could have been reproduced and 
shipped millions of times on the Web without significant losses in quality. Copyright 
enforcement as we had known it since then, in a word, had been killed by the Internet 
architecture. And this is why commentators have referred to the battle that followed as the 
battle between architecture and control (Renda, 2011).  
A first policy response came with the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright 
Treaty (WIPO Copyright Treaty), which called for a broadening and strengthening of 
copyright, at the same time endorsing technological protection measures (TPMs) and 
condemning any form of circumvention thereof. The United States (US) implemented the 
Treaty already in 1998 with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The DMCA did 
not criminalise copying; on the other hand, it allowed whatever form of anti-circumvention 
technique, including TPMs aimed at restoring control over digital content. In the same year, 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act extended the validity of copyright to 70 years 
after the author’s death. In the European Union (EU), the WIPO Copyright Treaty was 
implemented by Decision 2000/278/EC of 16 March 2000, and copyright legislation for the 
digital environment was finally introduced with Directive 2001/29/EC (hereinafter, the 
InfoSoc Directive), which forms the starting point and main subject matter of our 
evaluation in this report. 
Already at the outset, it became clear that simply legislating to enable the use of TPMs would 
not suffice to avoid end-users’ sharing content through the Internet on a massive scale. In the 
United States, cases like Napster and later Grokster, based on a legal precedent related to 
analogue technology (the 1984 Supreme Court decision in Sony v. Universal Studios), 
eventually led the Supreme Court to modify its interpretation of the law by developing in 
2005 an ‘inducement theory’ aimed at capturing facilitators of online copyright 
infringements, and even this attempt to extend contributory infringement and vicarious 
liability to online facilitators did not fully stop the proliferation of new file-sharing services 
based on increasingly elusive technologies such as torrents (Renda, 2011). A similar 
approach was adopted some years later in Europe, and in particular in the Swedish Pirate 
Bay case.  
The difficulty of limiting copyright infringement by relying exclusively on litigation in 
court has led to increased emphasis on ways to limit the possibility for end-users to share 
copyrighted files with their peers. In particular, the entry into the market of Apple’s iTunes-
iPod system determined the rise of Digital Rights Management (DRM) systems, initially 
hailed as a panacea against the perils of enduring illegal file-sharing. Not only the InfoSoc 
Directive was largely based on the belief that DRM would become a major way of ensuring 
copyright protection in the online environment (as will be recalled and illustrated in more 
detail in the next Sections of this report): a few years later, in 2005, a report by an ad hoc 
High-Level Group on DRM appointed by the European Commission concluded: “EU 
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Institutions and Member States [must] reflect in their policy positions that copyright abuse 
will not be tolerated, and that protection of content delivered via DRM is the way forward.”1 
But that, again, was only a chimera. Even the most sophisticated protection mechanism 
ever conceived, such as DRM, combining both technological and legal protection 
measures, has not put an end to the quarrel on how to effectively protect copyright online. 
For example, in an open letter dated 6 February 2007, Steve Jobs observed: “DRMs haven’t 
worked, and may never work, to halt music piracy...Much of the concern over DRM systems 
has arisen in European countries. Perhaps those unhappy with the current situation should 
redirect their energies towards persuading the music companies to sell their music DRM-
free...Convincing them to license their music to Apple and others DRM-free will create a 
truly interoperable music marketplace. Apple will embrace this wholeheartedly.”2 
The fact that DRM systems ended up becoming part of existing business models only in a 
limited subset of content markets (e.g. in e-books) led to a further reflection on how to 
strengthen copyright enforcement online. This reflection spurred a new wave of legislation 
that ended up conflicting with one of the most fundamental tenets of Internet policy: the 
idea, largely based on the need to defend the neutral design of the Internet, that Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) could not be held liable for the conduct of their subscribers, as they 
would not be expected to inspect the bits of traffic that end-users shipped or received 
through their ‘pipes’. These new pieces of legislation violated this principle by relying 
directly on ISPs to detect copyright infringement and even directly enforce the law. For 
example, in 2009 France passed a controversial ‘content and creation’ law that called for the 
creation of the Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des Oeuvres et la Protection des droits sur Internet 
(HADOPI), a new agency with a mandate to sanction those accused of illegal file-sharing. 
The law introduced a ‘three-strikes’ rule according to which ISPs should monitor infringing 
conduct by their subscribers, and after two warnings put them on a black list and block their 
account for up to one year. The ‘three-strikers’ would, by the way, continue to pay while 
being disconnected. During the following years, ‘three-strikes’ or ‘graduated response’ 
legislation was considered and also heavily debated in many other jurisdictions. At the same 
time, some countries (in particular those, like the Netherlands, that had already legislated in 
favour of mandatory net neutrality) decided to rely more on self- or co-regulatory remedies 
such as codes of conduct in order to strike a balance between the need to protect copyright, 
end-users’ right to privacy and intermediaries’ right to conduct business.  
At the EU level, the debate on the scope and enforcement of copyright law has been heavily 
affected by these different approaches to copyright legislation, with an additional 
complication, related to the lack of a legal basis to act directly at the EU level, if not to 
achieve harmonisation and further market integration. The InfoSoc Directive, as will be 
explained below, was inspired by an array of goals, including alignment with WIPO Treaties 
and the need to broaden the scope and strengthen the enforcement of copyright in the online 
environment; however, the legal basis of InfoSoc was essentially linked to the market 
integration objective. More than a decade after its adoption the Directive must be 
appraised in light of its original goals, and also of its coherence with other EU legislation, 
as well as its relevance in light of past, ongoing and upcoming technological 
developments. This is the main motivation for this evaluation Study commissioned to the 
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Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and Economisti Associati by the European 
Parliamentary Research Service. 
2. Structure of the work 
The remainder of this report is structured as follows. Part I analyses the intervention logic 
behind the InfoSoc Directive and discusses the developments that have led to its 
adoption. More specifically, this part answers the following questions: Why did the EU 
intervene in the field of copyright and what were the objectives of such intervention? 
Part II addresses a number of specific aspects of the implementation of the InfoSoc 
Directive and related legislation. In particular, Section 1 discusses legal aspects of 
copyright such as the extent of harmonisation of the EU copyright system, its regulatory 
efficiency and its interplay with other EU policy streams. Section 2 deals with the Internal 
Market aspects of copyright, and encompasses various issues such as the market 
fragmentation effects of current copyright legislation, the effect and underlying rationale of 
practices such as geo-blocking, and the effects of the current approach to copyright 
exceptions and limitations and their interaction with TPMs. Section 3 looks at the industry 
aspects of copyright enforcement in the digital environment, and focuses in particular on 
the suitability to the digital environment of the Directive on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights (IPRED), as well as the compatibility between copyright legislation and other 
legislation such as the 2000 e-commerce Directive and the Charter on Fundamental Rights. 
Section 4 addresses the issue of the remuneration and compensation of authors and 
performers3 by looking at the various approaches existing in EU legislation, as well as the 
existing data on market structure and revenue allocation in the creative content markets. 
Part III concludes by answering selected ex post evaluation questions provided by the 
European Parliamentary Research Service, and associated with the effectiveness, efficiency, 
relevance and coherence of the InfoSoc Directive and related legislation. Finally, Annex A 
contains a set of comparative tables on the national implementation of copyright 
exceptions and limitations in six Member States of the European Union.  
                                                   
3 In this study the terms ‘remuneration’ and ‘compensation’ are often used together to broadly refer to 
the financial reward that EU copyright Directives requ ire to be granted to authors and performers 
for certain uses of their works. These terms, which refer to the same concept and type of pecuniary 
obligation, are used interchangeably in the relevant legislation, also when the remuneration or 
compensation has to be paid to other categories of right-holders: for instance, reprography and private 
copying are allowed on condition that copyright holders receive ‘fair compensation’ (see InfoSoc 
Directive, Article 5(2)(a) and 5(2)(b)); music performers are given an unwaivable right to ‘equitable 
remuneration’ for the rental of phonograms (see Directive 2006/115/EC, Article 5); music performers 
are granted a right to an ‘annual supplementary remuneration’ for the 20-year period of additional 
protection of sound recordings provided by Directive 2011/77/EU (which amended Directive 
2006/116, Article 3), and so on. In the Section concerning the legal aspects of copyright (see Section 
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1. The rationale for the intervention: Why did the EU intervene in the 
field of copyright? 
This Section identifies the reasons that led to the EU intervention in the field of copyright 
by first assessing the needs and problems to be addressed by the InfoSoc Directive and its 
related acts. As a second step, the Section will outline the main objectives that the EU 
legislators pursued while setting out the EU framework on copyright. 
1.1 Needs and problems at the time of the InfoSoc Directive 
In a review of the EU legal framework on copyright undertaken in 2004, the European 
Commission defined the 2001 InfoSoc Directive as the most comprehensive piece of 
legislation ever adopted in this field.4 Even though, as reflected by its title and apparent 
objective, its adoption was historically triggered by the advent of digitisation of information, 
the InfoSoc Directive set out EU law provisions whose scope of application goes far 
beyond the realm of digital settings, and touches upon all dimensions of artistic and 
literary property. Since the time of the submission of a Directive proposal by the 
Commission in 1997, commentators pointed out that, through this new piece of legislation, 
the European Community (EC) would have replaced “maybe two-thirds of national 
copyright laws” (Cohen Jehoram, 2001, p. 545). None of the former EU interventions in this 
field has been as wide as the legislative reform of 2001, which re-defined and harmonised, to 
a large extent, the most relevant categories of rights granted to copyright holders and took 
steps to make copyright exceptions as uniform as possible, in both digital and analogue 
environments (Cohen Jehoram, 2001). 
1.1.1 Copyright and the principle of free movement: a basic tension  
There was no EU copyright law until the early 1990s. National rules on copyright were taken 
into consideration insofar as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found that national 
provisions created obstacles to the EC principles of free movement of goods and services, 
and unrestricted competition. National courts started seeking clarification about the basic 
tension that existed between EU-wide constitutional principles and national copyright rules. 
The exercise of intellectual property rights within national borders allowed companies to 
partition the Common Market in order to prevent the free movement of goods on a cross-
border basis. By reserving to the owner the exclusive right to exploit a protected process, 
product or work within Member States’ territories, on the grounds of the principle of 
territoriality of intellectual property, national laws ended up conferring the right to oppose 
the importation of a good which enjoyed an identical or similar right into another Member 
State.  
                                                   
4 See Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Paper on the review of 
the EC legal framework in the field of copyright and related rights, SEC(2004)995, Brussels, 19.7.2004, 
p. 3.  
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The first time the ECJ analysed such a conflict in the field of copyright was Deutsche 
Grammophon v. Metro-SB-Grossmärkte.5 The Court found that, although Article 295 of the 
EC Treaty reserved the creation and definition of the subject matter of an intellectual 
property right (in the Court’s lexicon: the existence of the right) to national law, the exercise of 
such a right nonetheless fell within the field of the application of the Treaty. Moreover, the 
Court clarified that Article 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), formerly Article 30 of the Treaty establishing the European Communities (TEC), 
exempted the exercise of an intellectual property right from the scope of Article 34 TFEU 
(formerly Article 28 TEC), but only insofar as it was necessary for the specific subject matter 
of that right to be protected. Embracing this distinction, the ECJ pointed out that, once a 
copyright holder exercises his or her exclusive right of distribution by putting a 
copyrighted work on the market for the first time, the rights should have been 
‘exhausted’, in the sense that Community law should prevent the right-holder from using 
his or her intellectual property right to prevent parallel imports and restrict Community-
wide trade. The ECJ found that, this way, Community law ended up respecting the existence 
of copyright while narrowing its exercise for the pursuit of the objective of free movement of 
goods. 
1.1.2 The principle of exhaustion and its scope of application 
After having been coined and implemented by the ECJ, the principle of exhaustion 
progressively found legislative recognition in Article 4(c) of the 1991 Software Directive,6 
which concerns the right of distribution.7 A similar provision was embodied in Article 5(c) 
of the 1996 Database Directive.8 Meanwhile, the ECJ detailed its definition of the scope of 
application of this principle in several decisions on Article 30 TEC (now Article 36 TFEU), 
whose wording justified restrictions on imports and exports on the grounds of national 
copyright protection.  
In Coditel and Others v. Ciné Vog Films and Others,9 the ECJ made it clear that the principle of 
Community-wide exhaustion applied only to the physical dissemination of copyrighted 
goods, without extending it to intangible forms of commercial exploitation such as a cross-
border re-transmission of a film. In that case, the Court excluded that the principle of free 
movement of goods and services could allow a Belgian trans-border cable re-transmission of 
                                                   
5 See C-78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro-SB-Grossmärkte, 1971, ECR 487. In this case a German 
manufacturer of sound recordings sought to enforce its copyright in Germany in order to block the 
import by a third party of copies of the records manufactured and sold in France by its French 
subsidiary (i.e. with the manufacturer’s consent). 
6 Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal 
protection of computer programs, OJ L 111, 5.5.2009; which replaced Directive 91/250/EEC, 
hereinafter ‘Software Directive’. 
7 Article 4(c) of the 1991 Software Directive read as follows: ‘The first sale in the Community of a copy 
of a program by the right-holder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the 
Community of that copy, with the exception of the right to control further rental of the program or a 
copy thereof…’ This provision is now included into Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24/EC.   
8 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal 
protection of databases, OJ L 077, 27.03.1996, hereinafter ‘Database Directive’. 
9 C-62/79, Coditel and others v. Ciné Vog Films and others (1980), ECR 881. 
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a film, broadcast in Germany, without the authorisation of the copyright owner of the film. 
In Warner Brothers v. Erik Viuff Christiansen,10 the Court declined to apply the exhaustion rule 
to a case of unauthorised rental of a videocassette in Denmark that had been marketed in the 
United Kingdom, on the grounds that Danish law, unlike UK law, provided a rental right in 
favour of copyright owners. Even if the Court recognised that the protection of the Danish 
rental right had the effect of restricting the intra-Community market for videocassettes, it 
held that such protection was justified on the grounds of Article 30 TEC (now article 36 
TFEU). In EMI Electrola v. Patricia and others,11 the ECJ argued that the national protection of 
intellectual property based on Article 30 TEC (now article 36 TFEU) allowed a copyright 
owner of sound recordings to obtain an injunction in Germany against the unauthorised 
importation of records from Denmark, where copyright on such recordings had already 
expired. 
1.1.3 The progressive development of an EU copyright policy and regulation 
All the above-mentioned cases have a historical relevance for the integration of Europe in the 
field of copyright since the European Commission institutionally (and politically) objected to 
any restriction of the principle of free movement of goods. The Commission started reacting 
to each of the above-mentioned ECJ judgments with a number of Directive proposals 
aimed at harmonising specific aspects of national copyright laws. On the one hand, the 
harmonisation measures proposed by the Commission in the field of copyright sought to 
remove distortions at the level of primary exploitation of exclusive rights. On the other 
hand, these legislative initiatives intended to remove national disparities – under copyright 
law – that hindered free movement of goods and limited the scope of the exhaustion 
principle. These disparities affected internal trade at the level of the free trade of copyright 
products after their primary exploitation by their proprietors within the EC territory.  
In the literature, commentators described the Directives proposed by the Commission as a 
direct consequence of the above-mentioned ECJ judgments (Cohen Jehoram, 2001). These 
institutional responses to the case law of the ECJ consisted of specific legislation that sought 
to put the conflict between free movement of goods and national copyright protection to an 
end. Looking at the legislative evolution of the early 1990s from this perspective, one can 
easily understand that the adoption of Directive 93/83/EEC on the coordination of certain 
rules concerning copyright in satellite broadcasting and cable retransmissions12 is a (not so 
timely) reaction to Coditel and Others v. Ciné Vog Films and Others; Directive 92/100/EEC on 
rental and lending rights13 is linked to the Warner Brothers decision; and Directive 
93/98/EEC on the harmonisation of the term of copyright protection14 was an answer to a 
                                                   
10 C-158/86 Warner Brothers Inc. and Metronome Video ApS v. Erik Viuff Christiansen (1988) ECR 2605.  
11 C-341/87 EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im- und Export and others (1989), ECR 79.  
12 See Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the co-ordination of certain rules 
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable 
retransmission, OJ L 248, 6.10.1993, p. 15. 
13 See Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on 
certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property, OJ L 346, 27.11.1992, p. 61. 
14 See Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on 
the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ L 372, 27.12.2006, p. 9, hereinafter 
‘Term Directive’. 
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disparity in the national term of copyright protection emphasised by EMI Electrola GmbH v. 
Patricia Im- und Export and others.  
At that time, the idea of the Commission was not that of creating an entire European 
copyright system. The publication of the Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of 
Technology15 shows that the Commission mainly intended to put an end to the undesirable 
outcome of the ECJ’s judgments, “and only for very particular subjects, such as computer 
software, databases, terms of protection and resale rights…” This Commission document 
explicitly emphasised that EU law should not have enacted horizontal (i.e. general) 
provisions (Cohen Jehoram, 2001). 
1.1.4 EU copyright Directives and industrial policy objectives 
This overview of the original Commission plan in the field of copyright would be incomplete 
without considering that the EU copyright legislation, while aiming to avoid competitive 
distortions in internal trade, primarily sought to foster the industrial development and the 
international competitiveness of Europe especially in sectors, such the production of 
computer programs and databases, where the European industry needed a boost (Ullrich, 
2003). The Recitals of EU copyright Directives, including the InfoSoc Directive, always stress 
the need to ensure a high level of protection of copyright as an indispensable tool to achieve 
industrial policy goals. In the very first European copyright statute, i.e. the 1991 Software 
Directive, the need to ensure a broad and uniform protection of software triggered the 
definition at European level of one of the most horizontal aspects of copyright law, namely, 
the standard of originality of creative works, as a basic requirement for such works (i.e. 
computer programmes) to be protected as literary works.16 At that time, while opting for a 
standard of originality borrowed from the continental-European droit d’auteur (i.e. the 
author’s right) systems, Article 1(3) of the Software Directive obliged Member States such 
as the UK and Ireland to change their copyright laws on a basic point (Cohen Jehoram, 
2001). Until then, British and Irish laws granted copyright protection to computer programs 
that entailed “skill, labour or investment”. To the contrary, the originality test under German 
law required at least certain categories of work such as designs and computer programmes 
to meet further qualitative or aesthetic requirements for copyright protection to be granted. 
Even in the case of the 1996 Database Directive the Commission continued to act as a 
copyright legislator pursuing internal and external industrial policy goals. The end was that 
of removing the existing disparities in the standard of originality required for a database to 
enjoy copyright protection.17 On that occasion, the reasoning of European copyright 
policymakers was that the difference between the lower copyright standard applied in 
common law Member States (often referred to as ‘sweat of the brow’ standard, involving the 
                                                   
15 See Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of 
Technology, COM(88)172 final. 
16 See Article 1(3) of the Software Directive: ‘A computer program shall be protected if it is original in 
the sense that it is the author’s own intellectual creation. No other criteria shall be applied to determine 
its eligibility for protection’ (emphasis added). 
17 See Commission of the European Communities, First evaluation of Directive 96/9/EC on the legal 
protection of databases, DG Internal Market and Services Working Paper, 12.12.2005, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright (hereinafter Commission’s Evaluation of the Database 
Directive). 
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aforementioned “skill, labour and investment” and the higher standard of intellectual 
creation applying in droit d’auteur Member States triggered market distortions in database 
products. Hence, the enactment of horizontal rules aimed at granting a high level of 
copyright protection to two distinct types of databases: (i) ‘original’ databases, which would 
presumably obtain protection under droit d’auteur jurisdictions, as they were the fruit of the 
author’s own intellectual creation and (ii) ‘non-original’ databases (i.e. mere aggregation of 
data), which resulted from substantial investment in either the obtaining, verification or 
presentation of their contents, and would meet just the common law copyright standard. 
That was the reason why the Database Directive introduced at the EU level a new form of sui 
generis protection for these products.18 
With the enactment of this kind of horizontal copyright law measure the European 
Commission sought to eliminate trade distortions at the level of primary exploitation of 
exclusive rights provided under national laws. The subject matter of the legal protection of 
computer programmes and databases was harmonised mainly in order to remove 
uncertainty on minimum requirements for such protection to subsist – so that protection of 
these works in all Member States could eventually be identical, uniform and complete – and 
to create higher economic incentives for the high financial investment of human and 
technical resources that the creation of software and databases required (Rodríguez Pardo, 
2003). It is worth pointing out that, at the time of the adoption of these Directives, the co-
existing objective of removing obstacles to the free movement of these particular goods and 
the operation of the exhaustion principle came into consideration only as a subsequent policy 
objective, which was that of facilitating the Community-wide exploitation of copyright 
goods after primary exploitation. 
1.1.5 From sector-specific interventions to horizontal legislation in the field of EU 
copyright 
A change in the European Commission’s copyright policy, following the publication of the 
1995 Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology, which still advocated a 
piecemeal approach to copyright harmonisation, and the subsequent proliferation of 
horizontal measures in this field were mainly the consequence of an institutional change in 
the EU decision-making process. The constitutional amendments that followed the entry into 
force of the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) allowed the Community’s Internal Market 
legislation, including copyright measures, to be adopted by the European Council (i.e., by 
the Member States) on the grounds of qualified-majority voting instead of unanimity (De Witte, 
2006).19 As stressed in the literature, the absence of any national veto under Article 100a (now 
Article 114 TFEU) ensured the vitality of this provision as a basis for the adoption of a large 
number of measures associated with the process of completion of the Internal Market 
(Weatherill, 1997). This change of legal basis for Internal Market legislation, together with 
the re-orientation of the Commission’s Internal Market Directorate objectives around 
                                                   
18 See Commission’s Evaluation of the Database Directive, p. 3. 
19 De Witte stresses even that, following the enactment of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty, the scope of ‘pure’ Internal Market legislation, originally encompassed by the 
legal basis provided by Articles 94 (ex 100: unanimity) and 95 (ex 100a: qualified majority) was 
reduced by the creation of sector-specific policies such as environmental protection, health and safety 
of workers, social policy, migration, and civil law and procedure. 
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1990, contributed to a smoother implementation of harmonisation measures that ensured 
free movement of copyright goods within the Community. 20 
1.1.6 The 1995 Green Paper on Copyright in the Information Society 
The preparatory work for the adoption of such a comprehensive measure as Directive 
2001/29/EC started with the publication of the above-mentioned 1995 Green Paper on 
Copyright in the Information Society.21 In this document, the European Commission identified 
several legislative adjustments that the EC would have needed to make in order to pave the 
way for a harmonised protection of copyright in the newly emerged digital environment. 
Interestingly, the Green Paper argued that, for such a framework to have been created, 
Community law should have enacted a number of measures that, eventually, were not 
incorporated in the InfoSoc Directive such as: i) international private law criteria to identify 
the law applicable to the contracts and copyright infringements taking place on the 
Internet; ii) the redefinition at European level of the subject matter and the extension of 
moral rights on creative works; and iii) an effective harmonisation of provisions regarding 
collective rights management of copyright.  
1.2 Objectives of the InfoSoc Directive 
The objectives pursued by the InfoSoc Directive are summarised in Figure 1. In a nutshell, to 
foster the development of the information society in Europe, the EU legislators decided on 
the one hand to improve the functioning of the Internal Market for copyrighted works 
and on the other to provide adequate incentives to boost the competitiveness of the EU 
creative content industry. These policy goals as well as the underlying specific and 
operational objectives are revealed by the preamble of the Directive as further discussed 
below. 
                                                   
20 See Cohen Jehoram who emphasised that, around 1990, the atmosphere in the copyright unit of 
what was, until recently, the Internal Market Directorate began to change. As the author stressed, 
‘New personnel was appointed with other ambitions and orientation than those that went before…’ 
(Cohen Jehoram, 2001, p. 536). 
21 See Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper. Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society, Brussels, 19.07.1995, COM (95) 382 final, 49. 
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Figure 1. General, specific and operational objectives 
 
Notes: General objectives in blue; specific objectives in red; operational objectives in orange; operational objectives 
imposed by international obligation in green. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
1.2.1 General and specific objectives 
As mentioned above, the InfoSoc Directive was adopted by the European Parliament and the 
Council with the intent to “create a general and flexible legal framework at Community level 
in order to foster the development of the information society in Europe” (Recital 2 of the 
InfoSoc Directive). To achieve this general objective, the EU legislator acknowledged the 
need to both improve the functioning of the Internal Market for new copyrighted 
products and services (cf. Recital 2 of the InfoSoc Directive) as well as foster substantial 
investment in creativity and innovation and thereby improve the EU competitiveness in 
the creative sector. More specifically, the Directive conceived copyright harmonisation and 
Internal Market integration as a means to an end, which was that of aiming at “growth and 
increased competitiveness of European industry” (Recital 4 of the InfoSoc Directive). To 
this end, copyright and related rights should have been adapted and supplemented in order 
to respond adequately to new economic realities by promoting investment in new forms of 
exploitation of creative works and in the development of network infrastructure.   
1.2.2 Operational objectives 
The creation of a truly integrated Internal Market for copyrighted works was to be achieved 
by removing disparities between national provisions in the domain of copyright, 
especially for digital uses. Harmonisation of national copyright laws was in fact deemed 
necessary in order to avoid inconsistent national responses to technological developments. 
The new Directive should have prevented Member States from responding to technological 
challenges in this field with isolated initiatives that might have resulted “in significant 
differences in protection and thereby in restrictions on the free movement of services and 
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products incorporating, or based on, intellectual property” (Recital 6 of the InfoSoc 
Directive). In particular, the existing copyright exceptions and limitations, as set out under 
national laws, had to be reassessed in the light of the new electronic environment (cf. 
Recital 31 of the InfoSoc Directive).  
When it comes to supporting the EU creative content sector, as already done for the legal 
protection of software and databases, the Directive made it clear that any harmonisation of 
copyright and related rights should have taken as a basis a high level of protection “since 
such rights are crucial to intellectual creation” (Recital 9 of the InfoSoc Directive). Protection 
afforded by copyright and the related rights was regarded as a pre-condition for the artistic 
work of authors and performers to be adequately rewarded and encouraged (cf. Recital 10 
of the InfoSoc Directive). The new regulation was based on the assumption that only a 
rigorous and effective protection of copyright and related rights would have ensured that 
European cultural creativity and production could receive the necessary resources, with a 
subsequent guarantee of intellectual autonomy for artistic creators and performers and the 
preservation of their dignity (cf. Recital 11). 
Both the preamble of the Directive and its main provisions show that an operational 
objective of the intervention was that of restating the logic of copyright by strengthening its 
legal protection and expanding the scope of the exclusive rights it provides, at a time when 
digitisation of content and the development of electronic networks could have easily 
frustrated copyright’s traditional incentive/reward rationale. Without strong incentives and 
an adequate financial reward – this was the assumption – the EU would have run the risk of 
not promoting and preserving cultural creation – and, as a result, cultural diversity – at a 
time when access to content, and consumer demand for new creations and entertainment, 
could have grown exponentially. Specifically, the InfoSoc served as a vehicle for the policy 
objective of promoting and protecting European industrial investment in copyright digital 
works and in network infrastructure by obliging Member States to uniformly redefine the 
scope of exclusive rights.  
In addition, when the Commission made its proposal for the text of a copyright Directive for 
the information society, another operational objective, external to the EC Treaty, prevailed 
over the accomplishment of intra-Community purposes. As explicitly mentioned in Recital 
15 of the Directive, this objective consisted of the implementation, by the EU, of a number of 
international obligations set out in the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, which were negotiated directly by the Commission 
with third countries.22 The two major reforms embodied in these treaties concerned, on the 
one hand, the explicit recognition in favour of both copyright and the related holders of the 
exclusive right of authorising any communication to the public, including the making 
available of copyrighted material to the public in such a way that members of the public may 
access these works from a place and at a time chosen by them.23 On the other hand, the 
WIPO Treaties introduced into international copyright law the duty for contracting parties to 
provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention 
                                                   
22 See WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted in Geneva 
on 20 December 1996, available at: http://www.wipo.int/treaties. 
23 See Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty; Articles 10 and 14 of the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty. A more in-depth commentary on the enactment of these measures is provided in 
Mazziotti (2008). 
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of effective technological measures that are used by right-holders in connection with the 
exercise of their rights.24 
 
                                                   
24 See Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 18 of the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty. 
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1. The legal aspects of copyright: harmonisation and efficiency of the EU 
copyright regime, and its impact on other policy areas 
1.1 Legal basis of EU copyright legislation 
Until the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU did not have a direct competence to 
legislate in the field of intellectual property. The EU acquired such a prerogative with the 
introduction of Article 118 under the TFEU. Even though this constitutional provision 
addresses mostly the creation of intellectual property rights whose protection requires “the 
setting up of centralized Union-wide authorization, coordination and supervision 
arrangements” (i.e. trademarks, industrial designs, and patents), this new legal basis would 
matter if, in the future, the EU decided to establish a genuinely pan-European copyright 
system.25  
For now, the EU legislative measures in the field of copyright have been legally based on the 
grounds of Article 114 TFEU (formerly Article 95 TEC). This provision enables EU 
lawmakers to enact measures that are designed to pursue the approximation of laws for the 
creation of a Single Market. Under Article 114 TFEU, therefore, the EU is allowed to take 
harmonisation measures insofar as they help to remove disparities between national 
provisions that hinder the free movement of goods, or distort competition. The only 
copyright directives that were adopted, more recently, with a different or broader 
justification under the TFEU were Directive 2012/28 on certain permitted uses of orphan 
works26 and Directive 2014/26/EU on collective management of copyright and related rights 
and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the Internal 
Market.27 These directives were adopted to pursue additional or more specific policy 
objectives that were, respectively, those of allowing the mutual recognition of the status of 
orphan works on a cross-border basis (on the grounds of Article 53(1) TFEU) and facilitating 
the supply of services of collective rights management in the Internal Market (on the 
grounds of Articles 50, 53 and 62 TFEU).  
As things stand, the unification of legislation in the field of copyright at EU level could be 
achieved through a regulation based on Article 118 TFEU. Such a process, however, would 
be more complex than that which occurred in areas such as EU trademark law since the EU 
layer of legislation would entirely replace national copyright laws. This is due to the fact 
that, contrary to what happens for industrial property, copyright protection is acquired by 
                                                   
25 In the domains of trademark law and industrial design law such pan-European entitlements already 
exist, as a result of EU regulations that, in the absence of a specific legal basis at the time of their 
adoption, had to be based on the so-called implied powers conferred by Article 308 TEC to EU 
lawmakers, acting on the grounds of unanimity (see Council Regulation (EC) 207/2009 of 26 February 
2009 on the Community trade mark (replacing Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1993), OJ L 
78, 24.3.2009; and Council Regulation (EC) 6/2002 of 12 December 2001 on Community designs, OJ L 
3, 5.1.2002).  
26 Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on certain 
permitted uses of orphan works, OJ L 299, 27.10.2012.  
27 Directive 2014/26/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on 
collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in 
musical works for online use in the internal market, OJ L 84, 20.3.2014, hereinafter ‘Directive on 
collective management of copyright’.  
IMPLEMENTATION, APPLICATION AND EFFECTS OF THE EU DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT | 17 
the act of creation, i.e. without any requirements of registration, but simply by operation of 
the law. As pointed out in the relevant literature, due to the automatic operation of a unified 
copyright system, a hypothetical EU copyright would simply supersede national copyright, 
in a way that the two titles could never coexist (as national and Community trademarks and 
designs, for instance, do) (Ullrich, 2004). This means that, in a context where harmonisation 
of national laws is still incomplete (see Section II.1.2), the enactment of a uniform and EU-
wide copyright system can legitimately be regarded as a very difficult achievement, at least 
in the near future.  
The InfoSoc Directive is the most comprehensive piece of legislation the EU has adopted 
in the field of copyright. On the grounds of former Article 95 TEC, the Directive sought to 
remove disparities between national provisions mainly through the redefinition at European 
level of the subject matter and the extension of economic rights on creative works. The 
assumption the whole InfoSoc Directive relies on is that copyright and related rights should 
have been adapted and supplemented in order to respond adequately to new economic 
realities by promoting investment in new forms of exploitation of creative works and in the 
development of network infrastructure (cf. Recital 5 of the InfoSoc Directive). In the view of 
EU lawmakers, intervening at EU level with a set of harmonisation measures in the field 
of copyright would have prevented uncoordinated and isolated initiatives at national 
level that might have resulted “in significant differences in protection and thereby in 
restrictions on the free movement of services and products incorporating, or based on, 
intellectual property…” (cf. Recital 6). These potential differences at national level would 
have caused distortions of competition in internal trade, weakening the industrial 
development of the information society.28 
The preamble of the InfoSoc Directive clearly shows that, in spite of the above-mentioned 
legal basis, the purpose of strengthening copyright protection through the expansion of 
the digital rights of authors, performers and content producers prevailed over the goal of 
paving the way for a ‘Digital Single Market’. An Internal Market for new products and 
services, whose creation, development and marketing was to be protected and stimulated by 
copyright and related rights was regarded as a pre-requisite for the development of an 
information society in Europe (cf. Recital 2). At a time when copyright became much easier 
to infringe (also at a commercial scale) because of the Internet’s decentralised structure, EU 
lawmakers intended to foster substantial investment in creativity and innovation with the 
aim of “growth and increased competitiveness of European industry” (cf. Recital 4 of the 
InfoSoc Directive).  
The choice of EU lawmakers to give priority to the objective of redefining the scope of 
copyright protection over the accomplishment of purposes of Internal Market integration 
was due mostly to the obligations set out in the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and the WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty. The goal of ensuring compliance with those 
international treaties forced the EU to effectively recognise broader rights that the treaties 
intended to grant to authors, performers and record producers with regard to their works. 
These broader rights consisted of an adaptation and expansion of copyright’s logic and 
rationale to new forms of content dissemination and use that digital technologies and 
electronic networks had started enabling from the mid-1990s onwards. In particular, the 1996 
                                                   
28 See Ullrich, who emphasised that all EU intellectual property measures, while seeking to avoid 
distortions of competition in internal trade, end up pursuing the goal of promoting Europe’s 
industrial development (Ullrich, 2003, p. 471). 
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WIPO Internet treaties required an extension of the traditional right of communication to the 
public with the purpose of including interactive transmissions of copyright content into the 
copyright scope.29 With the advent of digital networks, the public may access creative works 
on demand (i.e. from a place and at a time chosen by each Internet user). The WIPO 
contracting parties sought to ensure that this new form of ‘point-to-point’ content 
transmission enabled by digital networks was explicitly included in the legal concept of 
‘communication to the public’, to the benefit of authors, performers and the creative 
industries. Moreover, the WIPO Internet treaties influenced the drafters of the InfoSoc 
Directive by introducing into international copyright law the duty for the contracting parties 
to provide effective legal sanctions against the circumvention of technological measures (e.g. 
anti-copy devices, watermarks, DRM systems, etc.) that are used by copyright holders in 
connection with the exercise of their rights.30 
1.2 Form and extent of harmonisation of the EU copyright system  
In spite of its very broad scope, the InfoSoc Directive is just one of the EU copyright 
Directives and does not deal (directly at least) with several aspects of copyright protection in 
the framework of the EU Internal Market. Firstly, the Directive leaves intact and in no way 
affects the existing sector-specific Directives concerning the protection of computer 
programmes and databases (cf. Article 1(2)). Secondly, the Directive did not harmonise the 
standard of originality as a basic requirement for copyright protection, as previous 
Directives on the protection of computer programmes, photographs and databases did in 
their specific fields of application. Thirdly, the Directive does not provide any 
harmonisation measures with regard to transformative uses of copyright works (i.e. 
translation, adaptation or modification), which are reserved to the copyright owner and 
require his or her consent in order to be undertaken lawfully. 
The fact that the Directive was shaped more as an instrument of industrial policy rather 
than as a pro-Single Market initiative is also evidenced by the absence of provisions that 
would have been necessary to foster cross-border exploitations of digital works. For 
reasons that have never been clarified, issues that were identified as necessary for the 
purpose of removing barriers to market integration in digital markets in the Commission’s 
1995 Green Paper on Copyright in the Information Society31 were either taken into consideration 
at a much later stage (e.g. the harmonisation of collective rights management law through 
the aforementioned Directive on collective management of copyright) or remain unclear at 
present. For instance, in its case law the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
still relies on distinct international private law criteria to identify the law applicable to 
online copyright infringements. This issue was regarded in the 1995 Green Paper as an 
important step towards the harmonisation of copyright laws in the information society. Yet, 
in the absence of a specific provision, the CJEU has relied so far on Article 7 of Regulation 
1215/2012 (which replaced the so-called ‘Brussels I Regulation’), which provides that “in 
                                                   
29 See Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty; Articles 10 and 14 of the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty. 
30 See Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 18 of the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty. 
31 See Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper. Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society, Brussels, 19.07.1995, COM (95) 382 final, 49. 
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matters related to tort, delict, or quasi-delict” one can alternatively be sued before the courts 
of the place “where the harmful event occurred or may occur”.32 In recent judgments the 
CJEU has followed different criteria to define the place of infringement of copyright and 
personality rights, locating such a place in the country where the claimant has her centre of 
interests33 or in the country where the persons targeted by a given exploitation of copyright 
works are located.34 More recently, the CJEU opted for the so-called ‘accessibility’ criterion, 
according to which an infringement action can be validly brought before the courts of the 
place where the damage occurs or where the act causing such damage takes place.35 It is 
evident that the criterion of accessibility, whose validity was recently confirmed by the 
CJEU, paves the way for a multiplication of courts, on the assumption that a copyright 
enforcement action can be brought in each Member State where the infringed work can be 
accessed, in accordance with the applicable national rules and in relation to the damages 
occurred in each single jurisdiction.36  
1.2.1 Standard of originality  
The sector specific Directives that were adopted before the InfoSoc Directive explicitly 
identified the standard of originality as a basic requirement for copyright protection. The 
main reason for that was that EU lawmakers sought to ensure that Member States granted a 
uniform legal protection to types of works that either did not fall, at that time, within the 
traditional categories of copyrighted works or were protected in accordance with diverging 
criteria under national laws.37 If this legislation had not defined at EU level the subject matter 
of copyright, a different understanding of the basic requirements for protection at national 
level would have caused distortions of competition in the Internal Market for these works. 
To avoid that scenario, sector-specific Directives provided a definition of ‘computer 
programme’, ‘photograph’ and ‘database’, embracing the continental-European criterion of 
originality. Articles 1(3) of the Software Directive, 3(1) of the Database Directive and 6 of the 
                                                   
32 Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351/1, 20.12.2012.  
33 Joined cases C-509/09 and C-161/10, eDate Advertising GmbH v. X and Oliver Martinez, Judgment of 
25 October 2011, par. 48-52.  
34 C-173/11, Football Dataco Ltd v. Sportradar GmbH, Judgment of 18 October 2012, par. 38-39. 
35 C-170/12, Peter Pinckney v. KDG Mediatech AG, Judgment of 3 October 2013, par. 42-43.  
36 C-387/12, Hi Hotel v. Uwe Spoering, Judgment of 3 April 2014, par. 35 and 38-39 (where the CJEU 
held that the courts of the Member States where the damage occurs are ‘best placed, first, to ascertain 
whether the rights of copyright guaranteed by the Member State concerned have in fact been 
infringed and, secondly, to determine the nature of the damage caused’).   
37 For instance, when it comes to the protection of photographic works, Directive 93/98/EEC (Term 
Directive) provides that a photograph that fulfils the originality requirement set out under Article 6 
(i.e. ‘the author’s own intellectual creation reflecting his personality’) should be protected by 
copyright under national law. As pointed out in the literature, as a result of this provision Member 
States are free to protect other types of photographs that do not meet the originality requirement 
through copyright-related rights with their own terms of protection; however, such protection should 
be based on requirements other than the (harmonised) originality requirement defined in the 
Directive: Minero, who recalled that countries like Italy and Spain protect non-original photographs 
by a related right for 20 and 25 years, respectively, after the date of creation (Minero, 2014) – cf. Article 
92 of the Italian Copyright Act and Article 128 of the Spanish Copyright Act).  
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Term Directive clarify that the above-mentioned works are protected by copyright if they are 
original in the sense that they are their author’s own intellectual creation.38 Moreover, in 
order to reflect the respective standards of originality of common law and civil law countries, 
the Database Directive identified two distinct types of works that should have been 
protected under national laws: i) ‘original’ databases, which would presumably obtain 
protection under droit d’auteur jurisdictions (as they were the fruit of the author’s own 
intellectual creation); ii) ‘non-original’ databases, which result from substantial investment in 
either the obtaining, verification or presentation of their contents, and would easily meet the 
common law copyright (i.e. ‘sweat of the brow’) standard.39 
Unlike the above-mentioned Directives, the InfoSoc Directive did not adopt a single 
standard of originality for all the creative works it should have applied to. There is no 
provision in this Directive that seeks to define what the subject matter of copyright is. 
However, the harmonisation of the concept of originality of creative works was the result of 
the interpretation of the InfoSoc Directive by the CJEU through a number of judgments 
where the Court showed an increased determination to promote the development and 
completion of the harmonisation of EU copyright law (cf. Griffiths, 2014; Rosati, 2011). 
The CJEU sought to strike a fair balance between the relatively low standard of originality 
adopted in the UK and the higher standards applied in continental-European countries such 
as Germany and France. In the first and most important among such cases, i.e. Infopaq 
International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening (2009),40 the CJEU found that the notion of 
copyright ‘work’ under the Directive should have been the same as the one adopted under 
sector specific provisions that define originality with regard to works such as computer 
programmes, databases, and photographs. The CJEU held that, for a matter of consistency 
with other EU law measures (cf. Recitals 4, 9 to 11 and 20) the rights harmonised under the 
InfoSoc Directive should have applied only in relation to a work (or parts of a work) which is 
original in the sense that it is its ‘author’s own intellectual creation’. Considering the purpose 
of harmonisation of the InfoSoc Directive, the CJEU developed the process of interpretation 
that started with Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening (2009) in later 
judgments that clarified the notion of “author’s own intellectual creation”. According to the 
Court, for originality (and copyright protection) to subsist in the case of a graphic user 
interface, the features of such interface should not be differentiated only by their technical 
                                                   
38 See, in particular, Article 1(3) of the Software Directive: ‘A computer program shall be protected if it 
is original in the sense that it is the author’s own intellectual creation. No other criteria shall be applied to 
determine its eligibility for protection’; similarly, Article 3(1) of the Database Directive provides that 
‘databases which, by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, constitute the author’s 
own intellectual creation shall be protected as such by copyright. No other criteria shall be applied to 
determine their eligibility for that protection.’ 
39 See, respectively, Article 1(2) of the 1996 Database Directive: ‘For the purpose of this Directive, 
“database” shall mean a collection of independent works, data or other materials arranged in a 
systematic or methodical way and individually accessible by electronic or other means’; and Article 7, 
par. 1 and 4, of the same Directive, according to which Member States shall provide a sui generis right 
for the maker of a database to prevent extraction and/or reutilisation of the whole or of a substantial 
part of a database which shows that there has been qualitative and/or quantitatively a substantial 
investment in either the obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents, irrespectively of the 
eligibility of that database for copyright protection.  
40 See C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening (2009), hereinafter ‘Infopaq’. 
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function, in a way that the author cannot express his creativity in an original manner.41 In the 
case of a portrait photograph, the Court held that originality subsists insofar as the 
photographer makes creative choices and gives the work her personal touch.42 As for sport 
events, it was held that this type of ‘work’ does not satisfy the Court’s standard of originality 
insofar as the event is “subject to rules of the game, leaving no room for creative freedom for 
the purposes of copyright”.43  
1.2.2 The scope of the exclusive rights of reproduction 
For the definition of the right of reproduction, the InfoSoc Directive adopted a notion taken 
from the specific Directives on information goods, i.e. computer programmes and 
databases.44 This right is defined very broadly, as “…the exclusive right to authorise or 
prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any 
form, in whole or in part…” of copyrighted works and of performances, phonograms, films 
and broadcasts protected by so-called neighbouring rights. As pointed out in the relevant 
literature, because of the inclusion of temporary copying in the copyright scope, the technical 
concept of reproduction gives rise to an unprecedented condition of simultaneity among the 
different modes of commercial exploitation of a work (cf. Ginsburg, 1995; Ricolfi, 2002; 
Hugenholtz, 1996; Hugenholtz, 2000a). This condition of simultaneity is easy to understand 
if one considers that, in the digital environment, reproductions constitute a technical 
necessity for digital content to be browsed, cached, used and transmitted over networks.  
The preamble of the InfoSoc Directive emphasises the necessity to define the concept of 
‘reproduction’ in conformity with the acquis communautaire (cf. Recital 21). The very broad 
definition of the reproduction right (i.e. any form of permanent and temporary copying) 
incorporated under Article 2 follows the technology-related concept adopted by Directive 
91/250 with regard to computer programmes, ten years earlier. To counterbalance such a 
broad notion, the InfoSoc Directive provides a mandatory exception that specifies that 
temporary acts of copying are to be exempted from the scope of reproduction right when 
they are: “[T]ransient or incidental [and] an integral and essential part of a technological 
process and whose sole purpose is to enable: (a) a transmission in a network between 
third parties by an intermediary, or (b) a lawful use of a work or other subject matter to be 
made, and which have no independent economic significance…”  
Article 5(1) enacted two distinct provisions. On the one hand, Article 5(1)(a) exempts certain 
temporary acts, for example, caching,45 and routing,46 which enable intermediaries such as 
ISPs temporarily to store and reproduce digital packets of copyright works through their 
                                                   
41 See C-393/09 BSA v. Ministry of Culture of the Czech Republic (2011), par. 45-50.  
42 See C-145 Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard Verlags GmbH (2012), par. 88-92.  
43 See C-403/08 and 429/08 Premier League v. QC Leisure (2012), par. 98.  
44 See Article 4(a) of the Software Directive and Articles 5(a) and 7(2)(a) of the 1996 Database Directive. 
45 ‘Caching’ (from the French ‘cacher’, i.e. ‘to hide’) is the automatic creation of temporary copies of 
data in order to make the data immediately available for subsequent uses. 
46 The term ‘routing’, instead, describes a modality of transmission by which each whole of digital 
data is fragmented into many packets, each of which is sent electronically to the required destination 
through the shortest way. 
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cables and network infrastructure.47 On the other hand, Article 5(1)(b) allows end-users to 
engage in temporary acts (e.g. browsing and caching) that have “no independent economic 
significance”. The case law of the CJEU is of help to better understand the factual 
requirements that should be met for the exemption from the reproduction right to apply.48 
The Court found that a reproduction of copyright materials should be regarded as transient 
or incidental under certain conditions, each of which should be satisfied for the copyright 
exception to apply (Infopaq, par. 55). Firstly, the duration of the act must be limited to what is 
necessary for the proper completion of the technological process at issue (Infopaq, par. 64). 
Secondly, for temporary acts to be exempted, a reproduction should be an integral and 
essential part for the correct and efficient functioning of the technological process (Infopaq II, 
par. 30). Thirdly, the reproduction should aim at enabling either a transmission in a network 
between third parties by an intermediary or a lawful use, such as the ephemeral acts of 
reproductions that enable a satellite decoder and a television screen to function correctly.49 
Last but not least, the reproduction must not have an independent economic significance, in 
the sense that it is not be able to generate an economic advantage additional to the one 
generated by the intended use and it should not modify contents.50  
With particular regard to the transient reproductions made by information carriers and 
exempted under Article 5(1)(a), this exemption serves the purpose of excluding carriers from 
indirect liability for copyright infringements carried out by their customers (see also above, 
in the introductory Section to this report). The technical functioning of the Internet – like that 
of a gigantic ‘copy machine’ – requires intermediaries to engage in temporary reproductions 
of small digital packets for digital content to be communicated over networks. The above-
mentioned provision of the InfoSoc Directive makes it clear that acts of transient 
reproduction do not fall within the legal notion of ‘copies’ that are subject to the control of 
copyright holders. The complementary provisions of Article 5(1)(a) of the InfoSoc Directive 
and Articles 12 to 15 of the 2000 Electronic Commerce Directive restrict, under certain clear 
conditions, the liability of ISPs acting as mere conduits, caching and hosting service 
providers for the communication of infringing material.51 It is worth recalling that, at the 
time of the negotiations for the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaties, the issue of transient 
reproductions was far from being taken for granted. This question was highly debated in 
Geneva, where the US delegation proposed the adoption of a notion of copyright 
reproduction that would have intentionally invoked the liability of information carriers for 
                                                   
47 See: ‘Did we really need a European lawmaker to tell us that caching and browsing are allowed 
without authorisation? A common sense right would have done the job as well, if not much better…’ 
(Hugenholtz, 2000b). 
48 See C-5/08 Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening (2009); C-302/10 Infopaq 
International A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening (2012), hereinafter Infopaq II; C-403/08 Football Association 
Premier League Ltd and Others v. QC Leisure and Others (2012), hereinafter Premier League.  
49 See Premier League, par. 165-172. By ‘lawful use’ one should mean a use either authorised by the 
right-holder or not restricted by law, as made it clear in the InfoSoc Directive, Recital 33. See also 
Infopaq II, par. 43-44. 
50 See Premier League, par. 176, and Infopaq II, par. 54.  
51 See Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain 
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, 
OJ L 178, 17.7.2000, hereinafter ‘e-Commerce Directive, Articles 12 to 15. On the connection between 
the InfoSoc Directive and the e-Commerce Directive see Hart (2002) and IVIR (2007).  
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their acts of communication through networks. The intention was that of requiring such 
intermediaries to police unauthorised flows of copyrighted works through their 
infrastructure.52  
The landmark decision of the CJEU in Infopaq shed light on the scope of the exclusive right of 
reproduction by pointing out the existence of an inextricable link between the notion of 
‘reproduction’ and the requirement of originality of the copyright work that is copied 
without the authorisation of the copyright owner. Interestingly enough, Infopaq did not 
concern the making of digital copies. Rather, the supposedly infringing activity consisted of 
storing an extract of a copyright work comprising 11 words and printing out that extract. The 
CJEU found that such an activity could come within the scope of Article 2 of the InfoSoc 
Directive “if the elements thus reproduced are the expression of the intellectual creation of 
their author” (Infopaq, par. 51). In a subsequent case concerning the copying of transient 
fragments of protected works within a satellite decoder and on a television screen, the CJEU 
found that the reproduction rights could extend to those fragments insofar as they contain 
elements which are the expression of the author’s own intellectual creation and a court 
determines the subsistence of such elements while examining the units composed of such 
fragments simultaneously (Premier League, par. 159). As emphasised in the literature, if 
these judgments were deemed to mean that the reproduction of 11 words or of a few 
fragments of a protected work always infringes copyright, this would have maximising 
tendencies (Griffiths, 2014). Instead, this approach merely suggests that very short extracts of 
protected works might constitute a reproduction legally reserved to the copyright holder, 
within the meaning of Article 2.  
1.2.3 The exclusive rights of communication to the public 
The InfoSoc Directive provided an EU-wide adaptation of the traditional right of 
communication to the public to the realm of electronic networks (cf. InfoSoc Directive 
Articles 3 and 4). Taking as a model the broad definition embodied in Article 8 of the 1996 
WIPO Copyright Treaty,53 Article 3 of the Directive grants authors, performers and the 
producers of copyrighted works with the exclusive right “…to prohibit any communication 
to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the 
public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place 
and at a time chosen by them.”54  
                                                   
52 The US proposal, which was eventually rejected, had previously been elaborated in the so-called 
1995 White Paper: see U.S. Department of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Office, Information 
Infrastructure Task Force, Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure: The 
Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, available at: 
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/front.pdf. 
53 Article 8 of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty provides as follows: ‘Right of Communication to the 
public: ...Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making 
available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may access these 
works from a place and at the time chosen by them.’ 
54 The preamble of the Directive (cf. Recital 23) clarifies that this right ‘should be understood in a 
broad sense, covering all communication to the public not present at the place where the 
communication originates…’ and it should include ‘any such transmission or re-transmission of a 
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The teleological and ‘interventionist’ approach the CJEU developed in its judgments 
touched upon the subject matter of right of communication to the public. In the same way 
as with the notion of the right of reproduction, the CJEU did more than merely interpret 
the existing law and ended up coining additional requirements and parameters aimed at 
specifying (and narrowing, in certain cases) the scope of this exclusive right.  
In its interpretation of Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, the Court relied on the explicit 
objective of the Directive to ensure the extension of this right to all communications “to the 
public not present at the place where the communication originates” (cf. Recital 23). In 
interpreting this concept the CJEU made it clear that the harmonisation of the right of public 
performance fell outside the scope of Article 3, since ‘public performance’ requires actors and 
performers to be in direct contact with the public.55 In other cases where the communication 
of copyright works occurred as a result of an intervention (i.e. the installation of TV screens 
and/or speakers) by a commercial user or operator (i.e. a hotel, a spa establishment or a pub 
owner) in the transmission of copyright works, the Court found that such a deliberate 
intervention gave rise to a distinct act of communication and required a separate 
authorisation of the copyright owner for the activity to be lawful.56 The CJEU reached such a 
conclusion on the assumption that a company that had given its customers access to 
broadcast works via television sets installed in its clients’ bedrooms or in a public house 
intended to target a new public, by distributing in those places, with full knowledge of the 
position, the signal received carrying the protected works.57 According to the Court, even 
though the ‘public’ refers to an indeterminate number of potential listeners or viewers, such 
a notion does not necessarily entail a large number of persons. Rather, this notion establishes 
a certain de minimis threshold and requires that, for the author’s exclusive right to come into 
play, a work is made available to persons in general, and not to specific individuals 
belonging to a private group.58 In the above-mentioned cases, a ‘new public’ is a public that 
was not taken into account by the authors of the protected works when they authorised their 
use by the communication to the original public.59  
The implementation of the ‘new public’ criterion raised criticism and strong objections when 
the Court applied it in a landmark case where the question was whether the supply, on a 
given website, of a hyperlink to protected works freely accessible on another website 
                                                                                                                                                               
work to the public by wire or wireless means, including broadcasting…’ This means that the right 
covers, in particular, the interactive on-demand transmission of copyright works over digital 
networks (see Recital 25). 
55 See C-283/10 Circus Globus Bucuresti v. UCMR-ADA (2011).  
56 C-306/05 SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles SA (2006), par. 37-39 and 42; C-351/12 OSA v. Lecebne lazne 
Marianske Lazne (2014), par. 29-32; Premier League, par. 194-197. 
57 See C-306/05 SGAE v. Rafael Hoteles SA (2006), par. 42; Premier League, par. 194.  
58 C-162/10 Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Limited v Ireland (2012), par. 34-35; C-135/10 Società 
Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso (2012), par. 85-86.  
59 See Premier League, par. 197. In another relevant case concerning the retransmission of TV broadcasts 
by a company enabling its customers to watch streams of a third party’s TV broadcasts, the CJEU held 
that the circumstance that the online service provider used a specific technical means to ensure or 
improve reception of the terrestrial television broadcast should have been regarded as a new 
communication to the public ex Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive by itself, i.e. without the necessity of 
examining whether the user intended to target or reach a new public: see C-607/11 ITV Broadcasting 
Ltd v. CatchupTV Ltd (2013), par. 26-27 and 38-39.  
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constituted an act of communication to the public.60 A second question was whether acts of 
hyperlinking required the permission of the copyright holders. The CJEU gave a positive 
answer to the first question, holding that a hyperlink is a form of making content available to 
the public (Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB, par. 20-23). The answer to the second question, 
instead, was negative since, according to the Court, the fact that the linked works were freely 
available on another site, without being subject to any restrictive measures, did not lead to a 
communication of such works to a new public: “since there is no new public” – the CJEU 
concluded – “the authorisation of the copyright holders is not required”.61 This conclusion 
was upheld at a later stage by the CJEU in a case which concerned the lawfulness of 
embedding a copyright audiovisual work freely accessible on YouTube onto a given website 
without the right-holder’s authorisation.62 In the same way as in Svensson, the Court found 
that the embedded video was neither communicated to a ‘new public’ nor transmitted 
through ‘new specific means’ that would make the act of embedding content distinct from 
the original act of communication (Bestwater International, par. 19). In both Svensson and 
Bestwater International, then, the ‘new public’ criterion ended up narrowing the scope of 
the right of communication to the public. 
As emphasised by copyright experts, this approach by the CJEU is unfortunate from the 
perspective of right-holders since it enables third parties to capture the value created by the 
appeal of literary and artistic works made available by reference on certain sites without 
having to pay compensation. The conclusion of the CJEU is also unexpected insofar as it goes 
beyond the provisions of the InfoSoc Directive and deviates from the obligations of the EU 
under international copyright law, where the restrictions stemming from the ‘new public’ 
requirement are not contemplated. Moreover, the fact that these judgments draw on the 
absence of restrictions to access the works on the Internet seems to run contrary to the 
principle that copyright protection should not be made subject to formalities or any 
obligation to reserve rights, as provided under Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention on the 
protection of literary and artistic property.  
1.2.4 The exclusive right of distribution and the exhaustion principle 
From a legal perspective, a significant achievement of the InfoSoc Directive was that of 
defining (and distinguishing) the scope of the rights applicable to the different forms of 
circulation of copyright works in the digital environment. Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive 
established a careful distinction between the right of communication to the public of 
copyrighted works (which extends to making content available in an interactive manner, i.e. 
the ‘Internet way’) and the distribution right, which is strictly confined to the sale of physical 
media that incorporate a protected work. 
As anticipated above, the Directive defines the right of making content available through 
digital networks by strictly delimiting the right of distribution of copyrighted works. The 
Directive refers to ‘distribution’ with exclusive regard to the circulation of physical (i.e. 
tangible) media that incorporate a protected work. The preamble of the Directive (cf. Recital 
28) clarifies that copyright protection covers “the exclusive right to control distribution of the 
                                                   
60 C-466/12 Svensson v. Retriever Sverige AB (2014), hereinafter Svensson.  
61 See Svensson, par. 26-28.  
62 C-348/13 Bestwater International GmbH v. Michael Mebes (2014), hereinafter ‘Bestwater International’.  
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work incorporated in a tangible article”, in such a way that the principle of EU-wide 
exhaustion cannot apply to the dissemination of intangible copies over networks.63 The 
distribution right has been interpreted by the CJEU in a few judgments that acknowledged 
the application of such right only to the sale of physical copies of copyright works. In 
particular, the CJEU’s case law made it clear that Article 4 of the InfoSoc Directive does 
not leave Member States with the freedom to provide for a rule of exhaustion having 
effects outside of the EU (i.e. international exhaustion).64 Moreover, the Court found that 
the distribution right is not exhausted if a physical medium incorporating a copyright 
work has been altered after the sale of the medium in its original format without the 
copyright owner’s consent.65   
Despite the clarity of the principle that links exhaustion (just) to physical media, in a 
landmark decision the CJEU caught the European Commission and copyright experts by 
surprise, holding that this principle can be applied also in the online environment. The 
Court held that the exclusive right of distribution of the owner of a computer programme 
should be regarded as being exhausted in relation to the sale of a copy of the programme 
that customers downloaded from the copyright holder’s site after having purchased it under 
a license granted for an unlimited period of time.66According to the CJEU, when this type of 
sale occurs, the copyright owner is no longer entitled to block a second-hand market for such 
copies. This means that third parties who acquire the software licenses from the original 
users and sell them, while transferring also the related right to download updated copies of 
the computer programme, to their own customers do not infringe the right of distribution of 
the copyright owner. The CJEU reached this conclusion with specific regard to the Software 
Directive that – unlike the InfoSoc Directive – does not incorporate a right of making 
computer programmes available as a species of the right of communication to the public. The 
UsedSoft judgment clarified that, for the distribution right to be exhausted with regard to 
computer programmes, the first acquirer should delete or make the original copy of the 
programme downloaded onto his/her computer unusable at the time of resale.67  
                                                   
63 According to Article 4(2), which draws from the acquis communautaire on exhaustion, the 
distribution right ‘should not be exhausted within the Community in respect of the original or copies 
of the work, except where the first sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that object 
is made by the right-holder or with his consent.’ 
64 C-479/04 Laserdisken ApS v. Kulturministeriet (2006), par. 23-26.  
65 C-419/13 Art & Allposters BV v. Stichting Pictoright (2015), par. 37 to 40, and par. 46. This case 
concerned a business (Art & Allposters) which markets through its websites posters and other kinds of 
reproductions of copyright works of art by famous painters. The claimant (Pictoright) was a Dutch 
collecting society having the mandate to exploit copyright on behalf of the copyright holders. Among 
other products, Art & Allposters sells images on canvases, which are obtained through a chemical 
process by which images incorporated in posters are transferred from paper to canvas and then 
stretched over a wooden frame. Pictoright successfully claimed that this process and the related 
business was unlawful without the copyright owner’s consent and the exercise of the distribution 
right concerning the posters was not exhausted when it comes to canvases.  
66 C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle International Corp. (2012), hereinafter UsedSoft. 
67 See UsedSoft, par. 78-79. As acknowledged by the CJEU, ascertaining whether such a copy has been 
made unusable may prove to be difficult. Still – as the Court emphasised – copyright owners 
distributing computer programmes through physical media (e.g. CD-ROM or DVD) have to face the 
same problem, since it is only with great difficulty that they can make sure the original acquirer has 
not made copies of the programme that she continues to use after having sold her material medium. 
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This judgment clearly shows a problem of compatibility between the concepts of 
‘distribution’ and ‘exhaustion’ incorporated in the InfoSoc Directive and the same notions 
under the lex specialis of the Software Directive. In short, this judgment showed a problem 
of alignment between these Directives that is mostly due to the fact that the EU software 
legislation was enacted (and kept in force, in spite of the recast of the Directive in 2009) when 
the online environment did not exist and distribution occurred exclusively through physical 
formats. The European Commission is fully aware of this problem, to such an extent that it 
intervened in UsedSoft to endorse the arguments of Oracle and to claim (unsuccessfully) the 
non-applicability of the ‘exhaustion’ principle in the online distribution of software, which 
should have been regarded as a form of making content available to the public on the 
grounds of Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive (UsedSoft, par. 50).  
1.2.5 The ‘Europeanisation’ of copyright exceptions and limitations  
As this Section shows, the InfoSoc Directive embodies an imbalance that lies in the fact that, 
whereas the vast majority of exclusive rights was harmonised and adapted to the digital 
environment, exceptions and limitations were conceived as optional for Member States. As a 
result, these provisions have been understood and implemented at national level in very 
different ways. In spite of its harmonisation purposes, the InfoSoc Directive did not 
distinguish between exceptions having a negative impact on cross-border activities and 
exceptions whose subject matter could have been left to national lawmakers without 
hindering the smooth functioning of the Internal Market of copyright and related rights. This 
approach openly contradicted a Directive Recital (cf. Recital 31) where the drafters 
acknowledged the relevance of the distinction for a proper definition of the degree of 
harmonisation of the classes of exceptions.  
1.2.5.1 Optional character  
The Directive opted for a list of non-mandatory exceptions and limitations that, as clarified 
under Recital 32, should be regarded as exhaustive. It would be hard to understand the 
compatibility of this approach with the institutional objective of the Directive without 
recalling the general lack of consensus among EU lawmakers on the definition of the acts 
and uses that should have been exempted from the copyright’s scope, especially in the 
digital environment. It should be also borne in mind that, from a political point of view, 
national governments sought to preserve their sovereignty and prerogatives in defining and 
enforcing those exceptions and limitations through which national laws have traditionally 
pursued specific objectives of public and cultural policy (e.g. encouragement of education 
and research, criticism, freedom of expression and communication, news reporting, etc.). The 
only viable solution in order to quickly achieve a sufficiently broad consensus on 
harmonisation of copyright exceptions was that of allowing the Member States to include all 
of the exceptions that they wished to be in the list. Moreover, making the exceptions non-
mandatory would have allowed the Member States to agree more easily on the contents of the 
list. However, by making these concessions, the Directive largely missed its original 
purpose of integrating the Internal Market, since almost all of the exceptions are provided 
                                                                                                                                                               
To solve that problem, the CJEU concluded, the software owner is allowed to use TPM (like product 
keys) in the distribution of both physical and digital (i.e. intangible) formats.  
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on an opt-in basis, irrespective of how relevant each might be for the purpose of enabling 
cross-border activities.  
The final text of Article 5 makes mandatory only the technical exception regarding 
temporary reproductions, which served the purpose of transitory communication in a 
network between third parties (Article 5(1)). All the other exceptions, including the ones that 
the Directive seems to regard as most relevant from a public policy perspective, were 
conceived as optional, having been inserted into a list from which Member States are free to 
choose (Cohen Jehoram, 2001; Hart, 2002). The list of exceptions grew significantly from the 
original seven to more than 20 items.68  
1.2.5.2 Exhaustive character 
It is worth recalling that the EU Commission targeted the complex issue of exceptions and 
limitations in the information society, initially, in its Follow-up to the 1995 Green Paper on 
Copyright and Related Rights. In that context, the Commission disclosed its intention of setting 
out specifically defined exceptions to the exclusive right of reproduction, with the purpose of 
accommodating the interests of users or the public at large.69 In commenting on the Follow-
up, the European Commission Legal Advisory Board expressed its scepticism on the 
possibility of enacting an exhaustive list of copyright exceptions, such as the one embodied 
in Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive.70 The Advisory Board argued that harmonisation of 
national exceptions did not necessarily mean that national systems were to be made uniform 
in this regard. As briefly recalled above, exceptions could have been maintained in national 
systems as long as they did not hinder the pursuit of market integration for copyrighted 
works. Member States such as Italy, Spain and France took the view that an exhaustive list of 
exceptions and limitations would have been more appropriate than an open-ended list since 
exhaustiveness would have ensured a higher degree of harmonisation and legal certainty 
(Cohen Jehoram, 2001). Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, instead, unsuccessfully 
sought to oppose this approach while advocating the desirability of a more flexible system, 
where the concept of ‘fair use’ (modelled on the homonymous US doctrine) could have 
allowed legislation to more easily keep pace with technological advancements. As recalled 
above, the final text of the Directive did not follow the recommendations of the Legal 
Advisory Board and adopted an exhaustive list of (optional) exceptions.  
                                                   
68 Whereas the exceptions provided under Article 5(2) concern just the right of reproduction, Article 
5(3) provides a list of optional exceptions to the rights of reproduction and communication to the 
public. Article 5(4) provides that, where the Member States may create or maintain an exception or 
limitation to the right of reproduction in accordance with Articles 5(2) and 5(3), they are entitled to 
enact an exception or limitation to the exclusive right of distribution ‘to the extent justified by the 
purpose of the authorised act of reproduction’. 
69 See Communication from the Commission of 20.11.1996, Follow-up to the Green Paper on Copyright and 
Related Rights in the Information Society, COM(96) 586 final (under the paragraph to ‘Reproduction – 
Proposed Action’). 
70 See Commentaires du Legal Advisory Board sur la Communication de la Commission du 20 Novembre 1996, 
available (in French) at: http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/legal/fr/proprint/labcomment.htm.  
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1.2.5.3 The three-step test 
A legislative measure that, instead, was transposed in the 2001 Directive directly from the 
follow-up to 1995 Green Paper is the so-called three-step test (cf. Article 5.5 InfoSoc Directive) 
that EU lawmakers borrowed from international copyright law (cf. 9.2 Berne Convention; 
Article 13 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). This 
provision is regarded as essential by copyright holders and, more in general, by the creative 
industries insofar as it confines the implementation of exceptions and limitations to special 
cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the protected work and do not 
cause an unreasonable prejudice for the legitimate interests of the copyright holder.71 In 
short, the test makes sure that exceptions and limitations do not end up affecting 
unreasonably (i.e. excessively) the market for the copyrighted work. What is still unclear, is 
whether the test should be regarded just as a set of (mandatory) requirements for national 
parliaments that codify their own national exceptions under their laws (i.e. requirements 
that all Member States were already compelled to comply with as a result of their adhesion 
to the Berne Convention and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights) or also (and most important) as a binding test for national courts when 
they evaluate and apply the exceptions stemming from Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive 
(Mazziotti, 2008). 
1.2.5.4 Copyright exceptions and contract law  
Unlike the Software and the Database Directives, the InfoSoc Directive does not provide that 
contractual provisions aimed at restricting the exercise of copyright exceptions should be 
deemed null or void.72 To the contrary, the Directive (cf. Recital 45) seems to encourage the 
contractual overriding of copyright exceptions insofar as it provides that exceptions “should 
not, however, prevent the definition of contractual relations designed to ensure fair 
compensation for the right-holders insofar as permitted by national law”. The absence of an 
explicit provision clarifying the legal status of copyright exceptions at the level of EU law, 
and in particular whether or not exceptions (or at least a few of them) should be regarded 
as non-waivable through contract, creates a situation of high uncertainty.  
1.2.5.5 Unintended harmonisation as a result of the CJEU’s case law 
Even though the harmonisation of exceptions and limitations was deliberately shaped as 
minimal at the EU level, the CJEU recently interpreted several exceptions in a way that 
                                                   
71 As shown below (see §4.2.1.), the aforementioned restrictive requirements pointed out by the 
Commission in the Follow-up for the enactment of harmonised copyright exceptions are drawn from 
the so-called ‘three-step test’ embodied in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention. 
72 For instance, the Software Directive states, ‘The making of a back-up copy by a person having a 
right to use the computer program may not be prevented by contract insofar as it is necessary for that 
use’ (Article 5(2)); and: ‘Any contractual provisions contrary to Article 6 or to the exceptions provided 
for in Article 5 (2) and (3) shall be null or void’ (Article 9(1)). In addition, Article 15 of the Database 
Directive (‘Binding nature of certain provisions’) reads, ‘Any contractual provision contrary to Article 
6(1) and 8 shall be null and void’ (Article 6 of the Database Directive provides exceptions to restricted 
acts with regard to databases protected by copyright; Article 8, instead, sets out rights and obligations 
of lawful users in relation to databases protected by the so-called sui generis right).  
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reflected their autonomous concepts under EU law and recognised their potential to protect 
the public interest. At the same time, in several judgments the CJEU had the opportunity to 
clarify that Article 5(5) of the Directive (i.e. the three-step test) should not be interpreted 
broadly, i.e. as a provision justifying an extension of the scope of the different exceptions and 
limitations.73  
Considering the low degree of harmonisation that EU lawmakers – deliberately – sought to 
achieve in this area of copyright, Member States maintained or transposed exceptions and 
limitations in their legal orders in a highly discretionary manner (see Section II.2.3 and 
Annex A). However, despite the flexibilities embodied in the wording of Article 5, the case 
law of the CJEU progressively acknowledged the necessity to preserve the harmonisation 
goal of the InfoSoc Directive and to restate, also in the area of copyright exceptions and 
limitations, the principle of unity and consistency of the EU acquis. This means that, for an 
increasingly relevant number of exceptions, the CJEU has restricted the room for manoeuvre 
that, under the text of the Directive, the Member States could take advantage of. 
The pro-harmonisation approach of the CJEU materialised in relation to classes of uses that 
Member States are not (or ‘no longer’) entitled to modify or make more restrictive in scope, 
after having decided whether or not to maintain or implement a given exception or 
limitation. Examples of unintended harmonisation concern provisions of Article 5 such as 
those on fair remuneration and private copying,74 quotations for purposes such as criticism 
and review (Eva-Maria Painer, par. 129-137), parody75 and on-site consultation for purposes 
of research or private study of copyright works held by publicly accessible libraries, 
educational establishments, museums and archives (Technische Universitat Darmstadt): 
 The fair remuneration that should be paid to copyright holders in order to compensate 
the economic harm they suffer from private copying of sound recordings and 
audiovisual works (cf. Article 5(2)(b)) was regarded in Padawan as an autonomous 
concept of EU law since the purpose of the InfoSoc Directive was that of ensuring a 
coherent application of the exceptions to the reproduction right at the EU level (Padawan, 
par. 33-35). The case concerned the indiscriminate application of copyright levies on all 
copying devices and blank media in Spain, irrespective of whether the purchaser was a 
private individual or a professional user.  
 In Eva-Maria Painer the CJEU interpreted the quotation exception as not precluding the 
Member States from applying this exception when the quotation of a copyright work is 
not made in a subsequent literary work (i.e. a ‘quoting work’) but in a mere press report. 
The case concerned the unauthorised publication of a portrait photograph by 
newspapers and magazines for a search of a kidnapped girl by the Austrian police in 
1998. The judgment is relevant since the InfoSoc Directive remains silent on this issue and 
the interpretation of the CJEU clarifies that the requirements set out under Article 5(3)(d) 
do not also include the incorporation of the quoted work into another literary work, as 
the copyright law of Member States, such as France, requires in order to confine the 
                                                   
73 See Infopaq, par. 58; C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard Verlags and Others (2011), par. 109; C-
435/12 ACI Adam and Others v. Stichting de Thuiskopie (2014), par. 26; C-117/13 Technische Universitat 
Darmstadt v. Eugen Ulmer (2014), par. 47; hereinafter Technische Universitat Darmstadt.  
74 See C-467/08 Padawan v. SGAE (2010), par. 33-35, hereinafter ‘Padawan’. 
75 C-201/13 Johan Deckmyn v. Helena Vandersteen and Others (2014), hereinafter ‘Deckmyn’. 
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exception to cases where an editorial intervention shows the intent of criticism and/or 
review by the user of the work (see Section II.2.3.6).76  
 In a case concerning the publication in Belgium of a calendar incorporating a political 
cartoon, which represented one of the main characters of a well-known comic book 
without the copyright holder’s consent, the CJEU did more than acknowledge that the 
parody exception (cf. Article 5(3)(k)) should be regarded as a unitary notion of EU law, as 
a result of the harmonisation goals of the Directive. In the absence of a definition under 
EU law of what a parody is, the CJEU filled the gap while holding that this notion should 
be determined in consideration of its meaning in everyday language, that is, a work 
whose essential elements are the evocation of an existing work in a noticeably different 
manner and the expression of humour or mockery (Deckmyn, par. 19-20). According to 
the Court, no additional requirement, apart from the above-mentioned elements, should 
be met for the unauthorised use to be lawful, on condition that the competent national 
court, after having considered all the circumstances of each case, finds that the 
implementation of the parody exception strikes a fair balance between the interests of the 
copyright holders and the freedom of expression of the user (par. 33-34).  
 Last but not least, the CJEU found that the exception allowing the consultation of 
copyright items by dedicated terminals on the premises of a library, educational 
establishment, museum or archive (cf. Article 5(3)(n)) should be interpreted as 
incorporating the permission for one of these institutions to digitise some of the works 
from its collections. The CJEU acknowledged that the strict character of the exception to 
the reproduction right embodied into Article 5(2)(c) (which refers to “specific acts of 
reproduction”) would make digitisation of the entire collections of copyright works held 
by these institutions unlawful. Nonetheless, the Court found that, for the on-site 
consultation exception to pursue its public interest mission, the provision should be 
regarded as incorporating an “ancillary right of dissemination” into its scope (Technische 
Universitat Darmstadt, par. 27 and 43-49). In the Technische Universitat Darmstadt v. Ulmer 
case, a German university library had digitised and made available a textbook contained 
in its collections to the benefit of students and researchers, who could then print out the 
book on paper or store a copy on a USB stick. The CJEU seized the opportunity to clarify 
that the exception at issue does not extend to the printing of a copyright work on paper 
or to its electronic storage (par. 50-57).77  
1.3 Legal protection of technological protection measures  
Measures of technological protection and so-called DRM systems have developed at an 
impressive pace and become even more sophisticated in recent years. In spite of such 
technological advancement, the complex set of measures enacted by the InfoSoc Directive in 
order to afford legal protection of the technologies used by copyright holders to restrict 
                                                   
76 According to Article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc Directive, quotations should refer to works that have 
already been lawfully made available to the public and must indicate the source and name of the 
author of the work, in accordance with fair practice and to the extent required by the specific purpose 
of the use.  
77 It is worth recalling that, on the grounds of the on-site consultation exception, the German 
Copyright Act (Article 52b) does not allow a library to make available a number of copies of a work 
that exceeds the number of copies the library has acquired in analogue format (see Annex A). 
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unauthorised uses of their works has not proven to be successful in all markets for copyright 
works. Whereas these technologies have been progressively abandoned in the digital music 
sector, they are still widely relied upon by the book and newspaper publishing industries.  
Articles 6 and 7 of the InfoSoc Directive sought to implement the international obligation 
embodied in Article 11 of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty. These provisions oblige Member 
States to outlaw: i) acts of circumvention of any technological measure and the removal or 
alteration of any rights management information carried out knowingly by any person (cf. 
Articles 6(1) and 7(1)(a)); ii) any act of manufacture and distribution of technologies which 
enable or facilitate circumvention of effective technological measures and the making 
available of copyrighted work whose electronic rights management information has been 
removed or altered without authority (cf. Articles 6(2) and 7(1)(b)).78  
In spite of their broad scope, the above-mentioned ‘anti-circumvention’ prohibitions failed to 
predict how control and rights management technologies would have developed in the years 
following the enactment of the Directive. Fifteen years after drafting the Directive, the 
definition of technological protection of copyright works from acts of circumvention (and 
from technologies aimed at enabling acts of unauthorised access) no longer reflects the 
functioning of the most developed systems of control and rights management, which 
blend functions of access- and copy-control with rights management information.  
In the same way as equivalent provisions under US law, the EU anti- circumvention rules 
were widely debated in both industry sectors and society.79 It was argued that the legal 
protection ensured by technological protection ended up granting copyright holders an 
unprecedented ‘access right’ over their works.80 Considering the way they were shaped, 
these provisions seemed to establish a wholly separate tort of unauthorised access to 
copyright works, having the effect of restricting users from bypassing technological 
measures irrespective of whether their intent is to infringe copyright or not. In short, the 
main objection that was raised with regard to these far-reaching provisions was that 
circumvention-related activities were outlawed with no link to copyright infringement, in 
a way that technological protection and a newly created access right could progressively 
replace copyright law and, even more important, prevail and restrict copyright exceptions 
                                                   
78 This type of regulation found a precedent in the EU in the law of the so-called ‘Conditional Access 
Directive’: see Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 
1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access, OJ, L 320, 
28.11.1998, 54. In a way fairly similar to that of prohibitions laid down in Articles 6(2) and 7(1)(b) of 
the InfoSoc Directive, Article 4 of the Conditional Access Directive required Member States to prohibit 
on their territories all activities regarding the manufacture, marketing, use, possession and 
communication of any equipment or software designed or adapted to give access to a protected 
service (e.g. television and radio broadcasting) without the authorisation of the service provider.  
79 Anti-circumvention provisions were enacted in the U.S. DMCA, which entered into force on 28 
October 1998 by adding Sections 1201 to 1205 to the U.S. Copyright Act (U.S. Code, Title 17). Section 
1201 (‘Circumvention of copyright protection systems’) contains two types of prohibitions very similar 
to the ones laid down in Article 6 of the InfoSoc Directive.  
80 In the US literature, for instance, see Ginsburg, J., who argued that the so-called ‘access right’, as 
codified now under Section 1201 of the U.S. Copyright Act, was implicitly pre-supposed by the 
existence, under copyright law, of the exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution (Ginsburg, 
2000). 
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and limitations.81 However, this was not the intent of the international copyright law 
provision the Directive intended to implement. Article 11 of the 1996 WIPO Copyright 
Treaty made it clear that circumvention torts should have been linked to an objective 
violation of copyright or of the rights related to copyright. As a negotiator of the 1996 WIPO 
Copyright Treaty on behalf of Member States, the Commission was fully aware of the fact 
that Article 11 of the Treaty immunised copyright exceptions from the operation of 
technological measures. Unsurprisingly, in the initial proposal of the Commission, anti-
circumvention law was designed to protect technological measures as long as they restricted 
or prevented copyright infringements.82 This link between anti-circumvention protection and 
copyright infringements was removed from the text of the Directive at a later stage, when the 
Commission and the European Council reached a Common Position in September 2000.83  
The possibility of obtaining legal protection for technological measures implemented in 
order to protect more than just access to (and use of) copyright works was recently 
questioned by a judgment of the CJEU in a case concerning the circumvention of technical 
restrictions of videogame consoles.84 In this judgment the Court showed the intent to ensure 
the application of a principle of proportionality for the protection of technological measures. 
Drawing on Recital 48, the Court held that Article 6(2) of the InfoSoc Directive should not 
have the effect of outlawing the manufacture and distribution of technologies that have a 
commercially significant purpose or use other than that of circumventing a technological 
protection (Nintendo v. PC Box par. 30). The CJEU stressed that the legal protection granted 
under Article 6 should not go beyond the purpose of restricting – with regard to copyright 
works – acts not authorised by the copyright holder (par. 31). A corollary of this conclusion is 
that equipment (such as the ‘mod-chips’ produced by PC Box) which allows deactivation of a 
technical measure installed by a videogame producer (like Nintendo) on its consoles to 
restrict the use of illegal copies of its works might be lawfully marketed if it is evidenced that 
the technology at issue is also used for legitimate purposes. It is still unclear, however, 
whether EU anti-circumvention law should leave users free to circumvent technical 
measures through the above-mentioned dual-use technologies insofar as the purpose of the 
use is not to infringe copyright but to enable non-infringing uses of the protected works or 
devices.85  
                                                   
81 See: ‘The anti-circumvention provisions are the most interesting battlefield between the traditional 
vision of the copyright law and the dictates of technology...The scope of copyright is no longer 
decided according to what the proper scope should be, but according to what technology can do’ 
(Vinje, 2000, p. 556; Dusollier, 2005, p. 202). 
82 See Article 6(2) of the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society, COM (97) 
of 10 December 1997, OJ, C 108, 7.04.1998, p. 6.  
83 Whereas the position initially expressed by the Commission sought to preserve the vitality of 
copyright exceptions, several amendments coming from the Parliament extended the restrictive 
position adopted with regard to digital private copying to all other exceptions: see Common Position 
(EC) 48/2000 of 28 September 2000, OJ C 344, 1.12.2000, 1.  
84 See C-355/12 Nintendo v. PC Box (2014).  
85 PC Box argued that the actual purpose pursued by Nintendo through its technical measures was to 
prevent use of independent software which enables consoles to read MP3 files, movies and videos, 
giving users the possibility of using such consoles to a full extent: see Nintendo v. PC Box, par. 14-15.  
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As shown by Article 6(4), the Directive shaped the protection of TPM in a way that these 
measures can legitimately restrict the exercise of copyright exceptions. Only beneficiaries of a 
closed number of heterogeneous exceptions are expected to take advantage of a mechanism 
aimed at shielding copyright exceptions from the operation of TPM.86 For the exercise of 
these exceptions to be effectively guaranteed, the Directive obliges Member States to monitor 
and evaluate whether right-holders take voluntary measures (including agreements between 
right-holders and other parties concerned) in order to place the beneficiary of those 
exceptions in a position to benefit from each of them. A subsidiary obligation for Member 
States to intervene with ‘appropriate measures’ subsists when right-holders fail to provide 
effective means that enable beneficiaries to take advantage of one of those privileged 
exceptions.87 
In spite of its detailed character, the system of safety nets adopted by the Directive under 
Article 6(4) was not designed to have a broad application. Firstly, the Directive provides 
that only users who have already accessed copyrighted works (i.e. lawful users) must be given 
the technical means to benefit from the mentioned exceptions. This means that the Directive 
enables just the lawful buyers of copyrighted works, who have already accessed the work – 
and not the general public – to exercise the few exceptions they are entitled to benefit from. 
Secondly, the Member States are not obliged to monitor and ensure the availability of 
technical means to exercise certain exceptions when copyrighted works are made available to 
the public through interactive on-demand services.88  
The very narrow scope of application of this mechanism evidences a clear intent of the 
InfoSoc Directive to restrict considerably the enforcement of copyright exceptions in light of 
their increased economic impact in the new electronic environment (cf. Recital 44). This is a 
solution that, as explicitly provided under Recital 50 of the Directive, does not apply to 
computer programmes, whose technological measures should be protected without 
prejudice to the exercise of the (mandatory) exceptions under Articles 5 and 6 of the EU 
Software Directive.89  
                                                   
86 This list of exceptions includes acts of copying by libraries, educational establishments or museums, 
ephemeral recordings made by broadcasters, copying of broadcasts made by non-commercial social 
institutions, photocopying, quotations for teaching or scientific purposes, and uses for the benefit of 
people with a disability (cf. Article 6.4). 
87 Whereas Member States are obliged to take safeguard measures in order to ensure the availability of 
these exceptions, they are given the mere option to take such measures for the sake of the private 
copying exception, where this exception proves to be entrenched by the operation of a technical 
measure (cf. Article 6(4), §2).  
88 See Article 6(4), §4 (‘…shall not apply to works or other subject-matter made available to the public 
on agreed contractual terms in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by them’). 
89 Article 7 of the Software Directive, which provides that the legal protection granted under national 
law to technological measures applied to computer programmes should be without prejudice to the 
exceptions aimed an permitting back-up copies, uses aimed at observing, studying and testing the 
functioning of a programme, and so-called reverse engineering of a programme code for the creation 
of interoperable programs (cf. Articles 5 and 6).  
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1.4 Sanctions and remedies 
The InfoSoc Directive obliges the EU Member States to provide appropriate sanctions and 
remedies in respect of infringements of the rights and obligations set out in the Directive.90 In 
particular, Article 8(3) obliges Member States to make sure that right-holders are in a 
position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third 
party to infringe a copyright or related right. This is by far one of the most controversial 
provisions in the whole Directive. Recital 59 seeks to clarify the exact meaning of the 
provision by pointing out that, in the digital environment, third parties may increasingly use 
the services of intermediaries for infringing activities. This Recital specifies that copyright 
holders should have the possibility of applying for an injunction against an intermediary 
who carries a third party’s infringement of a protected work. The Directive left the Member 
States with the freedom to set out the conditions and modalities related to such injunctions, 
making it clear that an injunction against intermediaries should become available also where 
the acts carried out by the intermediary are exempted from liability under Article 5 of the 
Directive.  
In the current debate about online copyright enforcement in Europe, the creative industries 
(in particular film producers) have claimed that Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive has not 
(yet) been implemented effectively and uniformly throughout the EU (Mazziotti, 2013). The 
copyright industry argues that injunctions against online intermediaries should be available 
irrespective of the intermediary’s liability for the infringing acts carried out by users of its 
platform or infrastructure. Content producers claim that, in spite of such a duty of 
cooperation, ISPs and online intermediaries have been very reluctant to help them put an 
end to infringements. As a result of lack of cooperation, legal actions have been undertaken 
before national courts with different and contradictory results across Europe.  
The CJEU has made it clear that injunctions aimed at blocking access to infringing materials 
should pass a proportionality test in order to ensure a fair balance with the online 
intermediary’s freedom to conduct a business and other fundamental rights. The recognition 
of such a freedom for an online intermediary was a key part of the reasoning of the CJEU in 
judgments such as Scarlet Extended v. SABAM and SABAM v. Netlog.91 In these cases the 
Court was asked to review the compatibility with EU law of injunctions that would have 
obliged, respectively, an ISP (Scarlet) and the deviser of a social network (Netlog) to install, 
at their own expense, filtering technologies that the Court viewed as excessively costly and 
complicated enforcement measures. Such technologies should have aimed at disabling access 
by users of the intermediary’s services to the Belgian collecting society’s musical repertoire. 
To acknowledge the existence of such a limit to injunctions ex Article 8(3), the CJEU did not 
rely on the provision of Article 8(1) of the InfoSoc Directive, according to which sanctions 
should be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”. Rather, the CJEU developed a principle 
of proportionality on the grounds of Article 15 of the e-Commerce Directive (which does not 
allow Member States to impose duties of online monitoring on ISPs) and, even more 
                                                   
90 Article 8(2) provides that each Member State shall take the measures necessary to ensure that 
copyright holders whose interests are affected by infringing activities carried out on its territory can 
bring an action for damages and/or apply for an injunction and, where appropriate, for the seizure of 
infringing material as well as of devices, products or components enabling acts of circumvention of 
TPM. 
91 See C-70/10 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM (2011); C-360/10 SABAM v. Netlog (2012).  
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important, in consideration of the requirements laid down in Article 3 of IPRED.92 This 
reference is somehow surprising if one considers that Article 3 of the IPRED makes no 
mention of online intermediaries. This provision was introduced into EU law in order to re-
state the principle laid down under Article 41(2) of The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights93, which clarifies that enforcement measures should not be 
“unnecessarily complicated or costly”, to the benefit of intellectual property rights holders. 
In a subsequent judgment, UPC Telekabel v. Constantin Film and Wega 
Filmproduktiongesellschaft, the CJEU took a step further holding that, for a blocking measure 
to be fair and proportionate, an ISP (UPC Telekabel) should remain free to decide what the 
best means to be used against online infringements are.94 If specific measures (e.g. targeted at 
an infringing site’s domain name and at its current Internet Protocol address) had to be 
ordered by a court, the online intermediary would be deprived of the freedom to opt for the 
means that are best suited to its resources and abilities and which do not end up restricting, 
in a disproportionate way (i.e. over-blocking), the user’s freedom to access unprotected 
information (par. 51-56).  
1.5 On the current efficiency of the EU copyright system  
As briefly recalled above, with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and the enactment 
of Article 118 TFEU, the EU acquired a direct competence to develop a genuinely pan-
European copyright system through the adoption of an EU regulation. A unified copyright 
system – in principle – would be the easiest and most efficient way to establish a truly 
common market for copyright works, especially in a borderless environment such as the 
Internet and, more generally, digital networks. However, the EU has a long way to go in 
order to create a uniform copyright system, especially if one considers the non-negligible 
distance that still persists, in terms of substantive law, between common law and droit 
d’auteur national systems, and the various barriers, costs and burdens that national 
regulations also raise in the digital environment. 
This Section briefly explores the inefficiencies of and obstacles to the free circulation of 
copyright works in the Internal Market by the principle of territoriality of copyright, and the 
territorial dimension of collective rights management, the implementation of disparate 
copyright levy systems, and the lack of clarity on the scope of copyright in the various 
Member States.  
                                                   
92 See Scarlet v. SABAM, par. 36, and SABAM v. Netlog, par. 34, where the CJEU emphasised that the 
requested injunctions would have required the online intermediary to actively monitor all the data of 
each of its subscribers in order to prevent future infringements (in violation of Article 15 of the e-
Commerce Directive). To that end, the ISP should have implemented measures that would have 
conflicted with Article 3 of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights (hereinafter ‘IPRED’), while not being 
fair and proportionate and raising excessive costs.  
93 See The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_05_e.htm 
94 See C-314/12 UPC Telekabel v. Constantin Film and Wega Filmproduktiongesellschaft (2014).   
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1.5.1 Principle of territoriality and collective rights management  
In the architecture of the InfoSoc Directive, the exclusive rights whose scope was expanded 
and adapted to the digital environment remained firmly territorial. There is no provision in 
that Directive which restricts the possibility for copyright holders of exercising and enforcing 
their rights on a strict country-by-country basis. Considering how many relevant aspects of 
copyright law were left outside the scope of the InfoSoc Directive (and are still regulated 
under distinct national laws), it was somehow inevitable that the exercise and licensing of 
national entitlements could end up partitioning the markets for online content services.  
One of the very first attempts to target what today is known as ‘geo-blocking’ was an 
antitrust investigation launched by the EU Commission against Apple Inc. and the major 
record companies operating in Europe. The Commission took the view that the territorial 
sales restrictions embodied in the licensing agreements between Apple and each record 
company violated Article 81 TEC.95 According to the Commission’s statement of objections, 
the outcome of these agreements was the restriction of the consumer choice of where to buy 
digital music, what music to buy and at what price.96  
At an earlier stage the Commission had already started targeting a cause of territorial 
restrictions that the EU eventually sought to remove (or at least to reduce) through the 
adoption of Directive on collective management of copyright. The origin of this Directive lies 
in a 2004 Communication on “The Management of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Internal Market” through which the Commission questioned whether, in this context, “it 
should be left for the market to develop Community-wide licensing further, while respecting 
the basic rules of intellectual property protection, including its territorial nature, or whether 
the Community legislator should seek to facilitate greater Community wide licensing”.97 A 
year later, the Commission accelerated the pursuit of this objective with specific regard to the 
recently emerged market for online music services through the adoption of a 
Recommendation of 18 October 2005 on collective cross-border management of copyright 
and related rights for legitimate online music services.98 The 2005 Recommendation sought 
to trigger a radical change of the existing licensing structures in the online music sector. The 
Commission argued that the territorial restrictions stemming from reciprocal representation 
agreements concluded by national collecting societies were contrary to the logic of the EU 
common market.99 Under those agreements, collecting societies have traditionally 
                                                   
95 See Commission of the European Communities, Competition: European Commission confirms 
sending a Statement of Objections against alleged territorial restrictions in online music sales to major 
record companies and Apple, Press releases, Brussels, 3 of April 2007. 
96 Apple Inc. (iTunes) could easily verify the condition of the country of residence thanks to the 
compulsory requirement that consumers’ payments took place through either debit or credit cards 
linked to bank accounts based in their country of residence. 
97 See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council, the European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, The Management 
of Copyright and Related Rights in the Internal Market, COM/2004/0261 final (see in particular Sect. 1.2.4: 
‘The Call for Community-wide Licensing’).  
98 See Commission Recommendation on collective cross-border management of copyright and related 
rights for legitimate online music services of 18 October 2005, OJ L 276, 21.10.2005, pp. 54-57. 
99 See Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment reforming cross-border collective 
management of copyright and related rights for legitimate online music services, Brussels 11.10.2005. 
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administered, along with their own national repertoires, the repertoire of the affiliated, 
foreign collecting societies in their countries of establishment and operation.100 The main 
assumption in the 2005 Recommendation was that, in the European Economic Area (EEA), 
the territorial restrictions embodied in those contracts prohibited collective rights managers 
from licensing their repertoires outside their (national) territory of activity. The Commission, 
instead, intended to promote the adoption of a multi-territorial licensing policy that 
corresponded to the ubiquity of the online environment. In particular, the Commission 
sought to soften the burden of commercial users of digital music, who had to negotiate in 
every Member State with each of the respective collective rights managers for each right that 
must be cleared for online exploitations (i.e. the rights of reproduction and communication to 
the public) in order to be entitled to provide their services in the whole EU.   
The plan the Commission started developing in 2004 for the purpose of removing (or at least 
reducing) barriers stemming from strictly national collective rights management became 
effective, one decade later, with the adoption of Directive on collective management of 
copyright.101 This Directive grants now individual right-holders the right to entrust the 
management of any of the rights, categories of rights or types of works of their choice, for the 
territories of their choice, to a collective rights management organisation, irrespective of 
                                                   
100 The function of mutual representation agreements is addressed by the October 2005 Commission 
Working Document, op. cit., p. 6: ‘[I]n the traditional system of managing copyright and related rights, 
if copyright works are accessible in another territory, the society active in that territory (the “affiliated 
society”) normally enters into reciprocal representation agreement with the collective rights Managers 
that holds the repertoire on behalf of the right-holder…’ The same document, at p. 9, ft. 16, recalls that 
the Santiago and Barcelona agreements, referring respectively to the collective management of the 
right of communication to the public and of the reproduction rights, were not renewed by collecting 
societies of the EEA on the assumption that the European Commission was highly critical of the so-
called ‘economic residence’ clause in them. 
101 It is worth recalling that, before the adoption of Directive 2014/26 on collective management of 
copyright, through an antitrust decision of 2008 (known as the ‘CISAC’ decision, from the name of the 
international umbrella association of collecting societies) the EU Commission had found the clauses of 
territorial exclusivity and the membership requirement of economic residence embodied in the 
reciprocal representation agreements illegal because of their nature of cartels restricting competition in 
the EU market for services of collective management: see Commission Decision Relating to a 
Proceeding Under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement, C(2008) 3435 final, 
16 July 2008. The Commission decision did not call into question the very existence of reciprocal 
representation agreements: the decision solely concerned the exploitation of copyright via the Internet, 
satellite and cable retransmission. Moreover, the decision prohibited clauses restricting authors’ 
ability to freely join the collecting society of their choice and clauses having the effect of providing all 
collecting societies, in their territory of establishment, with absolute territorial protection against other 
collecting societies as far as the grant of licences to commercial users was concerned. Interestingly, a 
much later judgment of the General Court of the European Union (see T-442/08 CISAC v. Commission, 
and all related/joined cases, 12 April 2013) in the action brought by the addressees of the CISAC 
decision (i.e. most of the EEA collecting societies and CISAC itself), while upholding the legal 
interpretation of the Commission with regard to the membership and exclusivity clauses, annulled the 
Commission’s decision in respect of the finding of the concerted practice. In that respect, the General 
Court considered that the Commission had not provided sufficient evidence with regard to the 
existence of a cartel regarding the territorial scope of the mandates that collecting societies grant each 
other. In addition, the reasoning of the Commission did not render implausible the explanation that 
the parallel conduct of collecting societies was not the result of a cartel, but rather of the need to fight 
effectively against the unauthorised use of musical works. 
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nationality, residence or establishment of either the organisation or the right-holder (Article 
5(2)). In addition to that, the Directive seeks to establish a common level playing field for 
collective rights management organisations in order to enhance the degree of their efficiency 
and transparency. Moreover, in the specific domain of online music services, the Directive 
seeks to combine the goal of fostering competition on the market for rights management 
services with the objective to preserve EU-wide access to diverse musical repertoires and to 
facilitate aggregation of different repertoires on online content platforms. To do so, the 
Directive creates a mechanism (so-called ‘tag-on’ regime) under which each society which 
has an EU online licensing ‘passport’ for the issuance of multi-territorial licences has an 
obligation, in the absence of a voluntary representation agreement, to represent the 
repertoire and the rights of a society without such a passport.102 The tag-on regime is 
expected to give societies a strong incentive to create voluntary rights management ‘hubs’ 
since it requires the requested society, in the absence of an agreement between them, to 
license the repertoires of the requesting society under the same conditions as those that it 
applies to its own repertoire and to include such a repertoire in all of its offerings to online 
service providers.  
1.5.2 Procedures, regulatory and administrative burdens related to private copying 
levies 
The provisions of the InfoSoc Directive concerning the exceptions of reprography and 
private copying are certainly the biggest source of regulatory and administrative burdens 
in the domain of EU copyright law. The Directive provides that these exceptions should 
confer a recompense to copyright holders in the form of a remuneration right. The Directive 
provides that the level of this compensation should take account of the presence and 
operation of technological measures.103  
Articles 5(2)(a) and 5(2)(b) of the Directive have actually enabled Member States to maintain 
or introduce national levy systems under which national law is free to determine the form, 
detailed arrangement and possible level of fair compensation, on the condition that Member 
States carefully evaluate, among other circumstances, whether private copying causes harm 
to right-holders or not (Recital 35). The fact that national levies on digital copying equipment 
and digital media were proliferating without any control and to the detriment of the Internal 
Market has been evident since 2005.104 The idea of a copyright levy reform in the EU was 
                                                   
102 As laid down under Article 30 (cf. also Article 23), in order to be permitted to issue licences for pan-
European or cross-border digital uses, collecting societies should meet a number of requirements 
(known as ‘European Licensing Passport’). These requirements are all of a technical nature and 
impose high standards of service when it comes to processing the data needed for the exploitation of 
the licences, identifying the licensed repertoires through time-sensitive and authoritative databases, 
processing usage reports and invoicing, and so on (cf. Articles 24-28).  
103 The InfoSoc Directive defines private copying as copying made by “…a natural person and for ends 
that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, on condition that the right-holders receive fair 
compensation which takes account of the application or non-application of technological measures 
referred to in Article 6 to the work or subject-matter concerned…”: see Article 5(2)(b) of the InfoSoc 
Directive. See also Recital 35, in fine. 
104 See the speech given by Charles McCreevy (European Commissioner for Internal Market and 
Services), Address to the European-American Business Council/Business Software Alliance Conference on 
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already enshrined in a Roadmap document in 2006 in which the Commission evidenced that 
levies were unequally applied in terms of equipment, media and amounts across EU 
Member States and that there was a lack of transparency in relation to their collection and 
distribution. From 2006 a number of initiatives and stakeholder consultations have been 
undertaken, the last of which was a mediation process launched in April 2012 that drew 
upon a draft Memorandum of Understanding (2009) achieved under the shield of the 
Commission and was brought to an end with the release of recommendations by the 
European Mediator, Antonio Vitorino, in January 2013.105  
Whereas the vast majority of the Member States has provided compensation to right-holders 
through the creation of levy systems, others follow the ‘de minimis’ rule to exempt the 
application of levies (e.g. the UK and Ireland in general and France and The Netherlands in 
the field of reprography) and still others (e.g. Spain and Norway) provide compensation in 
the form of public budget funding.  
Significant barriers and distortions to cross-border trade within the Internal Market have 
emerged from the disparate national versions of levy systems.106 One of the most evident 
problems is raised by the fact that the existing levy systems have not been conceived in a 
way that levies are collected just once in cross-border transactions. The fact that, in most 
Member States that have a levy system in force, levies are paid to collecting societies by 
manufacturers and importers in both the country of origin (or import) and in the country of 
destination of the products has inevitably resulted in double payments. Moreover, the fact 
that levies are paid at the manufacturer’s or importer’s level means also that it is practically 
impossible to distinguish between categories of final buyers of levied products and to 
effectively avoid undue payments by users other than natural persons (i.e. professional or 
business users), who are not obliged to pay levies. Last but not least, the fact that a 
significant portion of products subject to levies are sold to professional users raises the 
complex issue of either ex ante exemptions or reimbursements aimed at preventing undue 
payments.  
None of the provisions of the InfoSoc Directive dealt with the above-mentioned issues. It 
was, once again, the CJEU that clarified and eventually clarified several uncertainties.  
1.5.2.1 Unitary notion of ‘fair compensation’ 
First of all, the Court held that, although it is open to the Member States to determine 
whether or not a private copying exception should be transposed into their national laws, 
‘fair compensation’ is an autonomous concept of EU law and should be interpreted uniformly 
in all Member States where this exception exists (Padawan, par. 33-34). This means that, 
irrespective of the levy system or State fund each Member State opts for, national lawmakers 
                                                                                                                                                               
Digital Rights’ Management, High level Industry Seminar/Global Industry Roundtable on Levies and 
DRMs, Brussels, 12 October 2005. 
105 See European Commission, Private copying levies, 
at:http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/levy_reform/index_en.htm. 
106 It seems worth recalling that, from the perspective of the TFEU, these barriers could be regarded as 
compatible with Article 36 TFEU insofar as fair compensation for private copying were deemed to 
form part of the specific subject matter of copyright and, as a result, constituted a justified restriction 
to free movement of goods (cf. Article 34 TFEU). 
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are obliged to ensure consistency and uniformity in the way they compensate right-holders 
on the grounds of the harm they suffer from private copying. If that were not the case – as 
the CJEU held in the Padawan judgment (par. 35-36) – levy systems would prove to be 
incompatible with EU law insofar as they stifled the achievement of the main goal of 
Directive 2001/29/EC (i.e. harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright law and creation of 
undistorted conditions of competition that arise from different national provisions). 
1.5.2.2 Liability to pay levies 
The CJEU clarified also that the liability to pay fair compensation rests on the private end-
users and the system of levies funded by the manufacturers or importers has been adopted 
for mere practical reasons (“where it is impossible to ensure recovery of the fair 
compensation from the purchasers”).107 As the CJEU stressed, a system of levies to be paid 
by those who make the devices available to consumers is legitimate insofar as it is 
possible for manufacturers and importers to pass the levy to the private end-users as part 
of the price of the product (Padawan, par. 45-50, and Stichting de Thuiskopie, par. 29). The 
Padawan judgment held that there must be a necessary link between the application of 
copyright levies to digital devices and their use for private copying and that the 
indiscriminate application of private copying levies to all devices – including products sold 
to persons other than natural persons (e.g. professional users) – does not comply with Article 
5(2) of the InfoSoc Directive (Padawan, par. 53).  
1.5.2.3 Where should levies be paid for cross-border sales? 
To solve the problem of undue or double payments, the CJEU found that in cross-border 
sales the levy should be paid just in the country where the final user resides, as this is the 
country where the harm caused by private copying occurs.108 Moreover, the CJEU indicated 
its preference for the implementation of ex ante exemptions of business users from the 
payment of private copying levies rather than reimbursement systems. The CJEU also held 
that reimbursements can replace such ex ante exoneration only if: i) reimbursements are not 
made excessively difficult; and ii) practical difficulties exist for the exoneration (Amazon, par. 
34-37).  
1.5.2.4 Applicability of levies when right-holders have licensed private copying  
Another relevant source of uncertainty concerns the applicability of levies and the related 
obligations and procedures when the copyright holders authorise (and control, through 
technological measures) private copying. By foreseeing the repeal of levies as a result of the 
progressive development of licensing systems, Article 5(2)(b) of the InfoSoc Directive clearly 
expresses a preference for the adoption of contractual arrangements vis-à-vis copyright 
exceptions in the online world. This policy choice is upheld by the fact that Article 6(4) also 
ensures that Member States do not render exceptions applicable in the context of on-demand 
content deliveries, where a license concluded by the service provider with the end-user 
                                                   
107 See C-462/09 Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies Deutschland (2011), par. 41.  
108 See C-462/09 Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies Deutschland (2011), par. 36-41; C-521/11, 
Amazon v. Austro Mechana (2013), par. 57-61, hereinafter ‘Amazon’. 
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authorises and covers private copying, leaving no room for levies and, as a result, for double 
payments.  
The main principle the Directive relies on is that, whenever the copyright holder authorises 
the copying of his works, copying cannot be subject to any additional form of compensation. 
If levies were applied in the context of online services that have already been licensed by 
copyright holders, consumers would end up paying twice, i.e. they would bear the cost of a 
levy after having paid a subscription fee in order to access the service. From a legal point of 
view, the private copying exception only applies in circumstances where right-holders 
cannot practically authorise the relevant acts in exercising their exclusive rights. The fact that 
licensing opportunities should be deemed to prevent the application of the private copying 
exception when content is delivered on-demand is explicitly mentioned in the InfoSoc 
Directive.109 This means that, wherever a right-holder authorises an activity in exercising 
his/her reproduction rights, no claim for fair compensation can arise since the person 
performing that activity (i.e. the subscriber of an online content service) is a licensee, and not 
a person making private copies under an exception.  
Despite the clarity of the above-mentioned provisions, the case law of the CJEU has raised 
uncertainties on this issue, unfortunately. Initially, in the Padawan judgment the CJEU held 
that fair compensation occurs only when private copies are made without the authorisation 
of the right-holders, as the InfoSoc Directive seems to suggest (par. 39, 40 and 45). A similar 
statement can be found in the subsequent Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies Deutschland 
judgment (par. 24, 26 and 35). Subsequently, the Court took a different view while delivering 
two judgments in VG Wort v. Kyocera and Others110 and Copydan v. Nokia Danmark,111 where it 
held that the right-holders’ authorisation (i.e. licence) of private copying has no effect on the 
obligation to pay fair compensation. According to the CJEU, Member States retain the 
freedom, under the Directive, to introduce an exception to the right of reproduction, for 
which they are requested to provide a system of fair compensation to right-holders. Once 
such an exception has been introduced under national law, the exception deprives 
copyright holders of the right to authorise private copying, in a way that any authorising 
act has no impact on the harm that copyright levies are expected to compensate.112  
1.5.2.5 Proliferation and an unequal application of levies 
It seems evident that the uncertainties that neither the InfoSoc Directive nor the case law of 
the CJEU has been able to bring to an end have facilitated a rapid proliferation and an 
unequal application of levies on digital copying equipment and media. Uncertainties and 
disparities concern also the amounts collected across Member States, with a subsequent 
fragmentation of markets at national level for all products subject to a levy (see Section 
II.2.3.9). In this respect, it is worth recalling that the CJEU clarified that the obligation to pay 
                                                   
109 See Article 6(4) and Recitals 35 and 45, where the InfoSoc Directive provides that statutory 
exceptions should not endanger the conclusion of licensing contracts and that no additional 
compensation payment should exist in case of licensing – either because a separate payment has 
occurred or since authorisation implies that there is no or minimal harm.  
110 See joined Cases C-457/11 to C-460/11 VG Wort v. Kyocera and Others (2013), par. 37-40. 
111 See C-435/12 Copydan v. Nokia Danmark (2015), par. 65-67.  
112 See also VG Wort v. Kyocera and Others, par. 37.  
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fair compensation arises just in relation to private copies of lawfully acquired works, and not 
with regard to copies made using unlawful sources (e.g. file-sharing content).113 This means 
that Member States are not entitled to provide fair compensation with regard to such copies, 
nor to make them fall within the scope of the private copying exception.   
1.5.3 Is lack of clarity on copyright’s scope a barrier to innovation? The examples 
of online news aggregation and text and data mining  
As things stand, in many EU jurisdictions it is still very unclear whether certain classes of 
economically relevant digital uses fall within the (broad) scope of copyright. What 
characterises certain technology-enabled uses is the automatic processing of creative works 
for purposes that have little to do with traditional forms of exploitation of these works. 
Considering the very broad scope of the right of digital reproduction, for these uses to fall 
outside of the copyright scope an exception or limitation would have to be applicable. Under 
the InfoSoc Directive, because of the low harmonisation of copyright exceptions and in 
consideration of their exhaustive character, the legal treatment of new categories of uses of 
copyright materials may easily diverge on the grounds of the applicable national laws. 
Moreover, the fact that the InfoSoc Directive was drafted at a time when the Internet and 
digital technologies were still in their infancy makes it difficult to apply old-fashioned 
categories of exceptions to new types of uses.  
1.5.3.1 Online news aggregation and the emergence of ancillary rights in favour of press 
publishers 
A good example of digital uses whose exemption from copyright is difficult to assess is the 
automatic processing of newspaper articles and the online display of portions of such works 
performed by search engines and online news aggregators. Under the laws of the Member 
States that have preserved the technology-neutral wording of the InfoSoc Directive on 
exceptions, the above-mentioned reproductions could be regarded as quotations of copyright 
works (Hugenholtz & Senftleben, 2011). This may happen in the Netherlands and in the 
Nordic countries, where quotations and uses for purposes of news reporting are, in their 
statutory definitions, not linked to purposes of criticism and review.114  
In other Member States where national laws set out such additional requirements for the 
quotation exception, online news aggregation services can easily be found to infringe 
copyright. For instance, in 2011 the Brussels Court of Appeal found that the news extracts 
displayed by Google News, in the absence of human intervention in the creation of its daily 
press review, could not be regarded as ‘quotations’ for purposes of criticism, review, 
education and research under Belgian law.115 
More recently, considering that the aggregation of online copyright content available online 
without the authorisation of the copyright holder would give rise to an infringement, 
                                                   
113 C-435/12 ACI Adam v. Stichting de Thuiskopie (2014), par. 54-58; Copydan v Nokia, par. 74-79.  
114 Ibid.  
115 Cf. Article 21, Sect 1, Belgian Copyright Act; see Court of Appeal of Brussels (9th Chamber), C-
2007/AR/1730, Google Inc v. Copiepresse, Judgment of 5 May 2011.  
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Germany and Spain introduced new ancillary rights in favour of press publishers.116 Even 
though these national provisions and the related rights are shaped in a different way, both 
end up obliging online commercial users of news products to pay compensation to their 
respective publishers. The Spanish ancillary right is conceived as a statutory limitation that 
authorises the aggregation of news and other online contents subject to a non-waivable 
equitable compensation. The German ancillary right is shaped as an exclusive right to make 
‘press products’ (or parts thereof) available to the public for commercial purposes 
(Xalabarder, 2014). 
1.5.3.2 Text and data mining 
Automated processing of copyright works occur also for purposes of text and data mining, 
computational analysis on texts and automated extraction of data. These uses are undertaken 
by machines to the benefit of machines and for reasons that are not (directly) associated with 
enjoyment and consumption of works by humans. These activities – in the context of which 
copyright materials are treated not as ‘works’ but as (mere) data – might be beneficial for the 
extraction, collection and reuse of vast amounts of useful information. So-called ‘non-
display’ uses of literary works in the context of large-scale book digitisation projects provide 
a very good example of such uses.117 It is still uncertain, for instance, whether the 
unauthorised scanning and digitisation of literary works which are not displayed to users 
but are merely used for purposes of data118 and text mining119 infringe copyright or not.120  
Considering that text and data mining entails a temporary reproduction of copyright works, 
as a technical necessity, the issue is whether or not such a reproduction should be regarded 
as transient or incidental under the mandatory exception of Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc 
Directive. Recently, in Public Relations Consultants Association v. Newspaper Licensing Agency 
and Others, the CJEU had the opportunity to clarify the scope of application of this exception 
                                                   
116 See, respectively, Article 87f of the 1965 German Copyright Act (as amended in 2013) and Article 32 
(Quotation illustration for educational purposes) of the Spanish Intellectual Property Act 1/1996 (as 
amended in 2014).  
117 In computer sciences ‘data mining’ is defined as the extraction of implicit, previously unknown, 
and potentially useful information from data (Borghi & Karapapa, 2011). ‘Text mining’ is the process 
of text analysis in order to extract information that is useful for particular purposes (Witten & Frank, 
2005). 
118 ‘Data mining’ is normally referred to as the extraction of implicit, previously unknown, and 
potentially useful information from data. Data mining is in many ways conceptually similar to 
‘reading’ and ‘research’. It is a way for software to perform tasks such as reading, comparing and 
analysing large quantities of data in order to draw conclusions. It has become a ‘copyright suspect’ 
since the above-mentioned tasks are achieved through technology.  
119 ‘Text mining’ indicates finding structural patterns in texts, extracting information out of these 
patterns and combining them with data on the use of works such as data on searching and accessing 
works.  
120 On automated text processing and data mining Borghi & Karapapa point out that automated data 
processing can pursue commercially valuable objectives such as data analysis, sophisticated text 
analysis (e.g. the content of a book or the whole production of a specific author), analysis of metadata 
on patterns of use of digital copies (e.g. to create databases of user profiles) and computational 
analysis (which includes image analysis and text extraction, linguistic analysis and automatic 
translation and indexing and search) (Borghi & Karapapa, 2013). 
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in a case concerning the unauthorised on-screen copies and cached copies made in the 
context of an online media monitoring service.121 The CJEU considered that the copies made 
in order to send emails containing the headlines of online articles, hyperlinks to the 
publishers’ websites and short extracts of the articles themselves to the service subscribers 
were temporary, transient and an integral part of the technological process (i.e. the online 
receipt of the press reports), as prescribed by Article 5(1).122 This means that the mere 
copying and viewing of the copyright works did not infringe the publisher’s copyright, since 
these acts were a technical necessity for the service providers to deliver its online reports 
after having obtained a web database license from the newspaper publishers’ association. 
Despite the relevance of this judgment, it has to be seen whether and how courts, in the 
absence of ad hoc legislative provisions, will extend such a conclusion to the realm of text and 
data mining, where the volatility of the copies of protected works has a different 
technological dimension.  
At a time when the European Commission had not even started taking into consideration a 
possible reform of copyright exceptions under the InfoSoc Directive, Member States such as 
the UK started developing a comprehensive reform plan that resulted, in 2014, in the 
enactment of new copyright exceptions that included an exception covering text and data 
mining for non-commercial research.123 This reform was developed in response to a public 
consultation launched by the UK government124 and to the policy recommendations 
embodied into the Hargreaves Review of May 2011 (Hargreaves, 2011). UK law allows 
researchers to make copies of any copyright works for the purpose of computational analysis 
if they already have lawful access to the copyright work, without having to obtain additional 
permission from the copyright holder to make the necessary copies. 
While the UK was developing its reform plan on new copyright exceptions, the European 
Commission developed a multi-stakeholder dialogue in Brussels (‘Licences for Europe’) with 
the intent to explore standard licensing models that could have facilitated access to, and use 
of, data. The premise of this dialogue seemed to be that data mining requires an additional 
copyright licence on top of the licence to access the copyright works. For technology 
companies, if additional licenses were required, copyright would inevitably extend to facts 
and data embodied in the works (e.g. scientific journal articles) that technologies used by 
researchers have to copy in large quantities in order to be able to analyse patterns, trends 
and other useful information. The publishing industry, instead, can ultimately rely on the 
protection of non-original databases through a sui generis exclusive right granted under 
Article 7 of the 1996 Database Directive. This right ends up protecting mere aggregation of 
                                                   
121 C-360/13 Public Relations Consultants Association v. Newspaper Licensing Agency and Others (2014). 
122 See Public Relations Consultants Association v. Newspaper Licensing Agency, par. 29-33 (arguing that 
the copies at issue were temporary since they were created and then deleted by the process used to 
view websites); par. 34-38 (arguing that without making temporary copies browsing would not 
function properly on the Internet) and par. 40 (where the CJEU recalled that a reproduction is 
transient if its duration is limited to what is necessary for the an automated process to be put to an 
end).  
123 See UK Intellectual Property Office (2012), Modernising Copyright: A modern, robust and flexible 
framework, 20 December, p. 16. Other areas in which the document announced legislative intervention 
are educational uses, quotation, parody, research and private study, disabilities, preservation, public 
administration and reporting.  
124 See Ibid. 
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data on condition that a database has required a substantial investment. This prerogative 
might easily come into play and legitimately restrict text and data mining since publishers 
can be easily regarded as makers of databases who are entitled to prevent extraction and 
reuse of the whole (or of a substantial part of) the database. This legal barrier might be easily 
raised since, unlike the EU Software Directive, the Database Directive does not grant lawful 
users of protected works a number of non-waivable exceptions pursuing the goals of 
freedom of research and study and competition in downstream markets.125  
1.6 Interplay between the EU copyright system and other EU policy streams 
This Section focuses on the interplay between the EU copyright framework and other policy 
streams: electronic commerce and the regime of liability for online intermediaries, data 
protection law, fundamental rights and cultural policies. The complexity of such interplay 
originates mostly from a lack of coordination of a number of Directives with the 
objectives of the EU copyright policy and regulation. 
1.6.1 Copyright and liability exemptions under the e-Commerce Directive 
As anticipated above, in a fast-changing technological context the CJEU has taken steps to 
coordinate and make the provisions of distinct EU Directives compatible and, to a large 
extent, complementary. When it comes to the copyright liability of online service providers, 
the CJEU has firmly relied on the so-called safe harbour provisions of the e-Commerce 
Directive (Articles 12 to 15). In particular, the Court has enforced the principle according to 
which Member States (and national courts) cannot impose on online intermediaries general 
obligations to monitor the content they store or transmit (Article 15). As mentioned above, 
this principle was applied in cases where national courts had to deal with requests for 
injunctions against ISPs and social network operators that, to prevent future infringements, 
would have required the installation of permanent filtering systems or technologies.126 These 
judgments held that injunctions aimed at imposing unlimited filtering measures would 
inevitably affect the freedom to receive and impart free information as well as the protection 
of personal data of Internet users and the freedom of online intermediaries to conduct their 
businesses.  
The interpretation of the liability exemptions created by the e-Commerce Directive has 
evolved over time also with regard to the role of online content platforms (i.e. ‘hosting 
providers’). Under Article 14 of the e-Commerce Directive hosting providers are shielded 
from liability insofar as they remove illegal or infringing content (or disable access to it) as 
soon as they gain knowledge of the infringement (normally in response to a notice sent by a 
copyright holder, in the context of so-called ‘notice-and-takedown’ procedures). As clarified 
by the CJEU in two landmark judgments, online intermediaries whose services are used by 
third parties to infringe intellectual property rights (i.e. trademarks) cannot be exempted 
from liability if the service provider plays an active role that presupposes knowledge of (or 
                                                   
125 See Articles 5(3) and 6(1) of the Software Directive.  
126 See C-275/06 Promusicae v. Telefonica (2008); C-70/10 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM (2011); C-360/10 
SABAM v. Netlog (2012).  
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control over) such infringing content.127 In L’Oréal v. eBay, the CJEU held that an online 
marketplace operator could benefit from the safe harbour provision if it confines itself to 
providing a service of merely technical, automatic and passive nature to its customers. In this 
case the Court found that eBay helped customers (who were caught to infringe trademarks) 
optimise the presentation of their offers for sale offers or promote those offers, in a way that 
eBay’s activity evidenced knowledge of the infringing nature of the materials it hosted.128 In 
Google v. Louis Vuitton, instead, the CJEU found that the sale of keywords corresponding to a 
third party’s registered trademark to advertisers, in the context of a referencing service 
enabled by Google’s search engine operation (i.e. ‘AdWords’), was not sufficient by itself to 
justify the conclusion that Google had knowledge of, or control over, the data entered into its 
system by advertisers and stored on its servers.129  
1.6.2 Copyright and data protection 
Anti-piracy activities run by copyright holders or specialised bodies established by right-
holders aim at gathering evidence of alleged infringements and obtaining disclosure of the 
identity of supposedly infringing users. These activities entail the monitoring of electronic 
communications (which might extend to inspection of the contents of such communications 
by means of ‘deep packet inspection’ technologies) and enable the collection and storage of 
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses of alleged infringers. Collecting such addresses, processing 
them and identifying the individuals acting behind each IP address gives rise to a form of 
personal data processing.130 EU data protection law makes these activities subject to 
restrictions such as the obligation to collect personal data only for specified, explicit and 
legitimate purposes and to processing such data in a way that is proportionate to the 
objective pursued.131  
In Promusicae v. Telefonica the CJEU acknowledged that copyright enforcement is a legitimate 
purpose to justify the treatment of personal data. However, such treatment must be 
proportionate in order to ensure a balance in the enforcement of conflicting fundamental 
rights.132 Privacy-related problems also emerge under so-called ‘three-strikes’ laws, where 
ISPs have to process IP addresses, identify infringing users, and store and monitor infringers’ 
data. As a consequence of the necessity to strike a balance between copyright and privacy 
protection, a systematic collection and identification of users’ IP addresses and analysis of all 
content they exchanged is likely to be found disproportionate, whereas a request by right-
holders to obtain a specific set of data through judicial proceedings would comply with the 
above-mentioned principle. 
                                                   
127 Joined Cases C-236/08 and C-238-08 Google France & Google v. Louis Vuitton and Others, par. 114-120; 
C-324/09 L’Oréal v. eBay International (2011), par. 113.  
128 See L’Oréal v. eBay International, par. 114-116.  
129 See Google France & Google v. Louis Vuitton, par. 117.  
130 As acknowledged by the CJEU in Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, par. 51, user IP addresses should be 
treated as personal data under EU law since these data allow users to be identified precisely. 
131 See Article 6 of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 
1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, OJ L281/31. 
132 See C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU (2008), par. 70.  
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Additional problems might arise when ISPs are requested to disclose the identity of 
supposedly infringing users of their networks. The fact that ISPs can technically identify 
users does not allow them to give copyright owners direct access to user personal data. The e-
Privacy Directive regulates access to users’ confidential information in the context of 
electronic communications and their retention and processing.133 This Directive allows 
disclosure of personal data only under the exceptional circumstances spelt out under Article 
15(1).134 The CJEU in Promusicae v. Telefonica clarified that the only obligation created under 
EU law for the Member States and national courts is that of interpreting and transposing the 
relevant EU Directives in order to ensure a fair balance between the various fundamental 
rights and a principle of proportionality in the enforcement of these rights. The CJEU 
interpreted this provision as not obliging Member States to force under their laws ISPs to 
disclose user personal data in order to enable an effective protection of copyright through 
civil proceedings.135 
Promusicae v. Telefonica clearly evidenced the need for better coordination at EU level 
between data protection and online copyright enforcement. The absence of a uniform 
interface between these two bodies of law has inevitably made it possible that, in certain 
EU countries, the protection of user privacy systematically prevails over requests for 
injunctions aimed at disclosing the identity of large-scale infringers of copyright. Here a 
lack of coordination between intellectual property law and data protection law is apparent, if 
one considers that the right to information ex Article 8 of the IPRED would allow the 
disclosure of the identity of Internet users found in possession of infringing goods on a 
                                                   
133 See Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector, OJ L201/37 (referred to as ‘e-Privacy Directive’) which ensures confidentiality 
of communications and the related traffic data by means of a public communications network and 
publicly available electronic communications services, through national legislation. In particular, 
Article 5 provides that Member States shall prohibit listening, tapping, storage or other kinds of 
interception or surveillance of communications and the related traffic data by persons other than 
users, without the consent of the users concerned, except when legally authorised to do so in 
accordance with Article 15(1) of the same Directive. 
134 The e-Privacy Directive (Article 15) allows Member States to adopt legislative measures to restrict 
user privacy rights when such restrictions constitute a necessary, appropriate and proportionate 
measure within a democratic society to safeguard national security, defence, public security, and the 
prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences or of unauthorised use of the 
electronic communication system. 
135 In the decision, the CJEU interpreted the exceptions to user privacy rights broadly, emphasising a 
reference that the e-Privacy Directive makes to the 1995 Data Protection Directive. According to such 
reference, Member States are given the option to restrict user privacy rights also in situations that may 
give rise to civil proceedings, in particular when the processing of personal data is necessary, inter alia, 
‘…for the protection of rights and freedoms of others…’ See Promusicae v. Telefonica, par. 52. Article 
13(1)(g) of the 1995 Data Protection Directive provides that Member States are allowed to restrict the 
right to privacy in relation to the processing of personal data where the restriction is necessary for 
‘…the protection of the data subject and of the rights and freedoms of others…’ The CJEU concluded 
that, due to this reference, the two Directives should be interpreted as expressing the intention of EU 
lawmakers not to exclude from their scope the protection of the right to intellectual property or 
situations in which copyright holders seek to obtain protection through civil proceedings. See 
Promusicae v. Telefonica, par. 53.  
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commercial scale or providing services used in infringing activities.136 However, IPRED 
requires that such right should apply without prejudice to other EU law provisions which 
“…govern the protection of confidentiality of information sources or the processing of 
personal data”, which includes IPRED and the harmonisation-related problem this Directive 
creates in the context of civil proceedings (Article 8(3)(e)). 
1.6.3 Copyright and fundamental rights 
Copyright enforcement on digital networks can easily have an impact on fundamental rights 
of citizens, Internet users and companies. The CJEU has recently evaluated the compatibility 
with EU law of several types of copyright enforcement measures that would end up 
imposing systematic and permanent filters or blocking access to sites through the 
cooperation of online intermediaries.137 By placing emphasis on the fact that all measures 
based on content filtering, removal or disabling access to websites can easily lead to 
restriction of lawful content communications (running the risk of over-blocking), the Court 
held that such measures are bound by the principle of proportionality. Serious concerns 
regarding freedom to access the Internet insofar as an administrative body (and not a court) 
could issue the sanction of disconnection of repeat infringers from the Internet were raised 
by ‘graduated responses’ (or ‘three-strikes’) schemes, such as the one introduced in France 
by the ‘Création et Internet’ legislation, which established the HADOPI.138 
Another source of tension between copyright enforcement measures and free access to 
online information is the system of graduated response put in place on a voluntary basis 
by ISPs on the grounds of agreements concluded with copyright owners. This issue was 
widely debated in 2009, during the lengthy and complex negotiations that led to the 
amendment of the 2003 ‘Telecoms Package’.139 This amendment introduced into the 
                                                   
136 See IPRED, Article 8(1). In particular, it seems to enable judicial authorities, upon request of 
copyright owners, to identify and prosecute users who are caught to have knowingly allowed their 
computers to be used as high-volume uploaders of infringing materials in fully decentralised peer-to-
peer architectures: see IPRED, Article 8(2), which makes it clear that information on the origin and 
distribution networks of infringing goods comprises the names and addresses of distributors and 
suppliers of infringing goods as well as information on the quantities delivered or received. 
137 See C-70/10 Scarlet Extended v. SABAM, 24 November 2011, and C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog, 16 
February 2012, which dealt with, respectively, lawfulness of enforcement measures imposing 
permanent filtering technologies to an ISP and the owner of a social network platform.  
138 See Law 2009/669 of 12 June 2009, amended on 15 September 2009, Journal officiel de la 
République francaise. Through a well-known decision, in 2009 the French Constitutional Council held 
that the protection of freedom of expression and communication under the French constitution 
includes the freedom to access the Internet and censored the new law insofar as it allowed the 
sanction of disconnection to be taken by an administrative body. The Council held that this provision 
was inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial: see French 
Constitutional Council, Decision n. 2009-580DC, 10 June 2009, Journal officiel de la République 
francaise. 
139 See Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2008 
amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services (referred to as Framework Directive), 2002/19/EC on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (referred to as Access 
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‘Framework Directive’ a new provision (cf. Article 1(3)(a)) on restrictive measures in 
communications networks – such as user disconnection from the Internet in the context of 
graduate response regimes. The Directive obliges Member States to guarantee a prior, fair 
and impartial procedure and an effective and timely judicial review to the affected parties. It 
was emphasised in the literature that, even though the new Framework Directive does not 
restrict Member States from introducing graduated response laws without judicial 
supervision, it guarantees at least a court hearing on an appeal from an initial ruling to 
disconnect.140  
1.6.4 Copyright and support to cultural diversity  
In certain specific circumstances EU copyright law supports cultural diversity not only 
through mere copyright protection but also while seeking to mitigate the economic conflict 
and tension arising between individual creators and the assignees of their rights (i.e. content 
producers). Certain EU copyright measures provide an exception to the ‘market knows 
best’ approach by granting authors and performers remuneration and compensation rights 
that are expected to guarantee a given income to them with the aim of supporting their 
artistic career and/or protecting their financial interests. Such remuneration rights 
constitute an evident exception to the principle of freedom of contract, which copyright law 
widely relies upon, and give rise to non-waivable rights (i.e. rights that cannot be validly 
transferred to intermediaries exploiting commercially the results of the author’s or 
performer’s work). The non-waivability of these rights is particularly relevant since it aims to 
directly support – in a ‘paternalistic’ way – the creative endeavour of individuals, who are 
the actors who ultimately guarantee, more than cultural industries, diversity of cultural 
creations.  
1.6.4.1 Non-waivable remuneration rights from reprography and private copying levies 
Even though the InfoSoc Directive does not explicitly give compensation rights stemming 
from private copying and reprography levies a non-waivable character, a principle of 
inalienability of this compensation seems to have become binding for all the Member States 
as a result of a recent judgment of the CJEU in Martin Luksan v. Petrus van der Let (par. 90-109). 
In this case the Court had to assess whether the sharing of fair compensation between the 
director of a cinematographic work and the film producer under Austrian law was in line 
with EU law and whether such compensation right should vest by operation of law, directly 
and originally, in the principal director, in his capacity as author or co-author of the 
cinematographic work. The CJEU concluded that the holders of the reproduction right (i.e. 
those listed under Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive) are the only ones entitled to the fair 
compensation directly and originally. According to the CJEU, the InfoSoc Directive restricts 
                                                                                                                                                               
Directive), and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services 
(referred to as Authorisation Directive), OJ L 337/37 (December 18, 2009).  
140 The amendments referred to in the main text constitute a dilution of an earlier proposal that was 
known throughout the blogosphere as ‘Amendment 138/Article 8(4)(g)’ to the Framework Directive. 
Amendment 138 aimed at requiring that disconnection from the Internet should have been 
permissible (only) through a court decision except when public security was threatened (Barron, 
2011).  
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national law from allowing the principal director of a cinematographic work to waive his 
right to fair compensation.141 This means that the author and original holder of the 
reproduction right must necessarily receive compensation.  
1.6.4.2 Resale right (droit de suite) 
A non-waivable resale right is granted to authors of original works of graphic and plastic art, 
and to their heirs under Directive 2001/84/EC.142 This right, known also as droit de suite, as it 
was first introduced in France in 1920, reserves a percentage of the resale price of artistic 
works when they are resold. The right covers any sales involving an art market professional 
as seller, buyer or intermediary, with the exception of private sales to non-profit museums. 
Despite the restrictions of its scope and the burdens it might raise for business actors in the 
European art market, the resale right matters in terms of support to cultural creation and, as 
a result, cultural diversity insofar as it provides extra financial resources to artists. This 
additional source of remuneration creates a system of incentives for the artist to maintain 
a high artistic value for subsequent works and to gain abroad a reputation and exposure, 
which increases the value of earlier creations and generates higher resale royalties over 
time.  
1.6.4.3 Remuneration and termination rights for music performers  
To avoid that music performers do not benefit effectively from the 20-year extension of the 
term of protection for sound recordings enacted under Directive 2011/77/EU143 (which 
amended the Term Directive) the Directive grants performers two types of non-waivable 
rights: i) a termination right that places music performers in a position to regain their rights 
if the record producer does not effectively market the sound recording within a year from 
the notification by the performer of her intention to terminate the transfer or assignment; and 
ii) a right to remuneration calculated on the grounds of net revenues that the record 
producer has derived from the marketing of the sound recording during its extended period 
of protection (i.e. following the 50th year after it was lawfully published or communicated to 
the public). Interestingly, the termination right introduces a mandatory ‘use it or lose it’ 
clause in the contractual relationship between performers and their record companies.144 As a 
result of the termination of the original contractual transfer or assignment, the rights of the 
producers should expire whereas the rights in the fixation of the music performance should 
revert to the performer. This provision enables the performer to either find another record 
producer wishing to exploit his/her performance or to do it himself/herself, for instance 
via the Internet under open content licensing schemes.  
  
                                                   
141 See C-277/10 Martin Luksan v. Petrus van der Let (2012), par 107-108.  
142 See Directive 2001/84/EC of 27 November 2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of 
an original work of art, OJ L 272, 13/10/2001, 32.  
143 See Directive 2011/77/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2011 
amending Directive 2006/116/EC on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ 
L 265, 11/10/2011, 1. 
144 See Directive 2011/77, Article 1(2)(c).  
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2. The Internal Market aspects of copyright: EU copyright and the 
functioning of the Single Market 
2.1 The market fragmentation effects of legislation on copyright and related 
rights in the European Union  
2.1.1 The territorial application of copyright rules 
As already recalled in the previous Sections of this Study, the territoriality of copyright and 
related (or ‘neighbouring’) rights is a core principle enshrined in Article 5 of the Berne 
Convention145 and in other international treaties and confirmed by the CJEU.146 Copyright 
and related rights are acquired and enforced at national level on the basis of the applicable 
law, which is determined on the grounds of the place where protection is claimed (lex loci 
protectionis).147 The geographical scope of these rights is limited to the territory of the State 
where they are granted and protected. Any aspect of copyright that is not harmonised at the 
EU level remains therefore regulated by Member States’ law.148 
The principle of territoriality may pose serious obstacles to the integration of the Internal 
Market.  
 Firstly, if the EU had harmonised national copyright laws broadly, national divergences 
concerning crucial aspects such as the subject matter of copyright, the identification of 
right-holders, and the scope and content of protected rights would have been greatly 
reduced. To the contrary, and as the CJEU emphasised before the European Commission 
started enacting copyright statutes, the very same work could happen to be protected 
by copyright only in some Member States; rights themselves may be differently 
defined at national level; and individuals or entities owning relevant rights may vary 
on a country-by-country basis. 
 Secondly, and most important, right-holders are entitled to exercise 28 different national 
rights rather than a single EU-wide right. Hence, copyright and related rights can be 
exploited on a strictly territorial basis and – at least until the adoption and enforcement 
of the exhaustion principle that applies to tangible copyrighted goods (see Section 
II.1.2.4) – parallel imports can be lawfully prevented. 
It is worth stressing that in most cases obstacles to a fully integrated Internal Market end up 
affecting both right-holders and users. While users may be obliged to clear different rights 
in different Member States to use the same work, right-holders may be forced to seek legal 
                                                   
145 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, last amended on 28 
September 1979 available at: http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=283698. 
146 See for instance Case C-192/2004 Lagardère Active Broadcast v. Sociéte pour la Perception de la 
Remuneration Equitable (SPRE) and Others. 
147 See Regulation 864/2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), L 199/40, 
31.7.2007, Article 8 (Infringement of intellectual property rights).  
148 See JURI Committee (2010), Copyright Territoriality, Collective Management and Remuneration, 
Working Document, European Parliament 15 September 2010. 
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advice to ascertain the rights they are entitled to in different Member States as well as to 
effectively enforce these rights.149 
2.1.2 Definitions that fall outside the scope of the EU copyright acquis 
As already recalled, in spite of the harmonisation measures provided under the EU 
Directives on copyright, there are still core aspects of copyright law that have not been 
harmonised (see Section II.1.2). 
Some notions that originally fell outside the scope of the InfoSoc Directive have been further 
elaborated by the CJEU in its case law, in order to preserve the original function of the 
Directive and to remove barriers to intra-EU trade that diverging standards might otherwise 
have caused. This is the case for the standard of originality. As emphasised above, EU law 
deliberately intervened by introducing a unitary concept of originality in those fields where 
this notion would have potentially generated the highest Internal Market obstacles, namely 
computer programmes and databases and, to some extent photographs. This definition is 
based, for all creative works protected by copyright, on the ‘author’s intellectual creation’ 
standard.150 While the InfoSoc Directive fell short of defining a standard of originality for 
other types of creative works, the CJEU intervened by extending the ‘author’s intellectual 
creation’ standard to all the works to which the rights harmonised under InfoSoc Directive 
apply (see Section II.1.2.1). Lack of harmonisation persists when it comes to the definition 
of derivative works/transformative uses and the attribution of authorship. 
2.1.2.1 Transformative uses and derivative works 
Transformative uses take place when users create new works by incorporating earlier 
copyrighted works. Derivative works such as translations, adaptations, and any other 
alteration or modification, as well as other uses such as quotations for teaching, criticism and 
scientific research, are examples of transformative uses. On the one hand, in some cases 
derivative works can constitute an ‘intellectual creation’ and therefore be considered worthy 
of an autonomous (although derivative) protection, similar to those granted to the original 
works they are based on. In other circumstances, derivative works can be the result of 
copyright infringement insofar as they require transformative uses of copyrighted works that 
need to be authorised by the relevant right-holders. 
The InfoSoc Directive does not harmonise the scope of the exclusive right of authorising 
transformative uses of copyrighted works. This issue has been addressed only by Article 
4(1)(b) of the Software Directive151 and Article 5(b) of the Database Directive152 granting to 
                                                   
149 See JURI Committee (2010), Copyright Territoriality, Collective Management and Remuneration, 
Working Document, European Parliament, 15 September. 
150 This notion of originality has been to a large extent taken from the continental-European droit 
d’auteur (i.e. the author’s right) rather than from the prevalent common law approach that is deemed 
to cover also less ‘creative’ content. In common law countries, originality requires that the work must 
not be copied and must be the result of ‘skill, judgement and/or labour’ (the so-called ‘sweat of the 
brow’), i.e. the author needs to be diligent during the creation of a certain work. In practice, the two 
approaches do not lead to a different extension of the copyright subject matter for the majority of 
works (Margoni, 2014). 
151 Directive 2009/24/EC. 
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the author the exclusive right of translating, adapting and transforming computer 
programmes and databases.153 As a result, the definition of derivative works and 
transformative uses for other copyright subject matter is left to Member States’ discretion.154 
While this is not surprising as significant linkages exist between lawful transformative uses 
and moral rights of authors (and especially the right of integrity), which are a matter of 
Member States’ law, the market fragmentation potential for this lack of legal harmonisation 
is becoming increasingly central in the digital environment (Margoni, 2014). Indeed, new 
technologies multiply the options for transformative uses of copyrighted works and, as a 
consequence, raise new issues in terms of compliance with national copyright law, 
especially for what concerns so-called user-generated content (UGC). In the current 
scenario, the creation by end-users of derivative works based on earlier works is easier and 
cheaper than ever before (Mazziotti, 2008). In addition, UGC is becoming commercially 
relevant by virtue of the availability of new and easily accessible distribution channels (e.g. 
web platforms, social networks, blogs) and licensing schemes.155 
Box 1. User-generated content 
UGC broadly refers to any form of content created and uploaded on the Internet by end-users: 
blogs, wikis, discussion forums, posts, chats, tweets, podcasting, pins, digital images, videos, 
audio files and other forms of content that have been created by users of an online system or 
service and shared through websites and social media. UGC poses problems to the traditional 
scope of exclusive rights, namely to the reproduction rights, the communication to the public 
(including the right to ‘make available’) and the adaptation right. With the massive 
dissemination of smartphones, online social media, interactive distribution platforms and 
various copying means, the rise of the so-called ‘amateur creators’ largely relies on broadband 
rollout and access to Internet services. Those new technologies have drastically reduced 
transaction costs to produce and share content. Consequently, the consumer of cultural goods 
traditionally conceived as a passive spectator has become a proactive user. This tendency raises 
many challenges for the copyright regime and awakes the fears of creators as regards their 
right to fair remuneration. 
The OECD156 has defined UGC on the ground of three main criteria: “i) a content that has been 
made publicly available over the Internet; ii) which requires a certain amount of creative effort; 
and iii) which has been created outside of professional routines and practices” (Margoni, 2014). 
However, a formal categorisation of UGC following those criteria remains difficult: while the 
formulation adopted by the OECD is still general, some underlying concepts such as 
originality, transformative use and derivative work are not harmonised across Europe. An 
                                                                                                                                                               
152 Directive 96/9/EC. 
153 Exceptions and limitations apply to these exclusive rights. 
154 Interestingly, several transformative uses (e.g. use for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche) 
are listed in Article 5(3) of the InfoSoc Directive among the optional exceptions and limitations that 
can be implemented by Member States. 
155 See European Commission (2013), Public Consultation on the Review of the EU Copyright Rules, 
Consultation Document available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/docs/consultation-
document_en.pdf. 
156 See OECD, DSTI/ICCP/IE (2006)7/Final, Working Party on the Information Economy (2007), 
Participative web user-created content, available at: http://www.oecd.org/sti/38393115.pdf. 
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attempt to categorise UCG types was made by De Wolf & Partners (2013) that identified three 
main types of content: i) “user-created content” or “user-authored content”, i.e. original works 
that do not rely on transformative uses of pre-existing works (‘creation from scratch’) and are 
made available by their authors through the Internet; ii) ‘user-copied content’, i.e. protected or 
non-protected content provided by a third party and made available without any substantial 
alteration (e.g. video format shifting or mere upload); iii) ‘user-generated derivative content’, 
i.e. works that combine pre-existing works with inputs of original creativity giving birth to a 
proper secondary creation.157 The emergence of the third type of UGC is relatively new in 
terms of scale and distributional impact on the creative content value chain. This phenomenon 
becomes even more complex when it comes to reuse of copyrighted content for the emergence 
of new business models for commercial purposes. 
 So far, the main issue raised in the debate is whether UGC should be subject to particular 
exceptions and limitations. The heart of the problem stems from the fact UGC blurs traditional 
distinctions between professional versus amateur dichotomy, as between public and private 
spheres (especially when distinguishing the private/non-private reproduction or making 
available to the public or to a private group), as well as the commercial and non-commercial 
purpose criterion. Although a work has not originally been designed as commercial in the first 
place, its success and popularity over time could generate substantial revenues via advertising 
incomes. The emergence of new licensing and monetising schemes for small-scale users of 
copyrighted content provides practical commercial and contractual solutions to ease UGC and 
facilitate micro-licensing for private or small commercial users. However, as highlighted in the 
Commission’s Communication on Content in the Digital Single Market,158 the main challenge 
lies in fostering transparency and access to information related to the scale and coverage of 
licenses and to the terms of agreements between publishers and platforms.159 In addition, the 
information related to a particular content should provide greater certainty to end-users over 
the potential legitimate and illegitimate uses of copyrighted work to facilitate rights clearance 
for small users. 
2.1.2.2 Authorship 
The notion of ‘authorship’ of copyrighted works has not been subject to a significant 
harmonisation at the EU level, except for the EU provisions on computer programmes and 
databases160 and cinematographic and audiovisual works.161 Nonetheless, for the latter, while 
Member States are obliged to consider the principal director as the author of the work, they 
                                                   
157 In light of the abundance of content available over the Internet that are easily usable or copied and 
of the increasingly blurred distinction between copyrighted and non-copyrighted content online, the 
possible copyright infringement in the case of a ‘user-generated derivative content’ is considered very 
high.  
158 See Communication from the Commission, On content in the Digital Single Market, COM(2012)789 
final. 
159 The terms of agreement between platforms and third parties are usually not accessible. Moreover, 
some monetising schemes based on views or clicks rates raise concerns in terms of transparency and 
good practice.  
160 See Article 4 of the Database Directive (Directive 96/9/EC) and Article 2 of the Software Directive 
(Directive 2009/24/EC). 
161 See Article 2(1) of the Term of Protection Directive (Directive 2006/116/EC).  
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are still free to designate co-authors; hence the harmonisation degree of this measure is quite 
limited (see Table 1).  
Table 1. Audiovisual authors in a sample of Member States 
 











      
Belgium 
      
Czech Republic 
      
Estonia 
      
Finland 
      
France 




    
Hungary 
      
Italy 
      
The Netherlands 
      
Poland 
      
Portugal 
      
Romania 
      
Slovakia 
      
Spain 
      
Sweden 
      
Switzerland 
      
United Kingdom 
      
Notes: Authors of the audiovisual work in blue; authors of a pre-existing or separate work in red; * according to 
the prevalent opinion. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on Despringre et al. (2015). 
In terms of market fragmentation, national divergences in the designation of the authors of a 
copyrighted work may have minor effects on the demand side, especially in those sectors 
where users can acquire licenses from a single entity (e.g. the producers of audiovisual 
content or the publisher of books) or from collective management societies (e.g. in the music 
sector). Nonetheless, this issue is central since the remuneration or compensation of artists 
can vary among Member States, thus providing different incentives to the creation of 
creative content and affecting the Internal Market on the supply side. 
2.1.3 Territorial exercise of the right 
As mentioned above, according to the principle of territoriality, copyright and related 
rights are conferred by national laws and are limited to the territory of the granting State. 
By way of example, Article 2(a) of the InfoSoc Directive does not grant a reproduction right 
that immediately covers all the territory of the EU to the author of a musical work. The 
author is in fact entitled to 28 separate national reproduction rights, each of them covering 
the territory of a single Member State. As a result, a right-holder can separately exercise each 
of these 28 rights on a strictly territorial basis. 
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Copyright territoriality does not pose any obstacle to the integration of the Internal 
Market when it comes to the distribution of tangible copyrighted goods. In fact, according 
to Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive, the distribution right is limited by the exhaustion 
principle. This principle, which was for the first time laid down by the ECJ in the Deutsche 
Grammophon case, provides that once a copyrighted good has been sold by the right-holder, 
or with his/her consent, in a territory of the European Union, further distribution of this 
good cannot be prevented.162 In other words, parallel imports of tangible copyrighted works 
are lawful as long as consent for their exploitation has been given in at least one Member 
State. Hence, the principle of exhaustion mitigates the market fragmentation effects of the 
principle of territoriality (see Section II.1.2.4). 
The InfoSoc Directive confines the scope of the exhaustion principle to the distribution right, 
which concerns just physical media embodying copyright works. Therefore, territorial 
licensing of intangible copyrighted works, which are equated with services, is entirely 
lawful and parallel imports can be prevented by relying on copyright territoriality. 
Indeed, the online market for copyrighted goods is still fragmented and end-users are 
currently facing access denials and other forms of restriction on the grounds of copyright 
territoriality (see Section II.2.2). 
Notwithstanding the prevalent interpretation of the principle of exhaustion, in many 
circumstances the online transmission of digital copyright works that are purchased by end-
users and downloaded on their own computer is equivalent, in its effects, to distribution of 
tangible copyrighted goods. Interestingly, the Dutch Court of Appeals (Hof Amsterdam), 
in a preliminary ruling, extended the controversial findings of the UsedSoft case163 to the 
resale of e-books.164 The progressive extension of the principle of exhaustion to download-
to-own165 copyrighted goods by national Courts may potentially lead to additional problems 
in terms of Internal Market as only in some Member States a second-hand market of 
copyrighted digital works (e.g. films, video-games, MP3 files) would be lawful.166 In 
addition, this new interpretation of the principle of exhaustion would deeply affect 
commercial strategies of online business models that currently sell digital copies of content 
on a strictly territorial basis and might foster the switch towards access-based services. 
As things stand now, the main question is whether market fragmentation is rooted either in 
the cost barriers generated by the combined effect of the principle of territoriality and the 
lack of legal harmonisation in many areas of copyright law, or in the market opportunities, 
given to both right-holders and commercial users by the principle of territoriality, to exploit 
rights on a territorial basis. 
                                                   
162 Case C-78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte. 
163 Case C-128/11 UsedSoft Gmbh v. Oracle International Corp.  
164 For further details see http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2015/01/28/the-dutch-courts-apply-
usedsoft-to-the-resale-of-ebooks/. 
165 The term download-to-own refers to the legal download to a private computer of copyrighted good 
via a network such as the Internet.  
166 It is worth stressing that, besides the lawfulness under the current EU copyright framework, the 
reselling of digital copies also raises additional issues such as: i) the need to avoid resellers keeping a 
copy of the file in their own computer; and ii) the creation of a market for second-hand digital files 
that are of the same quality of first-hand ones and potentially never deteriorate. 
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2.2 Territorial licensing and geo-blocking in specific sectors 
A widely debated issue within the context of the current EU Digital Single Market Strategy is 
the need to avoid the fragmentation of the Single Market generated by territorial licensing 
and geo-blocking. The latter is a technological measure that prevents online consumers from 
accessing a web-site or purchasing content based on location; such practice sometimes 
involves also re-routing to a local web-site (Madiega, 2015). 
Territorial licensing and geo-blocking create two main obstacles to the integration of the 
Internal Market.  
 First, they limit cross-border portability of copyrighted works. In a nutshell, consumers 
that lawfully subscribe to online services in their Member States to stream, e.g. music or 
audiovisual content, are not able to access the same service when moving, even 
temporarily, to another Member State.167 Limited portability may affect up to 4.7 million 
of Europeans per day, including both short-term migrants and travellers (Plum 
Consulting, 2012). 
 Second, and most important, they limit cross-border trade. Consumers living in a 
certain Member State are not able to subscribe to online services providing copyrighted 
content in another Member State. The effect of this ‘trade barrier’ is twofold:  
o Some EU consumers cannot access contents that are instead available to other EU 
consumers;168  
o Even when the same service is provided in several EU Member States, consumers can 
access only their ‘national’ offer.169, 170 
                                                   
167 It is worth stressing that, in the music sector, some service providers operating in more than one 
Member State allow for cross-border portability in geographic areas covered by their services. This is 
for instance the case of Spotify, which ensures full portability to premium users across 25 EU countries 
(Croatia, Romania, and Slovenia are still excluded). In such a context, cross-border portability is the 
result of the business acumen of some providers that are able to meet a pan-European demand by 
acquiring licenses in more than one Member State. In fact Spotify ensures portability beyond EU 
borders, in 60 countries worldwide. 
168 For instance Italian consumers cannot subscribe to Netflix, an online service that is instead available 
to UK and Ireland consumers. More generally, the availability of online music services largely varies 
among Member States: in 11 countries fewer than five services were available in 2012; in seven 
countries between five and nine; only in nine countries were more than ten service providers detected 
(see European Commission (2012), Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Collective Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights and Multi-territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online Uses in the 
Internal Market, SWD(2012)2014 final). 
169 For instance, although Apple iTunes reached EU-wide coverage, German consumers can purchase 
content only from their national iTunes Store and available content varies significantly among 
national web-stores. YouTube created a local version of the service in some EU countries where 
additional content is provided, but a consumer from Italy cannot access the UK national version. Also, 
content provided by Xbox Live is filtered according to the location. For further details see Plum 
Consulting (2012) and JURI Committee (2011), Copyright in the Music and Audiovisual Sectors, Working 
Document, European Parliament 29 June 2011.  
IMPLEMENTATION, APPLICATION AND EFFECTS OF THE EU DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT | 59 
These problems have been faced by the vast majority of end-users responding to the public 
consultation on the review of the EU copyright rules launched by the European Commission 
in 2013.171 
The fragmentation of the Internal Market stemming from territorial licensing and geo-
blocking is certainly rooted in the territoriality of copyright and related rights. On the one 
hand, the insufficient harmonisation of copyright law across the EU obliges providers of 
copyrighted works to clear relevant exploitation rights on a national basis. The 
transmission of copyright content in digital networks involves two different rights: i) the 
reproduction right;172 and ii) the communication to the public right, which includes the right 
of making copyrighted works available to the public. As a result a single act of exploitation 
requires clearing two autonomous and independent rights, which might raise transaction 
costs and make the rights clearance more complicated in sectors, like the music business, 
where these categories of rights might be held by different right-holders in different several 
Member States. 
On the other hand, the combined effect of i) the principle of copyright territoriality, ii) the 
application of the principle of exhaustion exclusively to tangible goods, and iii) the 
contractual freedom173 enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU enables 
right-holders as well as service providers to exploit copyright and related rights on a 
national basis without breaching EU law. Indeed, the online provision of copyrighted 
content on a territorial basis can be the result of the deliberate commercial decisions of right-
holders and/or commercial users. In other words, while the current EU copyright 
framework may inflate transaction costs174 and make the online provision of pan-European 
copyrighted content too costly, right-holders and service providers may autonomously 
decide to partition the Internal Market irrespective of copyright obstacles to multi-territorial 
                                                                                                                                                               
170 The compatibility of these business arrangements with Article 20(2) of the Directive 2006/123/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market 
(referred to as ‘Services Directive’) should be further investigated: ‘Member States shall ensure that 
the general conditions of access to a service, which are made available to the public at large by the 
provider, do not contain discriminatory provisions relating to the nationality or place of residence of 
the recipient, but without precluding the possibility of providing for differences in the conditions of 
access where those differences are directly justified by objective criteria’. 
171 See European Commission (2014), Report on the responses to the Public Consultation on the 
Review of the EU Copyright Rules, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/ 
copyright-rules/docs/contributions/consultation-report_en.pdf. 
172 It is worth stressing that each digital transmission of copyrighted works entails several acts of 
reproduction, including, inter alia, uploading and downloading of the digital work. 
173 The lion’s share of sectoral stakeholders agreed that contractual freedom should be preserved and 
that commercial users of digital content should be free to pursue the commercial strategy they prefer 
(Mazziotti, 2013). In addition, this principle has been explicitly confirmed by the European 
Commission (European Commission (2010), Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, A Digital Agenda for Europe, COM(2010)245final). 
174 Service providers might be required to negotiate licenses with a wide range of stakeholders located 
in various Member States rather than clearing all the required rights for all the territories of the EU in 
a single transaction. 
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licenses on the grounds of commercial motivations.175 This is not surprising, especially when 
considering that geo-blocking measures are adopted also in e-commerce of non-copyrighted 
goods.176 
Many additional obstacles to the Internal Market integration other than EU copyright law 
have been mentioned: i) technological barriers and limited access to broadband; ii) different 
degrees of computer literacy; iii) lack of legal harmonisation in other relevant areas of law 
(e.g. consumer protection, taxation, contract law); iv) uneven diffusion of electronic payment 
methods; v) diverging consumer trust in online transactions; vi) lack of demand for lawful 
content due to illegal downloading (i.e. piracy); vii) shortage of pan-European sponsors for 
advertisement-funded services. 
In order to assess the reasons and implications of territorial licensing and geo-blocking, it is 
necessary to focus on specific sectors as right-holders, bundle or rights as well as contractual 
practices largely vary among sectors and have different impacts on the proper functioning of 
the Internal Market. In what follows the main features of the audiovisual, music, and book 
publishing sectors will be discussed. 
2.2.1 The audiovisual sector 
While the WIPO generally defines an audiovisual work as “a work which appeals at the 
same time to the ear and to the eye and consists of a series of related images and 
accompanying sounds”,177 this Section focuses only on the film sector as it is characterised 
by the centralisation of the majority of relevant exploitation rights in the hands of a single 
entity, namely the film producer. 
As mentioned above (see Section II.2.1.2.2), in principle several intellectual creators (e.g. the 
director, scriptwriters, music composers, etc.) can be acknowledged as authors of a film; 
nonetheless, the main economic rights are transferred from the authors (and performers178) to 
the producer, by law or by contractual agreements.179 As a result, the producer is the single 
licensing entity for the exploitation of these audiovisual works (Charles River Associates, 
2014). Nonetheless, some of the authors or performers involved in the production of the 
movie can still be entitled to separate remunerations or compensations for certain uses of 
                                                   
175 Licensing content on a territorial basis enables not only service differentiation (taking account, for 
instance, of cultural and linguistic diversity) but also price discrimination. Hence, mono-territorial 
licensing schemes can be more profitable for right-holders and commercial users than multi-territorial 
or pan-European licenses. 
176 For instance, Belgian consumers can purchase clothes only on the Belgian Zara website. Similarly, 
Italian consumers can only access the Italian online Apple Store (and at the time of writing they 
cannot purchase an Apple Watch which is available only to British, French and German consumers). 
177 See WIPO (1980), Glossary of Terms of the Law of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights, World 
Intellectual Property Organization. 
178 Please note that, besides the fragmentation of authors’ rights, another grey area is represented by 
the rights of performers (actors) that are not fully harmonised at the EU level (DG INFSO and DG 
MARKT (2009), Creating Content in a European Digital Single Market: Challenges for the Future, A 
Reflection Document). 
179 See European Commission (2011), Green Paper on the Online Distribution of Audiovisual Works in the 
European Union: Opportunities and Challenges towards a Digital Single Market, COM(2011)427final. 
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their creative works incorporated in audiovisual fixation.180 Remuneration and compensation 
arrangements for audiovisual authors and performers in principle do not affect licensing 
schemes as the film producers are still vested with all the relevant economic rights. The only 
obstacle is represented by certain uses (e.g. online exploitation) of music works (i.e. pre-
existing musical compositions or movie soundtracks) embedded in a film.181 For this kind of 
content, the relevant rights (including so-called ‘public performance’ rights) have still to be 
cleared by dealing with the relevant collective management societies182 and can involve 
substantial transaction costs on a country-by-country basis.183 
Setting aside issues related to the clearance of rights for music incorporated in films,184 in 
principle the producer is free to decide the optimal licensing scheme for exploiting his/her 
audiovisual works. As regards the licensing ‘value chain’, producers may directly license 
their works or rely on distributors playing the role of intermediaries between producers and 
commercial users (see Figure 2). In addition, especially for foreign markets, sales agents can 
facilitate contractual agreements to transfer the rights from producers to territorial 
distributors. When it comes to the online supply of copyright audiovisual works, service 
providers have to acquire online rights (i.e. both the making available right and the 
reproduction right) from the relevant right-holders. Whereas service providers may directly 
deal with producers or resort to sales agents or distributors, in many circumstances they 
clear rights by concluding agreements with aggregators that are companies holding the 
relevant rights for large catalogues of movies. This is especially the case for video on-
demand services (Charles River Associates, 2014). 
It is apparent that in the film sector there are no significant obstacles to licensing agreements 
between producers and commercial users. In addition, in compliance with the current EU 
copyright system, producers may decide to exploit their rights via pan-European licenses. In 
principle, EU copyright law does not constitute a major obstacle to market integration. 
                                                   
180 In some Member States (e.g. Belgium, Bulgaria, France), collective management societies 
representing audiovisual authors collect ‘per use’ remuneration for TV broadcasting of copyrighted 
audiovisual works. In some other Member States (e.g. Spain), audiovisual performers are entitled to 
an equitable remuneration for the exploitation of their performances.  
181 Music right-holders are entitled to receive communication/’making available’ to the public 
royalties as a result of the broadcast of film on television, the exhibition of the film in movie theatres 
or the online exploitation. ‘Cue sheets are the primary means by which performing rights 
organizations track the use of music in films and TV. A typical cue sheet contains a log of all music 
used in the motion picture and includes such information as the film's title, air date, music length, 
song title, composer and publisher information, name of the performing rights society, timing/usage 
information, and percentage splits among copyright proprietors’ (Kushnir, 2005). 
182 In some Member State (e.g. Czech Republic, Spain, Germany), based on national legislation and 
collective bargaining agreements, in the audiovisual sector collective management societies play a role 
also for clearing certain rights (e.g. rental right) of certain right-holders (e.g. performers) (DG INFSO 
and DG MARKT (2009), Creating Content in a European Digital Single Market: Challenges for the Future, A 
Reflection Document). 
183 See European Commission (2011), Green Paper on the Online Distribution of Audiovisual Works in the 
European Union: Opportunities and Challenges towards a Digital Single Market, COM(2011)427final. 
184 Please note that in terms of market fragmentation, these issues are equivalent to those discussed 
below for the music sector. 
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Nonetheless, territorial or multi-territorial licensing schemes185 are still the prevalent and 
probably the most profitable system of right exploitation in this sector for a variety of 
reasons (see below). While licensing practices reflect lawful commercial strategies based on 
the principle of copyright territoriality, competition policy issues (cf. the Premier League case) 
may still arise, especially when licensing agreements are based on absolute territoriality 
exclusivity.186 The compatibility between EU competition law and EU copyright law is an 
important issue that requires further investigation. In this respect, in January 2014 the 
European Commission started a formal antitrust proceeding to examine territorial licensing 
agreements between US film studios and the largest European pay-TV broadcasters that may 
result in the partitioning of the Internal Market.187 
Figure 2. Licensing chain in the film sector 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on Charles River Associates (2014). 
 
                                                   
185 Several platforms providing on-demand services serve multiple territories of the EU insofar as they 
can still address customers included in a common language group (see European Commission (2011), 
Green Paper on the Online Distribution of Audiovisual Works in the European Union: Opportunities and 
Challenges towards a Digital Single Market, COM(2011)427final). 
186 These agreements exclude also the so-called passive sales, i.e. those sales resulting from a response 
to unsolicited requests from customers residing outside the territory covered by the license of the 
service provider. 
187 See European Commission (2014), Press Release, ‘Antitrust: Commission investigates restrictions 
affecting cross border provision of pay TV services’, 13 January 2014, available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-15_en.htm. 
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One of the main challenges to the development of the Internal Market for audiovisual 
content lies in the strong cultural and linguistic diversity across EU Member States. As a 
result, consumer preferences diverge substantially across EU countries. Accordingly, the 
provision of audiovisual works requires national adaptations such as subtitling and dubbing 
as well as tailoring marketing investment and, to some extent, versioning content to meet 
local preferences (e.g. general consumer tastes, holiday periods). In addition, some works 
(e.g. European film productions that are targeted to a specific national audience) are able to 
meet the demand only of a limited part of the EU population in terms of humour, popular 
characters or local stories and are bound to national contexts.188 For instance, in 2013 the 
average share of admissions of EU films in national markets was equal to 79%, in other 
words four spectators out of five were based in the same Member State where the film was 
produced.189 Interestingly, while the cross border penetration rate of EU films is below 10% 
in the majority of national markets, US films have a market share above 50% all over Europe 
(see Table 2). Dubbing is still required to release movies in four out of the five largest EU 
markets (i.e. France, Germany,190 Italy and Spain).191 Against this background, pan-European 
licensing schemes are often not profitable for right-holders, especially when a substantial 
pan-European demand is absent.192  
Table 2. Language transfer practices for cinema works and percentage share of admissions for national, 







over EU total) 
National films 
(%) 
Other EU films 
(%) US films (%) 
Czech 
Republic Subtitling 1.22 24.2 11.06* 64.74 
France Dubbing and subtitling 21.34 33.8 7.29 54.24 
Germany Dubbing and subtitling 14.30 26.2 6.10 65.4 
Hungary Subtitling 1.12 1.5 9.85 86.86 
Ireland Subtitling 1.62 0.9 n.a. n.a. 
                                                   
188 By way of example, MTV initially decided to provide a pan-European TV channel. At a second 
stage, the cultural diversity and linguistic specificities within the EU territory obliged MTV to change 
its strategy and create country-specific TV channels (RBB Economics and Value Partners, 2009 as 
quoted in Charles River Associates, 2014). 
189 European Audiovisual Observatory (2014), Yearbook Online Premium Services. 
190 Some small budget films are released in Germany only with subtitles. 
191 Please note that in UK, the share of admission for films in foreign languages is about 3%. 
192 The absence of demand for pan-European licenses, mutatis mutandis, can explain the lack of online 
transmission of sports events on an EU-wide basis (Mazziotti, 2013). Interestingly, in a recent 
interview, Mathieu Moreuil (Head of EU Affairs at Premier League) stressed that Premier League 
contents are worth £1 billion in the UK market and about €150 million in the rest of Europe and an 
even bigger ratio applies to the French Ligue 1 where €700 million are collected in France and €7 
million in the 27 other Member States. See Strömbäck, P. (2015), Interview with Mathieu Moreuil, Head of 
EU Affairs at Premier League, Netopia available at: http://www.netopia.eu/2015/05/04/be-careful-
what-you-wish-sports-on-the-dsm/. 
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Italy Dubbing 11.76 30.5 9.90 53.7 
Poland Subtitling 4.00 20.4 16.10 63.39 
Spain Dubbing 8.62 14.00 9.99 69.69 
UK Subtitling 18.25 22.1 3.00 72.7 
Note: *Estimated value. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on European Audiovisual Observatory (2014) and 
on Media Consulting Group 2007. 
An additional and complementary reason for partitioning the Internal Market is rooted in 
the financing scheme adopted to fund the production of movies. A substantial share of the 
overall budget is gathered by pre-selling exclusive exploitation rights on a territorial basis 
and for a certain period of time to sales agents, distributors, or television broadcasters in 
exchange for an upfront payment.193 In some Member States, broadcasting organisations and 
more rarely telecommunication operators are even obliged to contribute to the financing of 
audiovisual productions.194 In addition, some territorial licensing schemes transfer or used to 
transfer to distributors or commercial users full packages of rights covering also the online 
exploitation. As a result, in many circumstances, online exploitation on a pan-European 
basis in not possible as relevant rights are locked up for a certain period of time in 
contractual agreements on a territorial basis.195 Finally, territorial licensing schemes are 
deemed instrumental also to distribution strategies based on the so-called ‘release windows’, 
i.e. on the sequential release of audiovisual content via different media platforms (e.g. 
cinemas, DVD/Blue Ray, Video on Demand, Pay-TV, and free-to-air television), especially 
when the dates of first release and/or the length of the various ‘windows’ are different 
across Member States. 
In this context, geo-blocking is a lawful technical measure allowing commercial users to 
comply with territorial or multi-territorial licensing schemes for online exploitation rights. In 
light of the ubiquitous nature of the Internet, services providers acquiring licenses for the 
reproduction and making available rights of copyrighted content in a certain territory are 
obliged to resort to measures such as geo-blocking in order to avoid copyright infringement 
as well as breach of contract.  
                                                   
193 Based on case study approach FIAPF, IVF and IFTA pointed out that between 32% and 66% of the 
total financing plan of a European movie is covered by pre-selling rights (Charles River Associates, 
2014). It is worth stressing that when it comes to online service providers, some European 
telecommunication operators have purchased pre-selling rights from major Hollywood film studios to 
provide video on-demand services in certain territories (KEA, 2010). 
194 In Poland, Germany, Slovakia and Romania, statutory stakeholders’ contributions also involves 
providers of video on-demand rights, thus posing a potential obstacle to pan-European licensing of 
online exploitation rights (KEA, 2010). 
195 For instance, the majority of broadcast distribution contracts also entitle broadcasters to the right to 
make available online the relevant audiovisual work after the first broadcast (KEA, 2010). 
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2.2.2 The music sector196 
Irrespective of the business model adopted for the supply of digital music, generally online 
commercial users have to clear both the reproduction right (the so-called ‘mechanical’ 
right) and the making available right (the so-called ‘public performance’ right). 
Interestingly, in the music sector authors (i.e. composers and lyricists) hold a copyright on 
their musical compositions whereas performers (i.e. singers and musicians) and phonogram 
producers (i.e. record companies) hold related rights (‘related to copyright’ or ‘neighbouring 
rights’), respectively, on their performances and sound recordings of the authors’ musical 
compositions.197 These three layers of rights co-exist when it comes to exploitation of 
recordings, in a way that all such rights should be cleared for each exploitation to be lawful. 
In addition, each of the aforementioned right-holders is entitled to transfer its economic 
rights to other entities, as occurs with music authors, who traditionally share their rights 
with music publishers. 
As for neighbouring rights, they are generally transferred from performers to record 
companies based on contractual agreements. As a result, online commercial users can clear 
the bundle of related rights required for online exploitations by dealing, directly and 
individually, with record producers. This is usually the case for rights belonging to major 
labels. For related rights held by smaller independent record companies, instead, given their 
greater number and limited resources, commercial users interact with rights and content 
aggregators, on a collective basis.198 Record companies as well as aggregators, similarly to 
film producers, are potentially able to grant multi-territorial or pan-European licenses (see 
Figure 3). 
                                                   
196 At the outset of this Section, it is worth stressing that in 2014 the European Parliament and the 
Council enacted a Directive on collective management of copyright and related rights (Directive 
2014/26/EU) that is expected to facilitate the clearance of exploitation rights on a multi-territorial or 
pan-European basis in the music sector. As Member States have to comply with this Directive by 10 
April 2016, the present interim evaluation of the EU copyright framework does not take into account 
the expected outcome of this new EU measure. Before the enactment of the 2014 Directive, the 
European Commission has sought to simplify and encourage the development of multi-territorial 
licenses of online music rights (see Section II.1.5.1). In spite of such efforts, music rights are very 
fragmented thus increasing transaction costs and posing an obstacle to the integration of the Internal 
Market. 
197 Related rights also belong to broadcasters as regards their own broadcasts. 
198 Interestingly, some aggregators can be specialised in certain online services: ‘Aggregators convert 
and encode music formats and deliver technical copies of the music, and act as distributors of music 
over the Internet, negotiating directly or through an intermediary the deals with online music 
services’ (KEA & VRIJE Universiteit Brussels, 2012). For instance, Merlin offers a one-stop shop for 
streaming and mobile services (e.g. Deezer, Spotify) by negotiating licenses on behalf of independent 
music companies that already possess their own aggregator and distributor services dealing 
separately with traditional download platforms (e.g. iTunes). Merlin is a non-profit joint-licensing 
organisation established in 2007 as a global digital rights agency. It gathers 650 members representing 
more than 20,000 independent labels and distributors worldwide. Its mission is to represent the 
independent music sector worldwide and to act as a central point of entry to the music repertoires it 
represents, in particular for digital, new media and mobile rights. Hence, Merlin issues multi-
territorial licenses to streaming and mobile services via a single deal and redistributes revenues 
accrued from its commercial agreements to its members.  
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Figure 3. Licensing chain for related rights in the music sector 
 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on KEA & Vrije Universiteit Brussel (2012) and Charles River Associates (2014). 
Complexity arises when it comes to the author’s copyright in the music sector. The vast 
majority of music authors mandate a certain collective management organisation (CMOs) to 
manage, on an exclusive basis, their rights of communication to the public, which include the 
rights of making content available online, by: i) negotiating rates and terms of use; ii) 
granting licenses to commercial users; iii) monitoring the exploitation of rights and pursuing 
infringers; iv) collecting royalties and redistributing these revenues to right-holders.199 A 
CMO is generally based in a certain Member State where it offers a bundle of rights for its 
own repertoire as well as for repertoires of its associated CMOs operating in other territories 
(multi-repertoire licensing).200 In other words, they grant licenses for exploiting the rights of 
both national and foreign right-holders in the territory of the Member State where they are 
established. The licensing of other repertoires is based on a network of reciprocal 
representation agreements. In principle, a national collecting society can also grant multi-
territorial licenses for its own repertoire (provided that the authors’ mandate is not limited to 
one country). In practice, each collecting society usually grants licenses for all the repertoires 
in its own country (mono-territorial licensing), at least as regards offline exploitations that 
require a reasonably high monitoring capacity on a certain territory of operation.201 More 
recently, some collective management societies have created regional hubs where online 
                                                   
199 JURI Committee (2010), Copyright Territoriality, Collective Management and Remuneration, Working 
Document, European Parliament 15 September 2010. 
200 Is some Member States several CMOs coexist and represent different right-holders (e.g. authors, 
publishers) and, in some cases, different rights (European Commission (2012), Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical 
Works for Online Uses in the Internal Market, SWD(2012)2014 final). 
201 The main reason for this territorial partition is rooted in the need to physically monitor and enforce 
rights in the ‘offline’ environment (see C-351/12 OSA v. Lecebne lazne Marianske Lazne).  
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commercial users can obtain multi-territorial licenses for the repertoire of the member 
societies.202 
CMOs from continental-European (i.e. droit d’auteur or author’s right systems) Member 
States are generally entitled to manage also the reproduction rights for copyrighted musical 
works of the authors they represent. Nonetheless, this specific right is usually co-owned by 
music publishers, as a result of the contractual arrangements with composers and lyricists.203 
Interestingly, due to a different contractual tradition and a different way the mechanical 
rights were exploited in the pre-digital era, reproduction rights for Anglo-American 
repertoires are entirely owned by publishing companies rather than owned or co-owned by 
authors, in a way that these rights have been exploited by entities entirely controlled by 
publishers (Mazziotti, 2011). As a result, whereas collecting societies from ‘author’s right’ 
systems like France’s and Germany’s generally manage mechanical rights also for 
publishers,204 major publishers of Anglo-American repertoires, which originally managed 
these rights by themselves (either individually or through their own collective rights 
management organisations), in response to the European Commission’s initiatives in the area 
of collective management of online music rights, have progressively transferred their 
reproduction rights from their collecting societies to specialised and mono-repertoire 
rights management organisations whose sole purpose is the multi-territorial or pan-
European licensing of these specific rights.205 
                                                   
202 ARMONIA and the Nordisk Copyright Bureau are two examples of regional hubs. ARMONIA is 
the first pan-European hub for the licensing of online services and was founded in 2013 by the SIAE 
(Italy), SGAE (Spain) and SACEM (France). Recently joined by ARTISJUS (Hungary), SABAM 
(Belgium) and SUISA (Switzerland), among others, it represents 5.5 million aggregated works and 
aims at improving the identification of musical works and more accurately claiming authors’ rights. In 
particular, it seeks to improve processing speed of sales reports and better value the documentation 
and invoicing tools to simplify relationships with Digital Services Providers through the creation of a 
one-stop shop for sales reports for Digital Services Providers and the mutualisation of common 
activities of analysis and validation of sales reports. ARMONIA has signed a series of agreements with 
Beatport, Google, Deezer and YouTube for access to the repertoires of the member societies as well as 
those of UMPI, SONY ATV Latino and SPA. The Nordisk Copyright Bureau is the joint-collecting 
society owned by the Nordic performing rights societies such as KODA in Denmark, STEF in Iceland, 
STIM in Sweden, TEOSTO in Finland and TONO in Norway. Apart from administering the recording 
and copying rights on behalf of their owner societies, the Nordisk Copyright Bureau also administers 
these rights for the Baltic performing rights societies: AKKA-LAA in Latvia, EAÜ in Estonia and 
LATGA-A in Lithuania. The Nordisk Copyright Bureau also holds 50% of the shares in the Network 
of Music Partners (NMP), a joint venture company owned by NCB and PRS for Music that provides 
back-office services to the music copyright administration industry (Mazziotti, 2011). 
203 Music publishers are generally distinct from recording companies. They usually manage and 
promote authors’ compositions in exchange of part of the authors’ rights or a share of authors’ 
royalties. Music publishers are not considered copyright owners by law: they become right-holders as 
a result of the transfer of rights from authors (Charles River Associates, 2014; KEA & VRIJE 
Universiteit Brussels, 2012). 
204 In some Member States, publishers’ rights and authors’ rights are managed by different collecting 
societies (see note 200). 
205 Mono-territorial reproduction rights of publishing companies are still managed by national 
collecting societies, also for Anglo-American repertoire (Mazziotti, 2011; Mazziotti, 2013). 
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Figure 4. Licensing chain for copyright in the music sector 
 
Note: 
A) Mono-territorial licensing for all repertoires and multi-territorial licensing of Continental repertoire; 
B) Multi-territorial licensing of Anglo-American repertoire. 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on KEA & Vrije Universiteit Brussel (2012) and Charles River Associates (2014). 
In light of the above, as regards copyright of musical works, online commercial users have 
to deal with different licensing procedures depending on two main dimensions: i) the 
territorial scope of their offer; ii) the repertoire they intend to provide (see Figure 4).  
 For mono-territorial license of both Continental and Anglo-American repertoire, they 
have to clear both reproduction and making available rights with national CMOs.206  
 For multi-territorial license of Continental European repertoire they have to deal either 
with national collecting societies in all the Member States they intend to serve or, if any, 
with regional hubs grouping several collecting societies.  
 Finally, for multi-territorial license of Anglo-American repertoire, online commercial 
users have to negotiate with right management organisations for reproduction rights and 
with national CMOs or regional hubs for making available rights.  
As a result, the fragmentation of copyright and related rights, right-holders, and 
repertoires as well as the territorial scope of licenses granted by traditional collecting 
societies force online commercial users to conduct numerous parallel negotiations in each 
Member State. This inflates transaction costs and creates substantial obstacles to the 
provision of pan-European online music services as well as other online services requiring 
the clearance of music copyright and related rights, such as audiovisual services.207 
According to a study published by KEA & VRIJE Universiteit Brussels, commercial users 
                                                   
206 In those Member States where several CMOs representing multiple authors or rights are active, also 
mono-territorial licensing may require multiple licenses. In this circumstance, a layer of complexity is 
added by the so-called ‘split-copyright’ issue. In other words, as many musical works are co-written 
by several authors and each author may have transferred his/her rights to a different national 
collecting society, the clearing of rights might be particularly complex for the very same musical work. 
207 See European Commission (2012), Impact Assessment Accompanying the Document Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Collective Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights and Multi-territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online Uses in the 
Internal Market, SWD(2012)2014 final. 
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that provide services in more than one country and offer more than one million titles face 
transaction costs up to €260,000 per year and need about six employees to deal with licensing 
issues; in particular, the identification of relevant right-holders may require up to six months 
and negotiations to clear rights may last up to two years (KEA & VRIJE Universiteit Brussels, 
2012).  
As explained above, additional reasons may impinge on multi-territorial licensing in the 
music sector. Similarly to the film sector, to some extent cultural and linguistic diversities 
may also pose an obstacle to the proper functioning of the Internal Market. The success of 
several national repertoires is mainly limited to the territory of a certain Member State. EU 
music works that have a market beyond national barriers usually follow patterns that are set 
by cultural and linguistic proximity. Only Anglo-American repertoires are truly able to meet 
a pan-European demand by benefiting from the widespread use of English and the diffusion 
of the Anglo-American culture throughout Europe.208 In addition, especially for online 
advertisement-funded music service, territorial fragmentation may also result from 
commercial decisions and not only from the territorial scope of copyright and related rights. 
Given the current EU copyright framework and the contractual freedom left to right-holders 
and commercial users, also in the music sector geo-blocking is lawful and even necessary to 
avoid copyright infringement and breach of license terms in the absence of pan-European 
licenses. While geo-blocking seems detrimental for consumers, it protects them from 
infringing copyright by exploiting online content in territories not covered by the license 
they have purchased.  
Box 2. Virtual Private Networks (VPN) 
“A virtual private network (VPN) extends a private network across a public network, such as 
the Internet. It enables a computer or network-enabled device to send and receive data across 
shared or public networks as if it were directly connected to the private network, while 
benefiting from the functionality, security and management policies of the private network”.209 
VPNs offer a higher level of privacy and security against any kind of cyber-attack, intrusion or 
eavesdropping. Two main types of VPN are increasingly used to privatise the exchange of data 
over the public Internet: ‘site-to-site VPN’ allows multiple offices in fixed locations to establish 
secure connections with each other; and ‘remote access VPN’ which offers individual users 
secure connections with a remote computer network (Hussein FCMI & Abdul HadiQais, 2013). 
VPN providers set their own prices based on their geographic coverage and the quality of 
services they would guarantee (see Table 3). Generally, the most expensive offers would cover 
a broader geographic zone and guarantee a higher level of privacy protection as well as of 
bandwidth. Commercial services providers are constantly developing network innovations 
and new techniques to circumvent any VPN-blocking or throttling systems. The most 
expensive services usually provide additional so-called ‘socks’ to hide the user’s IP address 
and ensure higher levels of anonymity while surfing the web, to circumvent restrictions on 
                                                   
208 See European Parliament (2009), Collecting Societies and Cultural Diversity in the Music Sector, 
Directorate-General for Internal Policies. 
209 See Virtual Private Network, Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_private_ 
network#cite_ref-1.) 
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websites and quickly change the geographic location by switching the user’s IP address with 
one belonging to the service provider’s proxy server.210 There are also free VPN services that 
usually are not able to guarantee the quality of loading or the safety of transmitted data. 
Using VPN or any other methods to encrypt or circumvent public routes online raises many 
questions of legality. So far, using a VPN is generally lawful, however, problems of legality are 
posed as regards the practices enabled by the use of such technology, largely depending on 
activities pursued through the private network. When it comes to copyright, VPN is a powerful 
tool to circumvent geo-blocking and access to online copyrighted content licensed in a certain 
Member State from another EU or extra-EU country, thus bypassing both existing obstacles to 
cross-border portability and cross-border trade of digital works. It is worth stressing that 
activities enabled by geo-blocking circumvention constitutes copyright infringement as well as 
breach of licensing contracts. In this respect, the lawfulness of VPNs should be assessed also 
under the lens of Article 6(2) of the InfoSoc Directive, which obliges Member States to provide 
legal protection against the provision of services that “have only a limited commercially 
significant purpose or use other than to circumvent any effective technological protection 
measure”.  
Table 3. Sample of commercial VPN service providers 
Provider IP Addresses Locations P2P Monthly fee 
HideMyAss 116,607 311 Servers No $6.55 193 Countries 
VyprVPN 200,000 52 Servers Yes $5.00 43 Countries 
PureVPN 77,000 125 Servers Some $4.16 100 Countries 
Private Internet Access 3,000 23 Servers Yes $3.33 15 Countries 
SaferVPN 5,000 30 Servers No $5.99 22 Countries 
IP Vanish 25,000 76 Servers Yes $6.49 60 Countries 
Invisible Browsing VPN 2,000 62 Servers Yes $3.08 39 Countries 
Express VPN 10,000 97 Servers Yes $8.32 78 Countries 
Hotspot Shield n.a. 6 Countries n.a. $2.49 
EarthVPN 3,000 150 Servers Some $3.33 32 Countries 
IronSocket n.a. 50 Servers Yes $4.16 36 Countries 
StrongVPN n.a. 44 Servers Yes $4.58 22 Countries 
Proxify n.a. 1290 Servers n.a. $10.00 78 Countries 
NordVPN 633 20 Countries Yes $4.00 
                                                   
210 See TheSafety.US website  at http://thesafety.us/en. 
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TheSafety.us 200 23 Servers n.a. $30.00 20 Countries 




2.2.3 The book publishing sector 
The licensing value chain of the book publishing sector includes three main typologies of 
actors: i) the authors of literary content; ii) the publishers; and iii) the distributors (see Figure 
5). Authors are the content creators who materially draft manuscripts. Publishers select or 
commission literary works and add value to them by hiring, inter alia, editors, designers, 
illustrators, indexers in order to package a book edition. In addition, publishers make 
marketing and sales efforts to increase demand for their publications. By virtue of a 
distribution agreement, in the offline world distributors play the role of intermediaries 
between publishers and retailers such as bookstores. Nonetheless, the boundaries that 
traditionally divided publishers and distributors are progressively fading out. For instance, 
several large publishing companies have also their own distribution networks as well as 
bookstores. In the digital world, publishers can directly deal with online retailers and also 
smaller publishing companies may directly reach consumers via their own web-store and/or 
by adopting new alternative distribution mechanisms such as print-on-demand.211 More 
recently, some large retailers, such as Amazon, started to move upward along the value 
chain and provide publishing services, thus directly acquiring exploitation rights from 
authors. 
                                                   
211 Print-on-demand is a technology and innovative business process through which copies of a book 
or any press document are printed singly and entirely in a pre-defined quantity, once an order has 
been received. Therefore, it offers advantages such as quicker technical set-up for offset printing as 
well as reduced storage, handling and inventory costs. 
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Figure 5. Licensing value chain in the book publishing sector 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
 
Licensing schemes in the book publishing sector hardly fit in a pre-defined model as they 
are usually based on private negotiations between authors/writers of manuscripts212 and 
publishers.213 The outcomes of these negotiations are affected by national laws regulating 
the form and content of licensing agreements as well as rights and obligations of the parties 
and the termination of the contracts.214 A preliminary distinction can be made between the 
cases in which an author assigns his/her copyright to a certain publisher215 and the cases in 
                                                   
212 Authors/writers of manuscripts are the first owner of copyright as they are the creators of literary 
content. In some circumstances and under some national law provisions, the publisher can be 
considered the first owner of copyright. This is the case, for instance, of projects such as dictionaries or 
encyclopaedias or copyrighted materials created by employees during their work hours (WIPO, 
Managing Intellectual Property in the Book Publishing Industry, Creative Industries – Booklet No. 1). It is 
worth stressing that the identification of the author of a literary work can become particularly 
complex and subject to national rules when the creators produce content as part of their employment 
duties or when the work is created by several creators working together (the so-called ‘collaborative 
works’) or when creators are directed by a principal (the so-called ‘collective works’) (JURI Committee 
(2010), Copyright and Digitisation of Books, Working Document, European Parliament 18 March 2010).  
213 Please note that a published book may also include drawings, paintings or photographs. Therefore, 
the publisher needs to clear the relevant rights held respectively by illustrators, painters or 
photographers. For the sake of simplicity, what follows will focus exclusively on the rights held by 
authors of literary content. 
214 For instance, in some Member States, such as France and Germany, publishing contracts are subject 
to specific interpretation rules; in some other Member States, such as UK, general contract rules apply 
(DG INFSO & DG MARKT (2009), Creating Content in a European Digital Single Market: Challenges for the 
Future, A Reflection Document). 
215 In some countries this option is precluded by law (WIPO, Managing Intellectual Property in the Book 
Publishing Industry, Creative Industries – Booklet No. 1). 
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which only certain rights are transferred to a publisher via a licensing agreement (the so-
called ‘publishing contract’ or ‘head contract’). The former arrangement transforms the 
publisher in a single licensing entity comparable to the producers of audiovisual work. In 
other words, the publisher is fully entitled to exploit and enforce all the economic rights 
connected with a certain literary work. A comparable result is achieved when publishing 
contracts transfer to a publisher all the economic rights connected to a literary work on an 
exclusive basis (Clark & Philips, 2014). Against this background, the publisher is certainly 
able to distribute digital copies of a book, online on a pan-European basis. 
The picture is less clear when authors transfer only some of the commercially relevant 
rights. In principle, publishing contracts may vary in relation to three dimensions: i) the 
rights transferred; ii) the territorial scope of the rights transferred; and iii) the duration of the 
agreement. As for the first dimension, the minimum bundle of rights allowing the publisher 
to publish a literary work includes reproduction and distribution rights. In general, the 
contract may specify in what formats the book will be published as well as in what 
languages and countries. While territorial limitations are lawful but not frequent in the book 
publishing sector, authors may still decide to reserve for themselves the right of translating 
and publishing the work in other languages. These rights will be potentially included by 
authors in publishing contracts with foreign publishers. Authors may also retain the right of 
making available the work to the public that is necessary for allowing electronic publication. 
Interestingly, publishing contracts drafted before the digital era (especially in those countries 
where law provisions prevent the inclusion in these agreements of non-existing/future mode 
of exploitation)216 do not include the making available right; hence, electronic publishing still 
requires the written authorisation of authors. In more recent ‘head contracts’, this right is 
usually transferred to publishers (Strong, 2003). 
Also, ‘subsidiary rights’ can be an additional source of conflict while negotiating a 
licensing agreement. A few examples can be mentioned: i) the digest rights required to 
publish an abridgement; ii) the serial rights required to serialise the work in newspapers or 
magazines; iii) the dramatisation and documentary rights as well as the film rights required 
for the adaptation of the work for the screen; iv) the merchandising rights. In general, few 
authors have enough bargaining power to carve out commercially-relevant rights from a 
standard licensing agreement, especially when they deal with large publishing companies. 
Nonetheless, ‘head contracts’ with small publishers, in particular when the author is assisted 
by professional agents, can lead to a fragmentation of rights between the publisher and the 
original copyright owner. In addition, in some jurisdictions the licensing agreement has to 
include a maximum duration.217 When duration is not included in the agreement, the 
contract may still include termination clauses such as the option to revert the rights to the 
author when the publication goes out of the print and the publisher is not interested in 
reprinting it. The issue of the duration can potentially lead to a fragmentation of the rights 
over the time. 
It is worth stressing that collective management societies also play a role in the book 
publishing sector when it comes to managing reproduction rights. The so-called 
reproduction rights organisations (RROs) are authorised by right-holders (either authors or 
                                                   
216 See WIPO, Managing Intellectual Property in the Book Publishing Industry, Creative Industries – 
Booklet No. 1). 
217 Ibid. 
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publishers) to exercise the exclusive right of reproduction of literary works.218 Traditionally 
these organisations, which operate on a strictly territorial basis and are linked by bilateral 
agreements similar to those in force in the music sector, have been mandated to manage 
reprographic reproduction of copyrighted publications by granting authorisation to copy 
only a portion of a work, in a limited number of copies (Rudolph, 2005). Recently, several 
RROs deal also with reproduction of parts of literary works in the digital environment;219 this 
should affect only marginally digital publishing as long as right-holders still reserve for 
themselves the reproduction rights (for the entire publication) required for distributing their 
works over the Internet. It is worth stressing that, in the book publishing sector, the issue of 
printing and copying a whole digital publication can be effectively tackled via digital right 
management tools and TPMs. 
In conclusion, in spite of the potential fragmentation of commercially-relevant rights 
between publishers and authors as well as the validity of the principle of territoriality also 
for digital publishing of literary works, in practice copyright territoriality does not 
represent the main obstacle to the Internal Market integration. It is to some extent a minor 
issue when compared to the linguistic fragmentation experienced within the EU. And in fact, 
it is customary not to attach any territorial restriction to a book published in a given 
language.220 Nonetheless, in the markets for eBooks some licenses are being territorial 
restricted.221 
Box 3. Identification of right-holders 
The identification of right-holders of copyright and related rights can be a burdensome task. The 
legislative discussions on collective rights management and orphan works shed light on the 
difficulties related to rights clearance processes and on the issue of ‘split-copyright’ that refers to 
the fragmentation of rights among original copyright owner(s) and other parties involved in the 
licensing chain. For instance, as mentioned earlier, artistic works may be co-created, co-written 
or/and co-produced. In addition, right-holders may have mandated different collecting societies 
to manage their rights, and may have transferred their reproduction, communication, and 
making available rights to third parties (e.g. publishers and distributors), using different 
contractual agreements. Due to the complex and disparate management systems of copyright and 
related rights across the EU, rights clearance for one specific work might require identifying and 
dealing with several organisations and licensing schemes at Member State level. The 
identification of right-holders is made even more complex by the uncertainty created by the 
increasing phenomenon of UGC and related claims of right as well as by those works whose 
authors may not be identifiable nor locatable. 
First, difficulties in identifying right-holders may increase transaction costs for commercial users 
                                                   
218 In some countries right-holders can decide to exercise this right themselves; in some other countries 
reproduction right organisations are entitled by law to also manage the rights of non-represented 
right-holders. 
219 See WIPO, Managing Intellectual Property in the Book Publishing Industry, Creative Industries – 
Booklet No. 1). 
220 JURI Committee (2010), Copyright and Digitisation of Books, Working Document, European 
Parliament 18 March 2010. 
221 See European Commission (2014), Report on the responses to the Public Consultation on the Review of the 
EU Copyright Rules, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-
rules/docs/contributions/consultation-report_en.pdf. 
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and in turn increase costs for end-users or limit the available offer of copyrighted works, 
especially when transaction costs create barriers to cross-border content provision. Second, this 
issue remains a critical problem also for potential new creators insofar as derivative works and 
transformative uses require the explicit consent of the author of a pre-existing work. 
Consequently, improving the availability and accessibility of rights-related information is key for 
the EU creative industry, future potential creators and end-users. Besides identifying original 
right-holders, many questions are relevant: whether right-holders manage their rights 
individually or collectively; how rights are managed and which company is in charge of this task; 
whether the work is still available on the market or rather ‘out-of-commerce’ or ‘out-of print’; 
whether it constitutes an orphan work or belongs to the public domain. So far, the challenge lies 
in centralising this information that, to some extent, is already held by private actors such as 
production companies, collective right organisations or various public institutions (such as 
libraries, archives, museums, educational establishments, and public services broadcasters), but 
hardly available to commercial users (especially new entrants) and the broader public. In 
response to this problem, central databases and common identification systems are essential in 
facilitating access to information and improving the overall process of DRM. 
The European Commission funded several initiatives to support the use and interoperability of 
identifiers and ensure better access to right-holders and works-related information. The first 
attempt to create an Internet portal providing fast access to information on rights holders’ 
organisations in Europe was the ‘Open Right System’. More recently, the ‘Linked Content 
Coalition’ (LCC)222 and the ‘Right Data Integration’ (RDI)223 aimed to develop a standardised and 
interoperable architecture that would allow right users to access a central information and 
transformation hub. Specific to the music sector, the ‘Global Repertoire Database’ is an attempt to 
create a one-stop shop for copyright management, meaning a single global and authoritative 
source of multi-territory information about the ownership or control of the musical repertoires. 
Additionally, the Accessible Registries of Rights Information and Orphan Works towards 
Europeana (ARROW) aims also at facilitating the management of rights and keep track records of 
diligent searches224 related to orphan works, through an automated system that meets the needs 
of digital libraries for enhanced legal certainty and that supports the preservation and the 
dissemination of European cultural heritage.  
 
                                                   
222 LCC is a non-profit global consortium of standards bodies and registries aiming to facilitate and 
expand the legitimate use of content in the digital network through the effective use of interoperable 
identifiers and metadata. LCC members are organisations that create and manage data standards 
associated with content of one or more types, particularly for identifiers, metadata and messaging 
though a common ‘Rights Reference Model’; see http://www.linkedcontentcoalition.org. 
223 The RDI project aims at addressing the need for better solutions for discovering, licensing and 
delegating intellectual property rights, and providing users with access to information and enabling 
creators and right-holders to be properly rewarded; see http://www.rdi-project.org. 
224 The Directive on certain permitted uses of orphan works lays down basic requirements constituting 
a diligent search and entrusts the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market to establish and 
manage a European database containing the information related to orphan works and records of 
diligent searches across the European Union, in coordination with relevant national authorities. 
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2.3 The market fragmentation effects of copyright exceptions and limitations 
2.3.1 Exception and limitations at EU and Member State level 
2.3.1.1 The EU legal framework 
As explained in more detail in Section II.1.2.5 above, the system of exceptions and 
limitations225 provided by the InfoSoc Directive determined the emergence of the following 
situation.  
 First, Member States are free to choose which exceptions and limitations to adopt in 
their national legislation as well as, to some extent, to tailor the content of the 
exceptions and limitations taken from the EU closed list. In addition, national courts 
may provide divergent interpretations of some exceptions. Interestingly, while in some 
Member States the three-step test is recognised either explicitly (in France) or implicitly 
(in Germany) as an instrument in judicial revisions of the copyright law, in other Member 
States such as the UK the test is addressed to the legislator only and cannot be used by 
courts.226 Hence, some uses may be lawful in certain Member States and not lawful in 
others.  
 Second, Member States are responsible for finding the right balance between 
copyright exceptions and limitations and TPM and they have a large margin of 
discretion in pursuing this objective; hence, some uses may be technically possible in 
certain Member States and not possible in others.  
In what follows, the potential Internal Market fragmentation effects stemming from Articles 
5 and 6 of the InfoSoc Directive are discussed. In particular, the following copyright 
exceptions and limitations, which are deemed to have the most relevant impact on the 
Internal Market in the digital era, are carefully assessed227: 
 The mandatory exception for transient and incidental copies (Article 5(1)); 
 The exceptions for the benefit of libraries, educational establishments, archives, and 
museums (Article 5(2)(c) and 5(3)(n)); 
 The exception for the purpose of teaching or scientific research (Article 5(3)(a)); 
 The exception for the purpose of reporting of current events (Article 5(3)(c)); 
 The exception for quotations (Article 5(3)(d); 
 The parody exception (Article 5(3)(k)); 
 The freedom of panorama exception (Article 5(3)(h)); 
                                                   
225 The term ‘exceptions’ is used in this Section interchangeably with the term ‘limitations’. 
226 The three-step test has not been implemented in the national legislation of all Member States, 
despite in principle its application is mandatory (see Annex A for further details). 
227 See European Commission (2007), Report to the Council, the European Parliament, and the 
Economic and Social Committee on the Application of Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of 
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, Commission Staff 
Working Document, SEC(2007)1556; and European Commission (2013), Public Consultation on the 
Review of the EU Copyright Rules, Consultation Document available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/docs/consultation-
document_en.pdf. 
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 The ‘private copying’ exception (Article 5(2)b)). 
The national implementation of the exceptions and limitations listed above are assessed in a 
sample of Member States comprising France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Poland and the UK. 
Selected countries represent about 70% of the total gross domestic product (GDP) generated 
by copyright-intensive industries at the EU level in 2010 (approximately €366 billion out of 
€535 billion) and about 65% of the total workforce directly employed in the same sectors 
(approximately 4.5 million out of 7 million).228 In particular, France, Germany, the UK and 
Italy are the top four EU Member States contributing to copyright intensive industries in 
terms of both GDP and employment. Similarly, Poland tops the list of Central Eastern 
European Member States for both dimensions. The inclusion in the sample of the UK and 
Ireland enables a comparison between civil law and common law countries. Interestingly, 
Ireland is also the EU country with the highest GDP share (8.1%) ascribable to copyright-
intensive industries. 
Annex A at the end of this Study contains detailed comparison tables for all exceptions listed 
above, and for each of the six selected Member States. 
2.3.2 Transient and incidental copies  
Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive includes the only mandatory copyright limitation which 
exempts: i) certain temporary acts (e.g. caching, reproduction on Internet routers) enabling 
transmission of digital copyrighted content in a network between third parties by an 
intermediary (e.g. an ISP); ii) certain temporary and lawful acts which are carried out by end-
users and have no independent economic significance (e.g. browsing, caching, copies created 
in a Random Access Memory of a computer) (Mazziotti, 2008). According to Recital 33 of the 
InfoSoc Directive a use is lawful when authorised by the right-holder or not restricted by 
law.  
While in the Netherlands this limitation was deemed to define the scope of the reproduction 
right, in all the other Member States it was implemented by reflecting carefully the text of 
the InfoSoc Directive (Queen Mary Intellectual Property Research Institute, 2007; see Annex 
A for further details). Notwithstanding the literal transposition, this provision can still lead 
to issues of market fragmentation due to diverging interpretation by national courts, 
especially when it comes to new uses and new technologies.229 
                                                   
228 See European Patent Office and Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (2013), Intellectual 
property rights intensive industries: contribution to economic performance and employment in the European 
Union; absolute values have been computed on Eurostat data for GDP and employment. 
229 For instance, a Belgian court (Google v. Copiepresse, Brussels Court of First Instance (TGI), 13 
February 2007) did not apply this limitation to the copy of a web page stored in Google’s servers and 
accessible through a link available on the Google search website. In addition, a Swedish court (Danske 
Dagblades Forening v. Infopaq Sverige AB, District Court Stockholm, 14 August 2014) decided that this 
limitation does not apply to scanning technologies. The jury is still out when it comes to the 
application of Article 5(1) to text and data mining. 
78  RENDA, SIMONELLI, MAZZIOTTI, BOLOGNINI & LUCHETTA 
2.3.3 Exceptions for the benefit of libraries, educational establishments, archives 
and museums 
Libraries, educational establishments, archives and museums230 are covered by two 
exceptions under Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive.231 Article 5(2)(c) provides an exception 
to the reproduction right for specific acts of reproduction made by these institutions, 
provided that no direct or indirect economic or commercial advantage results from such 
acts. Interestingly, the provision does not specify the acts that are exempted, it does not 
cover the making available on the Internet of copies of copyrighted works (cf. Recital 40) and 
does not contain any indication on ‘format shifting’ (e.g. the digitisation of books via 
scanning technologies) or the number of copies that can be made. In compliance with the 
three-step test, this exception has been interpreted to allow only certain special acts of 
reproduction that are usually identified with preservation and archiving purposes. 
In France this exception does not apply to educational establishments and covers also on-site 
consultation of copyrighted works. The Italian law exempts only reprographic 
reproductions and explicitly excludes digital copying from the scope of application of this 
exception (in other words, ‘format shifting’ is not permitted); when the copy is made by 
libraries, a levy scheme applies. In Poland the exception, which does not apply to museums, 
is not explicitly restricted to non-commercial purposes and enables both preservation and 
making available to the public ‘free of charge’; reproduction rights are granted, under certain 
conditions, also to research centres and information and documentation centres. In the UK, 
libraries, archives and museums are entitled to make copies of all types of works included in 
their collections in order to preserve or replace those works and also to supply them to other 
privileged institutions to replace discarded, lost or destroyed works; this exception is subject 
to several conditions and is shielded from any contractual restriction. In Ireland and 
Germany, there is no specific implementation of Article 5(2)(c) of the InfoSoc Directive. In 
Ireland, libraries and archives (museums are excluded) can make copies for preservation 
purposes or to replace lost works, which cannot be purchased, in other libraries and 
archives; several additional exceptions apply to reproduction within educational 
establishments, libraries and archives. In Germany, reproduction acts by libraries and 
archives are generally constrained; these institutions are only entitled, under the private 
copying exception, to make copies, on paper or similar medium, for inclusion into ‘own’ 
archives (provided that these archives are not accessible by third parties and not intended for 
direct or indirect commercial purposes) (see Annex A). 
In principle, this exception has no cross-border effects, as the acts of reproduction for 
preservation and archiving purposes are made by privileged institutions within the 
territory of the State where they are located and on copyrighted works available in the 
their collections.232 Nonetheless, in the digital era some acts of reproduction might become 
crucial when it comes to mass digitisation, i.e. the activity of digitising, in full or partially, 
                                                   
230 According to Recital 40 of the InfoSoc Directive, these exceptions apply to ‘non-profit’ institutions 
such as publicly accessible libraries. 
231 Please note that an optional public lending exception is formulated in Article 6 of the Rental and 
Lending Directive (Directive 2006/115/EC). 
232 Some issues linked to the principle of territoriality may arise when libraries and other institutions 
decide to outsource the acts of reproduction to companies that are based in a different State (De Wolf 
& Partners, 2013). 
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collections held by certain institutions, such as libraries and archives, with the purpose of 
preservation. These digitised works are then, usually, made available to the public.233 The 
provision included under Article 5(2)(c) of the InfoSoc Directive can potentially exempt from 
right-holders’ authorisation reproduction acts requiring ‘format-shifting’ (e.g. scanning of 
books), thus accelerating the digitisation of library and archive collections. Nonetheless, 
according to a recent decision of the CJEU, this exception would not allow the digitisation of 
an entire collection held by privileged institutions (cf. Technische Universitat Darmstadt). At 
this stage, the scope of this exception is still shaped to a large extent by national transposition 
as well as by national courts’ interpretations, especially when it comes to ‘format shifting’. 
As a result, institutions based in certain EU Member States may have a ‘competitive’ 
advantage in mass digitisation activities as well as in providing copyrighted contents for 
transnational projects such as Europeana.234 On this issue, the Commission intervened in 
2006 with a Recommendation and advised Member States to improve conditions for 
digitisation of, and online accessibility to, cultural material and to establish national 
strategies for the long-term preservation of (and access to) digital material, in compliance 
with copyright law.235 Specifically, the Commission recommended enacting provisions that 
enable multiple copying and migration of digital cultural material by public institutions for 
preservation purposes, in full respect of both EU and international copyright legislation. It is 
worth remarking that at any rate the exception formulated in Article 5(2)(c) does not cover 
the making available to the public of digitised, copyrighted works. 
In this respect, Article 5(3)(n) provides an additional exception enabling communication or 
making available of copyrighted works and other subject matter included in the 
collections of the aforementioned institutions, via dedicated terminals on their premises, to 
the benefit of individual members of the public and for the purpose of research or private 
study. Interestingly, off-premises access to the collections of these establishments as well as 
public lending and ‘e-lending’ are not covered by this exception. In addition, the exception 
has not been shielded from contractual arrangements that may prohibit or limit on-site 
consultation.  
In France, this provision is included to some extent in the one covering reproduction for 
preservation purposes; a specific on-site consultation exception applies to establishments in 
charge of the legal deposit of copyrighted works (e.g. the National Library) and only to 
‘authorised’ researchers. In Ireland the exception concerns only copying and does not 
include making available on dedicated terminals; at any rate, right-holders are entitled to 
establish a licensing scheme and claim for compensation. In Italy, Germany, Poland and the 
UK the formulation is to a large extent similar to the text of the InfoSoc Directive. 
Nonetheless, in Germany two caveats apply: i) right-holders may claim reasonable 
compensation administered by collecting societies; ii) the number of copies made 
simultaneously available cannot exceed the copies owned by the privileged institutions. 
                                                   
233 See European Commission (2013), Public Consultation on the Review of the EU Copyright Rules, 
Consultation Document available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/docs/consultation-
document_en.pdf. 
234 Europeana is an Internet portal acting as an interface to millions of books, paintings, films, museum 
objects and archival records that have been digitised throughout Europe. 
235 See European Commission (2006), Commission Recommendation of 24 August 2006 on the 
Digitisation and Online Accessibility of Cultural Material and Digital Preservation, (2006/685/EC). 
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Interestingly, in Poland the exception covers also work subject to purchase or licensing terms 
for these uses (cf. Annex A). 
At this stage, given the limited spatial (on the premises of the privileged institutions) and 
technical (via dedicated terminals) scope of application, this exception has no impact on 
the functioning of the Internal Market (De Wolf & Partners, 2013). Nonetheless, according 
to the CJEU this exception incorporates an ‘ancillary right of dissemination’ that would allow 
the digitisation of copyrighted works included in the collections of the privileged institutions 
in order to enable on-site consultation (cf. Technische Universitat Darmstadt). As a result, 
Article 5(3)(n) might become key to facilitating a mass digitisation project. It is worth 
stressing that for those publications that are largely available in digital format, such as 
academic publications in peer reviewed journals, many libraries and educational 
establishments have entered into licensing agreements with right-holders (i.e. publishers) in 
order to provide remote consultation236 to part of their collections. These arrangements are 
less frequent for non-born-digital content such as books and journals printed in the pre-
digital era. 
2.3.4 Teaching or scientific research 
Article 5(3)(a) of the InfoSoc Directive gives the option to Member States to implement 
exceptions and limitations allowing uses of copyrighted works for the sole purpose of 
illustration for teaching or scientific research without commercial purposes. Such uses 
require, whenever possible, the indication of the source and the author’s name. According to 
the text of the InfoSoc Directive, the requirement of illustration applies only to teaching 
rather than to scientific research. Recital 42 includes distance learning (e.g. e-learning) in the 
scope of application of this exception. In principle, the formulation of Article 5(3)(a) is quite 
open, thus leaving room for diverging implementation at Member State level.237 
In France, this exception allows communication or reproduction of excerpts of copyrighted 
works and is subject to sectoral agreements as well as to additional conditions. For instance: 
i) works made for educational purposes, sheet music and works made for a digital edition of 
literary works are excluded; ii) the public can include only pupils, students, teachers or 
researchers; iii) right-holders are entitled to fair compensation; iv) the purpose of illustration 
is mandatory also for research. In Poland, disseminated works (in original or in translation) 
can be used by research and educational institutions for teaching and research activities; 
there is no mention of the illustration purpose nor of non-commercial purposes. The recent 
implementation in the UK is limited to non-commercial purposes, requires sufficient 
acknowledgements of the right-holders and covers: i) the uses of copyrighted works for the 
sole purpose of illustration for instruction (these uses are shielded from contractual 
restrictions and licensing agreements); ii) the recording and communication of a broadcast, 
provided that no licensing agreement is available; iii) the copying of extracts of works, 
provided that no licensing agreement is available. Germany, Ireland and Italy did not 
                                                   
236 Remote consultation usually includes ‘on campus’ access via the university network and, with 
increasing frequency, ‘online’ access via proxy servers or virtual private networks. 
237 European Commission (2013), Public Consultation on the Review of the EU Copyright Rules, 
Consultation Document available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/ 
docs/consultation-document_en.pdf. 
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implement this provision. In Germany, a similar exception existed before the enactment of 
the InfoSoc Directive; this exception, similarly to the case of France, is limited to small parts 
of works, requires a public composed of a limited number of students or scientists, and 
entitles right-holders to receive fair compensation; in line with the formulation of the InfoSoc 
Directive, the illustration purpose is not mandatory for scientific research. In Ireland, the 
exception is partially covered by exceptions and limitations for libraries, educational 
establishments, archives and museums and for research or private study. In Italy, the 
quotation exception deals also with illustration for teaching and for scientific research; the 
purpose of illustrations is mandatory also for scientific research and the making available on 
the Internet is permitted only for certain types of works (music works and pictures at low 
resolution or low quality) (see Annex A). 
The exception under Article 5(3)(a) of the InfoSoc Directive may hinder the functioning of 
the Internal Market for what concerns distance learning that may include a cross-border 
dimension. In particular, by virtue of the principle of territoriality, in e-learning services the 
copyright law of both the State where the university/educational establishment is located 
and the State where the student is accessing the course apply.238 Whenever students follow 
classes or get access to copyrighted materials in a Member State other than the country 
where the university is based, copyright infringement may result from the diverging 
transposition of Article 5(3)(a) between Member States or by different interpretations given 
by national courts. In principle, a certain university or practitioner that intends to provide a 
multi-territorial e-learning service is required to seek legal advice in each concerned Member 
State in order to avoid being liable for copyright infringement. Another problem arises from 
the introduction in some countries of fair remuneration requirements; in particular, in cross-
border uses the jury is still out when it comes to the determination of the party liable as well 
as the territory where the payment is due (De Wolf & Partners, 2013). Against this 
background, the current fragmentation at the EU level may potentially discourage the 
provision of e-learning beyond national borders and the creation of an Internal Market for 
distance education.239 
Similarly, discrepancies in the application of this exception to research activities might 
impinge on the dissemination of research results within the EU as well as on cross-border 
cooperation in research activities. Paradoxically, copyright law might constitute a barrier to 
the functioning of the European Research Area (which is defined by the Commission as “a 
unified area open to the world, in which scientific knowledge, technology, and researchers 
                                                   
238 Distance learning activities can be categorised in four groups: i) supplementary e-learning, when 
supplementary materials are provided online to students enrolled in a ‘standard’ course; ii) e-learning 
courses provided by a certain university, where an entire course or a substantial part of it is taught 
online to students who can follow classes via the Internet; iii) massive open online courses (MOOC), 
which aim at unlimited participation and open access via the web; iv) e-learning courses provided in 
the context of transnational collaborations between universities, which are cross-border by their very 
nature. The cross-border dimension is increasingly important going from category i) to category iv) 
(De Wolf & Partners, 2013). 
239 This issue is particularly significant when considering that the education market is estimated to be 
worth some $4.2 trillion worldwide, i.e. treble the size of the media and entertainment market, and 
over the next ten years the e-learning market is expected to represent 30% of the total education 
market (Edxus Group, 2013). 
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circulate freely”,)240 as long as researchers based in different Member States can benefit from 
a different bundle of exceptions and limitations to copyright and related rights. 
2.3.5 Reporting of current events 
Article 5(3)(c) includes two exceptions for the reporting of current events. The first part of 
the provision allows reproduction by the press, communication, or making available of 
published articles, broadcast works or other subject-matter on current economic, political or 
religious topics. These uses are permitted only if they are not expressly reserved. The second 
part of the article allows uses of copyrighted works or other subject matter to report current 
events to the extent justified by informative purposes. At any rate, both exceptions require, if 
possible, the acknowledgment of the source as well as the author’s name. 
In France, Ireland and the UK there is no specific implementation of this provision. In 
Ireland and the UK, reporting of current events is generally covered by quotations for 
purposes of criticism and review and is subject to a case-by-case analysis. In France, press 
reviews as well as partial or full reproduction for informational purposes of a work of 
graphical, plastic or architectural art are permitted. In Germany, Italy and Poland, this 
exception has been implemented by echoing the twofold structure of Article 5(3)(c); 
nonetheless, some divergences are apparent in terms of type of uses that are allowed, 
addressees of the exception, and fair remuneration. For instance, in Germany authors are 
entitled to a fair remuneration to be administered by collecting societies when the 
reproduction goes beyond a short part of the article; in Poland, fair remuneration is due only 
to authors of certain specific works; in Italy there is no reference to right-holders 
remuneration. In Germany the main beneficiaries of the reproduction act are newspapers 
while for the communication to the public the privileges are extended to everyone; in Italy 
the exception only applies with respect to uses in other magazines or newspapers or news 
broadcast programmes, and therefore is limited to media providers; in Poland press, radio 
and television are beneficiaries (see Annex A). 
The exceptions provided under Article 5(3)(c) have relevant cross-border effects in 
connection to the online provision of news via web. Also in this circumstance, according to 
the principle of territoriality, the national copyright law of both the country where the 
reporting of current events is made and the country where the news is received do matter. 
Diverging national implementations as well as discrepant interpretations by national courts 
may generate legal uncertainty and increase the risk for media providers to infringe 
copyright in certain Member States. This may discourage (or increase the cost of) both pan-
European media services as well as the provision of news targeted to a national audience 
via the web to citizens based in different Member States. Obstacles generated by copyright 
law are proportionally more burdensome for private individuals (e.g. bloggers) and small 
and medium enterprises that can invest a limited amount of resources to be acquainted with 
28 different national copyright regimes. This aspect is particularly worrisome as in some 
Member States, such as Italy, only professional media providers are beneficiaries of this 
exception. 
                                                   
240 See the European Research Area web-page at: http://ec.europa.eu/research/era/index_en.htm. 
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2.3.6 Quotations 
According to Article 5(3)(d) of the InfoSoc Directive, Member State may allow quotations for 
purposes ‘such as’ criticism and review. It is apparent that criticism and review are listed by 
way of example, thus leaving room to additional justifications for quotations. Four 
cumulative conditions apply: i) the quotation relates to a work or subject matter made 
lawfully available to the public; ii) the source and the author are indicated whenever 
possible; iii) the use complies with fair practice; and iv) the quotation is no longer than what 
is required by the specific purpose. Interestingly, the CJEU interpreted this exception as not 
precluding Member States to allow quotations also when they are not made in a subsequent 
copyrighted work, but for instance in a mere press report.241 
The national implementation of this exception is quite uniform and only minor 
differences exist. For instance, in France short quotations cannot involve works of visual art; 
in Germany quotations of musical works should be limited to a few passages; in Poland 
minor works can be quoted in full in independent works; in the UK any contract term which 
prevents or restricts exempted quotations is unenforceable (see Annex A). 
For what concerns the proper functioning of the Internal Market, this exception may affect 
the media market, scientific research as well as derivative works and UGC with 
fragmenting effects comparable to those stemming from exceptions for: the reporting of 
current events (see above); teaching or scientific research (see above); parody, caricature 
and pastiche (see below). In practice, the impacts on the functioning of the Internal Market 
are expected to be limited, as no major divergences are experienced in national 
transpositions. Nonetheless, some problems might still arise from the interpretation of what 
actually qualifies as a quotation, especially in the audiovisual sector and for UGC. 
2.3.7 Parody, caricature and pastiche 
Article 5(3)(k) enables Member States to exempt uses for the purpose of caricature, parody 
or pastiche. Absent a uniform definition under EU law, a parody is defined by the CJEU as a 
work whose essential elements are the evocation of an existing work in a noticeably different 
manner as well as the expression of humour or mockery.242 
In Ireland, Italy and Poland this exception has not been implemented; concerned uses are 
partially covered by the quotation exception. In Germany, parody and caricatures are 
possible as long as they do not constitute reproductions or adaptations of the original work. 
In the UK contract terms aiming at restricting works for the purposes of caricature, parody 
or pastiche are void (see Annex A). In France parody, caricature and pastiche are generally 
permitted. 
Interestingly, in several Member States, such as Italy, this exception has not been 
implemented as the relevant uses are considered covered by the freedom of expression. 
This is not surprising both because exceptions listed under Articles 5(2) and 5(3) of the 
InfoSoc Directive are optional and because in several other cases explicit exceptions coexist 
with implicit exceptions conferred under constitutional principles, legal doctrine and/or case 
law. Nonetheless, in the digital era where options to create derivative works have 
                                                   
241 See C-145/10 Eva-Maria Painer v. Standard Verlags and Others (2011). 
242 See Case C-201/13 Johan Deckmyn v. Helena Vandersteen and Others.  
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multiplied and are available at low cost also to private individuals, the absence of a well-
defined exception has the effect of increasing legal uncertainty. This can potentially hinder 
creative activities based on transformative uses of copyrighted works. In particular, private 
individuals may incur disproportionate costs to understand which acts are lawful and which 
instead constitute copyright infringements when a proper license has not been granted by 
relevant right-holders (De Wolf & Partners, 2013). 
2.3.8 Freedom of panorama 
Member States are allowed, under Article 5(3)(h) of the InfoSoc Directive, to introduce an 
exception, also known as ‘freedom of panorama’, for the use of works, such as works of 
architecture or sculpture, which are made to be located permanently in public places. The 
implementation of this provision largely varies among Member States. In France and 
Italy, this exception has not been implemented. In Germany the reproduction of works 
permanently placed in public places is permitted as well as the distribution and/or making 
available to the public of the resulting copies. Also in Poland ‘freedom of panorama’ applies 
and, whenever possible, requires the acknowledgment of the full name of the author and of 
the source. In Ireland and the UK exceptions similar to the one provided in Article 5(3)(h) 
are in force; nonetheless, reproductions of graphic works and text are not exempted (see 
Annex A). 
This exception is central in the modern digital age when both pictures and videos are posted 
on websites and platforms making these contents immediately available on a cross-border 
basis. In light of national implementations, sharing pictures and videos of copyrighted 
works permanently placed in public spaces may be classified as a copyright infringement 
in many EU jurisdictions and lead to heavy penalties.243 
2.3.9 Private copying  
Article 5(2)(b) of the InfoSoc Directive provides Member States with the option to enact an 
exception for reproduction on any medium made by natural persons for private uses and 
for purposes that are neither directly or indirectly commercial. Right-holders are entitled to 
receive fair compensation for such non-authorised private copying activities. Compensation 
schemes have to take into account TPMs to the extent that they may restrict or control 
private copies made by end-users (for further details on the legal aspects of this exception see 
Section II.1.5.2). It is worth stressing that the InfoSoc Directive does not provide for a right to 
private copying.244 
                                                   
243 The authors Labert et al. mention the case of Claes Oldenburg and Coosje van Bruggen, two 
sculptors who claimed a copyright infringement under the US law and obliged the Wikimedia 
Foundation to take down from Wikipedia the pictures of their sculptures, although these sculptures 
were permanently placed in public spaces in several countries (Labert et al., 2015).  
244 Both the Brussels Court of Appeal (Belgium) and the Cour de Cassation (France) stated that the 
private copying exception does not constitute an enforceable right for private users. See European 
Commission (2007), Report to the Council, the European Parliament, and the Economic and Social 
Committee on the Application of Directive 2001/29/EC on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Information Society, Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2007)1556. 
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All Member States implemented the private copying exception under Article 5(2)(b) of the 
InfoSoc Directive. The only deviation is represented by Ireland where a narrow exception 
applies only to copies of broadcasts for the purpose of time shifting (i.e. later viewing) that 
are made by natural persons or certain establishments and to copies of performances made 
by natural persons for private and domestic uses. National transposition considerably 
varies among Member States (see Annex A). In France, copies are allowed for strictly 
private purposes; this exception applies only to natural persons and does not cover file-
sharing. In Germany, private copying comprises domestic and personal purposes as well as 
other ‘own’ uses beyond the private sphere such as scientific purposes, ‘own’ archive and 
information about current events. While in the private sphere copies can be made only by 
natural persons or by third parties on behalf of the privileged person, copies for ‘own’ uses 
can be made also by legal entities. The German exception allows both digital and analogue 
copies as long as they come from a lawful source and are not used for sharing files on the 
Internet. In Italy, the private copying exception covers only copies of phonograms and 
videograms245 made by natural persons for personal uses and without commercial purposes 
and can be restricted by contractual arrangements; these copies cannot be made by third 
parties and have to come from a legal source. In Poland, private uses (which include but are 
not limited to single copies) are permitted to a larger group of beneficiaries, including circles 
of persons having personal relationships (e.g. consanguinity), affinity or social relationships. 
The exception under Article 5(2)(b) has been recently introduced also in the UK246 where 
personal copies of copyrighted works are currently permitted, provided that the concerned 
work is lawfully owned by the privileged person and copies are made for private use and for 
ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial; interestingly, ‘format shifting’ is 
explicitly permitted and contract terms aiming at preventing or restricting private copying 
are unenforceable. 
As regards the fair remuneration condition expressly introduced by the InfoSoc Directive, 
both the UK and Ireland do not have any compensation scheme in force and remuneration 
for certain private uses is left to collective licensing agreements between right-holders and 
end-users. Interestingly, the UK is the only European country where the private copying 
exception is not accompanied by a right to fair remuneration, in stark contrast to the 
InfoSoc Directive247. The other surveyed countries have introduced levy schemes for private 
copying which aim at compensating right-holders for the harm suffered when copyrighted 
works and other subject matter are copied without their authorisation (see Annex A). Levies 
are generally applied to blank carriers, devices with storage capacity and recording 
equipment and are paid by manufacturers and importers248 and collected by one or more 
national collecting societies. Exports are either exempted ex ante or subject to an ex post 
                                                   
245 Copies on paper or a similar medium are included in the reprographic exception even when made 
for personal use. 
246 Up to the reform introduced in 2014, in the UK a narrow exception covered recording of broadcasts 
for purposes of time shifting. 
247 Interestingly, a UK court stated the UK government erred in law when introduced a new private 
copying exception without a compensation scheme ensuring fair remuneration to right-holders. For 
further details see: Press Association (2015), “Music groups win court battle over private copying of 
CDs”, The Guardian, Friday 19 June (www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/19/music-groups-
win-court-battle-private-copying-cds). 
248 Levies for reprographic copying are usually also paid by copy centres and libraries. 
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reimbursement scheme for paid levies. Generally levies do not apply to blank carriers and 
devices purchased for professional uses; accordingly, professionals may either benefit from 
an upfront exemption or apply for refunds. In Italy and Poland, methods of application and 
calculation are determined by a decree of the Minister of Culture; in France by a commission 
of stakeholders (including consumers’ organisations); in Germany by national collecting 
societies after negotiating with associations of manufacturers and importers. As a result, 
there are considerable differences across the EU in terms of level of remuneration, products 
subject to levies, and overall revenues (see Table 4).  
Table 4. Levies on selected blank carriers and devices and revenues in a sample of Member States 
(2012) 
 
France Germany Ireland Italy 
Poland 
(% of the sale price) 
UK 
CD-R (700MB) €0.35  €0.06  €0  €0.15 1.72% €0 
DVD-RW (4.7Gb) €0.90 €0.27 €0 €0.41 2.95% €0 
USB Key (16Gb) €1.60 €1.56 €0 €1.44 0.47% €0 
External Hard 
Disk (500Gb) €11 €7 €0 €5 1% €0 
Mobile (16Gb) €8 €36 €0 €0.90 n.a. €0 
PC with CD/DVD 
writer €0 €17 €0 €2.40 3.28% €0 
Revenues (2012) €173,877,725 n.a. €0 €71,738,387 €1,668,677 €0 
Revenues per 
capita (2012) €2.65 n.a. €0 €1.18 €0.04 €0 
Note: Due to national lawsuits, data on overall revenues for Germany are not available. 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on WIPO 2013. 
In all the surveyed countries, in principle revenues and restrictions stemming from TPM 
should be taken into account when determining levies; in France individual licensing 
schemes should also be considered (see Section 1.5.2.4). Collected revenues are distributed, 
via collecting societies, to different categories of right-holders (e.g. authors, performers, 
producers, publishers) based on proportions that considerably vary among Member States 
(see Annex A). In some countries, such as France, Italy and Poland, a share of the revenues 
are allocated by law or according to the statutes of relevant collecting societies to social and 
cultural purposes. 
According to the report resulting from the mediation on private copying and reprographic 
levies drafted by Mr Antonio Vitorino,249 the existing discrepancies among national levy 
schemes are a source of frictions hindering the proper functioning of the Internal Market. In 
this respect, three major problems can be identified: i) double payments in cross-border 
transaction of levied products; ii) undue payments of levies by professional users; iii) 
uncertainty in the determination of the amount of levies as well as of media and 
equipment concerned. Mr Vitorino argued that, to some extent, solutions to these Internal 
                                                   
249 Vitorino, A. (2013), Recommendations Resulting from the Mediation on Private Copying and 
Reprographic Levies, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/ 
levy_reform/130131_levies-vitorino-recommendations_en.pdf.  
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Market issues have been provided by the case law of the CJEU. In the Padawan case,250 the 
CJEU stated that all media, equipment and devices capable of making copies of copyrighted 
content can be subject to levies, provided that they are used by natural persons for private 
uses. In addition, the CJEU explained that fair compensation has to be computed on the basis 
of the actual ‘harm’ caused to right-holders by the introduction of the private copying 
exception. In the Opus case,251 the CJEU concluded that the ‘harm’ to be compensated via a 
levy scheme always occurs in the Member State where the final private user resides; hence 
levies should be collected only in the State where the end-user is based. 
On paper, the majority of Member States have introduced ex ante exemptions or 
reimbursement mechanisms to avoid or mitigate both double payments in cross-border 
transactions and undue payments for professional uses. Nonetheless, these mechanisms 
are deemed very burdensome (e.g. reimbursement generate substantial administrative 
burdens and may take months or years) and/or non-functioning at all.252 As a result, levies 
can still constitute a financial obstacle to cross-border trade of products subject to levies as 
well as unduly increase business costs of certain professional users. Interestingly, according 
to the CJEU, reimbursement mechanisms applied by Member States are a lawful alternative 
to ex ante exemptions, both for exports and for private uses, on condition that they are 
effective and do not make it excessively difficult to get refunded.253 
Also, processes setting the levies are deemed cumbersome and, especially when it comes 
to new products, are able to paralyse the functioning of the market for devices and media 
in some Member States.254 In several EU countries, stakeholders have initiated lawsuits that 
resulted in the adoption of provisional levies or in the introduction of levies with retroactive 
effects on certain categories of products. On the one hand, legal uncertainty increases 
commercial risks for manufacturers and importers that miss information on a significant 
component of the final price of the products they sell. On the other hand, long disputes to 
avoid or postpone payments also affect right-holders as the collection and in turn the 
distribution of levies can be substantially delayed. 
2.3.10 Relationship between technological protection measures and copyright 
exceptions and limitations 
Article 6(4) of the InfoSoc Directive intends to safeguard some of the exceptions and 
limitations255 from restrictions imposed by TPM (for the legal aspects of TPM see Section 
                                                   
250 See C-467/08, Padawan SL v. SGAE (2010). 
251 See C-462/09 Stichting de Thuiskopie v. Opus Supplies Deutschland (2011). 
252 See Vitorino A. (2013), Recommendations Resulting from the Mediation on Private Copying and 
Reprographic Levies, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/ 
levy_reform/130131_levies-vitorino-recommendations_en.pdf. 
253 See Case C-521/11, Amazon v. Austro Mechana (2013), and C-463/12 Copydan Bandkopi. 
254 See Vitorino A. (2013), Recommendations Resulting from the Mediation on Private Copying and 
Reprographic Levies, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/ 
levy_reform/130131_levies-vitorino-recommendations_en.pdf. 
255 In a nutshell, Article 6(4) of the InfoSoc Directive aims at ensuring that right-holders make available 
to users the following exceptions and limitations: i) reprographic copying; ii) archiving made by 
publicly accessible libraries, educational establishments, museums or archives; iii) ephemeral 
recordings; iv) reproduction of broadcasts made by social institutions; v) quotations for teaching or 
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II.1.3). Specifically, this provision obliges Member States to: i) promote the adoption of 
‘voluntary measures’ by right-holders; ii) monitor and evaluate whether such ‘voluntary 
measures’ are taken and how they work; iii) intervene with ‘appropriate measures’ when 
right-holders do not enable users that have legal access to the work to engage in acts allowed 
under the relevant exceptions and limitations. Interestingly, when it comes to copyrighted 
digital content, the safeguard provision introduced by Article 6(4) does not apply to on-
demand online services; therefore, in the online world technological measures can 
override to a large extent all the exceptions and limitations provided by national laws 
(Mazziotti, 2008). In this respect, the CJEU has recently intervened by arguing that the legal 
protection granted under Article 6 of the InfoSoc Directive should not go beyond the 
purpose of restricting uses that require authorisation by right-holders.256 
While in Poland this provision has not been implemented, in the other Member States 
included in this survey the implementation considerably varies at least along three 
dimensions: i) the list of exceptions safeguarded; ii) the possibility for right-holders to ask 
for a license fee; and iii) the mechanisms available to end-users to benefit from 
exceptions. For instance, as regards the last dimension, in Germany and Ireland it is 
necessary to have recourse to courts; in France, Italy and the UK the conflict between 
exceptions and TPM is ruled instead by administrative bodies (see Annex A). More 
generally, the national transposition of the InfoSoc Directive has not resulted in the creation 
of a uniform balance between TPM and exempted uses of copyrighted works. 
As for the Internal Market aspects, the relationship between technological measures and 
exceptions and limitations may be relevant, especially on the supply side. For online uses, 
technological protections are not subject to safeguard measures; hence commercial users are 
able to tailor the scope of copyright for digital content made available to the public on the 
Internet. Conversely, for tangible copyrighted goods (e.g. DVDs, CDs), the same 
technological protection measure might be lawful in certain Member States and unlawful in 
others, thus potentially requiring national adaptations (in principle a music CD sold in 
Germany can prohibit private copying for domestic purposes; selling the same CD in Italy 
would potentially lead to a dispute resolution before an administrative body to safeguard 
the private copying exception). The issue is particularly thorny as the lawfulness of certain 
technological measures is quite difficult to assess ex ante and this increases uncertainty both 
for distributors of copyrighted products and for end-users. Paradoxically, in the online 
market where the principle of exhaustion does not apply, copyright territoriality is a 
potential source of Internal Market fragmentation; in the market for tangible copies, 
where instead the principle of exhaustion is an effective measure to create a pan-European 
market, the adaptation of TPM to the extent required by each Member State may still 
hamper the free movement of tangible copyrighted goods within the Internal Market. 
  
                                                                                                                                                               
scientific research purposes; vi) uses for the benefit of people with a disability; and vii) uses for the 
purposes of public security. Member States may also optionally safeguard the ‘private copying’ 
exception. 
256 See Case C-355-12 Nintendo v. PC Box.  
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3. Industry aspects of copyright enforcement in the digital environment 
As already recalled in Part I of this Study, the original rationale behind the Information 
Society (InfoSoc) Directive was to ensure low-cost enforcement of copyright in the digital 
environment mainly by means of TPM embodied in DRM systems. The scenario 
envisaged was that most copyrighted material would circulate by means of TPM-protected 
files and the bulk of enforcement would be automatically ensured.  
To this aim, very strong provisions were introduced in the Directive mandating Member 
States to protect these systems against any act of circumvention or facilitating circumvention, 
including for uses deemed otherwise legitimate (see Section II.1.3). A very broad horizontal 
norm – Article 8(3) – has then been included to fill the residual gaps and ensure that right-
holders could in any remaining unforeseen circumstance act against intermediaries, whose 
services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right, by means of the 
ordinary (and more costly) judicial injunctions. 
However, contrary to expectations and because of technological developments over the 
Internet, copyright enforcement by means of TPMs has remained residual and strongly 
sector-based (e.g. video games, e-books, etc.) both in terms of market share and recourse to 
anti-circumvention provisions in courts (Derclaye, 2009).257 In fact, it appears that most 
digital copyright infringement takes place over the Internet in already decrypted files by 
means of file-sharing and other open modalities of access, rather than by willing acts of TPM 
circumvention. When TPMs have been successful in allowing effective enforcement of 
copyrights, they have usually been based on closed proprietary standards operating in 
physically separate devices which has raised parallel issues of interoperability and concerns 
about the potential market distortive effects of related lock-in strategies (so called ‘walled 
gardens’). 
Actually, due to the possibility allowed by the InfoSoc Directive to circumvent by means of 
TPM-based standardised contractual arrangements the traditional copyright exceptions 
granted at the national level, online content providers have indeed developed the practice 
of licensing the use of copyrighted material in the context of TPM-protected systems in 
much more restrictive terms than what copyright law would normally permit. At that time 
a study carried out for the Commission correlated the impact of these restrictions on users 
accustomed to the traditional copyright models with the spectacular rise of the open source 
and open content movements, and proposed that one could have contributed as a partial 
cause for the other (IVIR, 2007). 
While the initial intention of the InfoSoc Directive legislator has seemingly been to encourage 
economic players to move towards a more finely tuned and individualised form of rights 
management in the online environment, it is doubtful whether the purely contractual-based 
approach actually put in place by the Directive has been evenly responsive to the interests of 
all parties involved. 258 
                                                   
257 There are therefore few industries where recourse to TPM remains notable and has also given rise 
to substantial litigation in court on the scope of related provisions, see for instance the Case C-355/12 
Nintendo v. PC Box.  
258 A Dutch web firm that sells second-hand e-books has recently complained to the country’s 
competition authorities that it is being boycotted by three of the largest Dutch publishers that have 
blocked it from selling their new e-books through its website, allegedly to block further sales of 
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In fact, after only a few years following its adoption, the Commission itself already conceded 
that: 259  
At the same time, in their present status of implementation, DRMs do not present a 
policy solution for ensuring the appropriate balance between the interests involved, 
be they the interests of the authors and other right-holders or those of legitimate 
users, consumers and other third parties involved (libraries, service providers, 
content creators...) as DRM systems are not in themselves an alternative to copyright 
policy in setting the parameters either in respect of copyright protection or the 
exceptions and limitations that are traditionally applied by the legislature. 
As a result of that and somehow unexpectedly, the bulk of whatever copyright enforcement 
activities in the digital environment is carried out by means of the InfoSoc Directive has 
therefore taken place through Article 8(3), that in theory would give right-holders a very 
broad and unbounded right to apply for judicial injunction not only against other 
commercially motivated third parties, but also against infringing final consumers, an area 
that should have been originally covered under the TPM provisions. 
Since Article 8(3) was not conceived to be a mainstream remedy to redress mass-scale 
infringements, a number of policy issues have been raised over time concerning: 
1. the resulting coordination and coherence of the InfoSoc Directive with the provisions of 
other EU Directives and the contents of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights; 
2. its actual concrete effectiveness and efficiency in curbing infringing behaviour when 
unexpectedly used as a deterrent, and also as a result of that; 
3. the overall expediency of the current enforcement framework to deal with copyright 
infringement over the Internet as a mass phenomenon. 
In particular, the structure of the current copyright enforcement framework in the digital 
environment has resulted in a set of potentially conflicting, very broad provisions whose 
concrete scope of action has had to be slowly clarified by means of case law by the CJEU 
over time. 260 This lack of clarity has represented a strong incentive for industry to revert to 
self-regulation and codes of conduct (Hugenholz, 2012). 
Coherence and coordination issues have arisen, for instance, on the need to limit the costs 
right owners could impose on intermediaries through the very broad language of Article 8(3) 
by means of the general mitigating reasonableness and proportionality principles stated in 
                                                                                                                                                               
second-hand licenses. According to standard terms and conditions for digital media, when people 
‘buy’ e-books, they only really purchase a license to use that product, and do not have a right to resell 
it. But when the retailer opened its virtual doors in mid-2014, it justified its business model with a 
2012 ruling by the CJEU in the case of Oracle v. UsedSoft, in which the court ruled that a software 
license could in fact be resold. Other national courts, however, have ruled differently (see Section 
II.Part II.2.1.3). A German court decided in 2013 that the Oracle case could only be cited in software-
related cases. 
259 European Commission, Communication from the Commission, The Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights in the Internal Market, COM(2004)261 final, Brussels, 16.04.2004, p. 10. 
260 See in particular C- 275/06, Promusicae v. Telefonica; C-70/10, Scarlet Extended v. SABAM; C-360/10, 
SABAM v. Netlog, and more recently C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih 
GmbH and Wega Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH (2014). 
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Article 3 of IPRED. Most important, issues have been raised on how the right to information 
stated in IPRED Article 8 could actually be enforced in the digital world. 
Finally, major coordination issues have arisen with the conflicting principles stated in the 
Electronic Commerce Directive, in particular Article 15, banning general obligations on 
online intermediaries to monitor the content they store or transmit, and Article 12, defining 
the conditions of ‘mere conduit’ under which an ISP cannot be considered liable for the 
information transmitted. 
Moreover, the ECJ has made it clear several times that the enforcement of the very broad 
rights of injunction envisaged under Article 8 of the InfoSoc Directive should consider the 
basic principles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, although these often appear to be 
restatements of norms already stated elsewhere. 
3.1 Suitability of IPRED for use in the digital environment 
Recourse to judicial enforcement of copyrights by means of the civil injunctions 
envisaged under IPRED (Article 11) and the InfoSoc Directive (Article 8(3)) nowadays 
plays a relatively marginal role in the enforcement of digital copyrights in many large EU 
Member States, with the possible notable exception of Germany and therefore leaves 
largely unaffected a sizeable share of the EU consumer market. This is because of a 
combination of efficiency and effectiveness factors. 
As far as their efficiency is concerned, civil injunctions have been generally replaced by 
extra-judiciary means such as recourse to procedures codified in voluntary codes of conduct 
(e.g. BREIN in the Netherlands) or ad hoc administrative-based mechanisms (e.g. HADOPI in 
France, the OFCOM-managed Digital Enforcement Act (DEA) in the UK, AGCOM in Italy, 
Ley Sinde and Ley Lassalle in Spain) that are much speedier and less burdensome to 
implement than the ordinary judicial mechanism of Courts. 
Then, civil actions aimed at large-scale commercially-motivated infringers have been 
hindered either by their being not sufficiently dissuasive (ad hoc sanctions to infringing 
websites in Spain can reach as high as €300,000 or even double that amount for advertisers), 
or by the difficulties faced in their implementation when it comes to the identification of 
infringers (in the Netherlands, for only one in five of the sites that are suspected of 
infringement can the actual infringer be traced261) and have been replaced by criminal 
proceedings where support can be received from police forces in the identification of 
transgressors. 
Finally, the possibility of acting by means of civil injunctions – at least at the consumer level 
– has been hindered in a number of Member States by difficulties in the identification of 
infringers and the lack of compatibility between the right to information envisaged in IPRED 
with national privacy laws, which made recourse to other mechanisms almost inevitable. 
As also reported in the public hearing on the challenges posed to Directive 2004/48 (IPRED) 
in the digital environment, this has created a situation where most copyrights online are 
either privately or administratively enforced by means of mechanisms not necessarily 
                                                   
261 The BREIN Foundation is the joint anti-piracy programme of authors, artists, publishers, producers 
and distributors of music, film, games, interactive software and books; available at: http://anti-
piracy.nl/english.php. 
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envisaged in the Directive or are being dealt with as criminal cases with fines and other types 
of sanctions to dissuade infringers and restore right owners. 262 
Member States have then chosen a different mix of the possible policy approaches and have 
varied in the emphasis given to action aimed at the final users vs. that targeted against 
commercially motivated infringers, as well as to recourse to alternative administrative, 
criminal or code of conduct-based tools. In all cases, however, the instruments have been 
tailored as much as possible to their intended use. 
Conversely, the implementation of the IPRED provisions online has suffered from the lack of 
a clear distinction between infringements related to operations carried out on a commercial 
scale and for commercial purposes, and infringements at the individual subscriber level. The 
Commission has finally started tackling this key definition as recently as autumn 2014 by 
setting up a workshop on the subject.263 
In fact, concepts of ‘commercial scale’ and ‘commercial purpose’ are extensively used in 
the IPRED Directive to qualify enforcement provisions, but no justification for the use of 
the concept or formal definition has been provided in the text of the Directive. This has 
led to substantial differences in interpretation between jurisdictions. However, while in 
Commission staff working papers at that time it was clearly stated that the Directive was not 
aimed at consumers, the prevailing interpretation of commercial purposes in Recital 14 of 
IPRED seems to go so far as to cover almost any infringement by referring to a “direct or 
indirect economic or commercial advantage” and carve out only consumers acting in good faith. 
It is therefore of little use in fine-tuning provisions aimed at different target groups. 
The lack of a clear distinction in the legal framework between these two possible types of 
infringement has also contributed to conflicting opinions on the appropriateness of the 
damage and legal cost mechanisms envisaged by IPRED Articles 13 and 14 in the Digital 
Environment. 
On one hand, there are concerns that when addressed to the final users the current 
mechanism of legal costs reimbursement under Article 14 would lead itself to be abused in 
forms of vexatious litigation (so called ‘copyright trolling’) (Hargreaves & Hugenholtz, 2013). 
On the other hand, the lack of provisions on statutory damages or the difficulties courts often 
have in recognising unjust enrichment would make the damage mechanisms under Article 13 
insufficiently dissuasive towards large-scale commercial operations, and conversely too little 
of an incentive for right owners to take action. 
In particular, although the European Parliament and the Council rejected at that time the 
Commission’s original proposal and refrained from implementing any kind of punitive 
statutory damages as envisaged in the US law, the principle has remained that judicial 
authorities should order an infringer to pay the right owner damages in reparation of the 
total loss incurred (including the total court costs, lawyers’ fees and any other expenses 
incurred by the successful party) to the extent that these costs are reasonable and 
proportional. For some countries, this means that a higher recovery of legal costs is possible 
                                                   
262 See European Commission, MARKT/ZH D(2011), Public Hearing on Directive 2004/48/EC and the 
challenges posed by the digital environment, Brussels, 07.06.2011 (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/conference20110607/hearing-report_en.pdf). 
263 Workshop on the concepts of ‘commercial scale’ and ‘commercial purpose’ in the context of 
infringements of intellectual property.   
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while litigating with consumers in online copyright infringement cases than in other civil 
cases. The size of this potential liability can then be used as an improper incentive to induce 
alleged infringers to refrain from their right to a fair trial and force them to settle cases out of 
court. 
While most instances of vexatious litigation have thus far concerned the US, where statutory 
damages are enforced and a market for ‘trolls’ has actually been created, Germany, where 
the mechanisms of civil injunctions has been particularly efficient and therefore widely used, 
has also felt the need to approve legislation limiting the amount of damages paid at the 
consumer level to some €1,000264 (i.e. €155.30 in damages plus forfeit legal expenses) instead 
of the €10,000 and more that could be allowed by the courts when legal expenses are fully 
considered. It did that by amending the copyright act and introducing a clear distinction in 
the liquidation of damages between commercially-motivated and other infringements. On 
the other hand, when faced with operations on a commercial scale, right owners often have 
difficulties in proving the exact scope of infringement and courts in some Member States do 
not easily award the profit generated by the infringer (unjust enrichment). So the relatively 
low damages awarded in cases involving a significant profit for the infringers (again some 
€10,000-15,000 or so in some Member States) and a lack of clarity about unjust enrichment 
also act as a disincentive for right owners to act and receive effective remedy. 
The CJEU itself has left the Member States and national courts substantial room for 
manoeuvre in defining the boundaries within which IPRED enforcement principles can be 
implemented in the digital environment. This is, first and foremost, the case of the so-called 
preliminary ‘right to information’ about the identity of alleged infringers. Article 8(1) of the 
IPRED Directive foresees the possibility of securing from intermediaries “disclosure of 
information on the origins and distribution networks of infringing goods or services in 
response to a duly justified and proportionate request”. 
In other words, copyright owners would have a right to receive information from ISPs on the 
identities of alleged infringers. This measure represents a preliminary necessary step for 
right-holders in order to allow them to take further action, and therefore represents a key 
cornerstone in enforcing copyrights online by means of civil injunctions against final users. 
In the Commission’s original intentions, this right was always deemed compatible with both 
the Directive on the Protection of Personal Data and the provisions of the e-Commerce 
Directive and should have given rise to a harmonised implementation EU-wide (Mazziotti, 
2013). 
However, the CJEU, in its watershed Promusicae interpretation of the Directive,265 has given 
Member States and national courts significant room for manoeuvre in substantiating this 
right, which has resulted in major differences in implementation across the EU. In fact, the 
Court found that the competent judicial authorities are not obliged by the Directive itself to 
release injunctions along these lines, but retain a margin of discretion and may or may not 
order that the information be provided. 
                                                   
264 See Act against dubious business practices – what changes in copyright law? (www.mucportal.de/ 
2013/07/01/gesetz-gegen-unseriose-geschaftspraktiken-was-andert-sich-im-urheberrecht/). 
265 See Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España SAU, 
judgment of 29 January 2008 Protection of intellectual property rights – data 
(http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/ 
legal_service/arrets/06c275_en.pdf). 
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According to the Court, this is also tantamount to the lack of any legal obligation requiring 
the Member States to lay down in their national legislation transposing the Directive 
provisions to communicate personal data in the context of civil proceedings. So, when 
obligations are there, they are considered lawful, and when they are not there, the refusal to 
do so is also considered lawful. Needless to say, this has created a very fragmented 
patchwork between countries where in practice the right to information is very easy to 
obtain because it is automatically foreseen in the law, and others where this is very difficult 
and complicated to enforce. 
Finally, it has been also noted (Mazziotti, 2013) that a notable limitation of IPRED in the 
digital environment would concern the limited possibility of blocking payments 
addressed to copyright infringers on a commercial scale. While IPRED explicitly mentions 
the possibility of issuing judicial orders aimed at blocking bank accounts and other assets of 
the alleged infringers as a possible enforcement measure, there is no reference whatsoever in 
the Directive to provisions that would allow the possibility of blocking online payments 
addressed to accounts of alleged infringers. This, in fact, cannot be construed under Article 
11 of IPRED, because in this case infringers use the payment services to receive the financial 
gains coming from an illegal activity and not to commit the infringement itself. 
3.2 Coherence issues between IPRED and the InfoSoc Directive 
Coherence and coordination issues between IPRED and the InfoSoc Directive have 
materialised in a widely fragmented enforcement framework across Europe as concerns 
the scope of the obligations and related costs that can be imposed on intermediaries under 
Article 11 of IPRED and Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive. The resulting variety of 
practices and behaviours has been slowly harmonised by the CJEU by means of case law, 
but substantial differences remain in the way enforcement of online copyrights is actually 
managed across the Member States.266 
On the negative side, this fragmentation has also meant that many national courts have been 
reluctant to implement injunctions released by other courts in the EU, especially when these 
were based on a different understanding of the scope of injunctive relief or on mechanisms 
deemed unknown or unreasonable in the local prevailing practice. 
The starting point is that Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive, stating the very general 
principle that Member States shall ensure that right-holders are in a position to apply for an 
injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a 
copyright or related rights, and based on the assumption that ISP are always in a position to 
ensure this at the lowest possible cost, has been deemed not sufficiently typified by national 
courts and the CJEU alike. Therefore, Article 8(3) has been made subject to various 
limitations in the light of concurrent proportionality and reasonableness principles 
envisaged under Article 3 of IPRED. 
These generic principles have been variously understood in the past, but the underlying 
rationale is that contrary to the InfoSoc line of reasoning there are limits to the costs that 
                                                   
266 This does not apply to copyright only, but is a more general problem with the implementation of 
IPRED injunctions in the different legal systems. See European Observatory on Counterfeiting and 
Piracy, Injunctions in Intellectual Property Rights, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/injunctions_en.pdf. 
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intermediaries must bear to ensure copyright enforcement on behalf of right owners, i.e. to 
the social cost that enforcement implies. 
The CJEU position over time has systematically considered disproportionate and 
excessively costly any injunction requiring an intermediary to actively monitor and filter 
all the data of each of its identified customers in order to prevent any future infringement. 
But apart from that reasonableness and proportionality criteria have been left undetermined 
and therefore a considerable element of risk in running a business. 
So, for instance, the Court has recently allowed a very stringent interpretation of the 
obligation to terminate access to a website deemed ‘structurally infringing’, by means of 
whatever measure could be requested to this aim, and left technical reasonableness 
considerations to the discretion of the national judge.267 Moreover, courts in different 
Member States have also given different interpretations of the ISPs’ obligation to collaborate 
with right owners in carrying out investigations on the identity of infringers and bear related 
costs. 
As mentioned above, this lack of legal certainty and the need to decrease business risks 
has been one of the driving forces towards the establishment of private codes of conduct 
as forms of industry self-regulation to avoid unnecessary and disruptive litigation along 
the value chain. This recourse to self-regulation has had several pros including flexibility 
and the possibility of quickly adapting to technological developments, but has also further 
contributed to creating a quite fragmented picture at the EU level, where not only copyrights 
but also the way they are concretely privately enforced based on the national practices 
differs. 
Also on the negative side, it is sometimes unclear to what extent codes of conduct and other 
forms of agreement are binding on non-signatories and can be used to discriminate 
enforcement behaviour between agents. Needless to say, codes of conduct are not necessarily 
representative of the interests of all stakeholders but only of the signatory parties 
(Hugenholtz, 2012).   
3.3 Interaction between copyright enforcement and the e-Commerce Directive 
Cost considerations have also driven the difficult interaction between online copyright 
enforcement and the e-Commerce Directive. The TPM-based model could no longer 
realistically serve as a tool to ensure low-cost machine-based enforcement of copyright and 
doubts have been increasingly cast in a number of Member States on the effectiveness and 
feasibility of purely Article 8-based deterrent strategies. Hence, there has been growing 
support from content owners to replace both methods with filter-based mechanisms 
implemented at the ISP level that – being also machine-based268 – would allegedly allow a 
similarly low cost enforcement environment (see also Section II.1.6.1). 
                                                   
267 See C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega 
Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH (2014). 
268 On the request to have copyrights enforced through a machine-based mechanism see also: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/conference20110607/hearing-
report_en.pdf. 
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However, the various attempts that have been made at imposing filtering at the ISP level by 
means of the InfoSoc provisions have met an insurmountable resistance in the conflicting 
principles of the e-Commerce Directive, which have been judged worthy of a greater 
protection. So far the CJEU has firmly based all its rulings on the cornerstone of the 
prevailing right, embodied in Article 15, that national courts or legislators cannot impose 
general obligations on online intermediaries to monitor the content they store or transmit. 
Copyright injunctions should rather limit themselves to well-defined specific instances of 
‘notice and take down’, or – in well substantiated cases – to termination of structurally 
infringing sites. Injunctions aimed at terminating access to ‘structurally infringing’ websites 
remains therefore the strongest remedy possible under the current legal framework. 
However, this is subject to substantial burden of proof limitations and very different risks of 
paying related damages if the claim is deemed not sufficiently substantiated in the different 
legal systems, which leaves websites in very different competitive positions as concerns their 
potential business risks and liabilities.269 Most important, services can easily be moved to 
other countries and the ban circumvented through other means (e.g. VPNs).270 
One option entails reconsidering the level of protection offered to online intermediaries, 
which exempt them from an active duty to monitor, and checking whether the conditions 
for such exemption of responsibility under Article 12 of the e-Commerce Directive apply. 
To invoke the exemption, the service provider should not play any role in initiating 
communication, or cannot select the receiver of the information, or cannot select or modify 
the information provided (a principle that the CJEU has recently interpreted in very broad 
potential terms, for instance, in the case of e-Commerce on e-Bay v. L’Oreal).  
So while article 15 exemption generally fully applies to ISPs operating as telecom companies, 
most social networks and other internet services cannot be deemed as necessarily protected 
under article 12 and could then be liable to full responsibility for the contents they transmit, 
including for copyright infringement. The burden of the proof that the mere conduit 
conditions spelled in article 12 are not met lie on the right-holders. At the same time, right-
holders may also be subject to counter-requests for damages if access to a website is 
terminated – possibly on a provisional ground – and eventually the mere conduit protection 
is found to apply in successive steps of the claim. The burden of proof and the risk of 
counter-damages have also represented strong driving factors towards establishing codes of 
conduct and for resorting to criminal proceedings, where is the public authority itself 
‘shutting down’ a website. 
                                                   
269 Martin Husovec Injunctions against Innocent Third Parties: The Case of Website Blocking, 2013 
(www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-4-2-2013/3745/husovec.pdf).   
270 Stakeholders have also raised concerns that notice-and-takedown regimes merely displace hosting 
activity to other countries and civil injunction remedies would have some chance to apply cross-
border only if the infringing sites are hosted within another Member State. However, to cope with the 
erratic behaviour of courts, in this case criminal proceedings seem to be the preferred option (see, for 
instance, the well-known Pirate Bay case). 
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3.4 Interaction between copyright enforcement and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights  
The CJEU has stated several times that the very broad right owners’ right of injunction 
envisaged in the InfoSoc Directive should be interpreted and implemented by legislators 
and national courts in a way that strikes a fair balance with the various other fundamental 
rights protected under the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This argument has therefore 
been used to further strengthen the provisions on the need to ensure compliance with the 
general principles of proportionality already envisaged under Article 3 of the IPRED 
Directive (for further details on the interaction between copyright law and fundamental 
rights see Section II.1.6.3). 
In particular, the Court has found that the fundamental rights to protection of property and 
to an effective redress underlying Article 8 of the InfoSoc Directive should be balanced on 
the one hand with the parallel fundamental right to respect for private life as foreseen in 
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter,271 and on the other hand with the freedom to run a business272 
as envisaged under Article 16 of the Charter. 
According to some commentators, reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights would 
represent an insurmountable boundary not only to any future reform of these provisions at 
the EU level but also to private regulation of enforcement, and would inform the contents of 
codes of conduct. However, this remains unclear and in practice some private codes of 
conduct do include provisions (such as filtering) that the Court has deemed in breach of the 
Charter (Hugenholtz, 2013). 
In practice, reference to balanced protection of these concurrent fundamental rights has had 
little practical impact on industry and been used to further strengthen the rationale behind 
limiting the scope of Article 8 InfoSoc injunctions; and namely: 
 the right to have a private life and to protect personal data has been used to reinforce 
the interpretation given to Article 8 of the IPRED Directive concerning the right to get 
information about infringers. This in practice has been left to the interpretation of 
national authorities; 
 the freedom to run a business had been used to protect intermediaries from injunctions 
that are too complicated and costly to implement as already envisaged under Article 3 of 
the IPRED, which boils down to a stronger ban on any future attempt at circumventing 
the principles of Article 15 of the e-Commerce Directive. 
                                                   
271 In the landmark Promusicae case the CJEU added consideration of two further fundamental rights, 
namely the right that guarantees protection of personal data and hence the right that guarantees 
protection of private life as laid down in Article 7 of the Charter and Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
272 In the judgment on Scarlet Extended v. SABAM the CJEU found that the broad filtering measure 
requested by the Belgian collecting society SABAM would have led to a serious restriction of the 
freedom of the ISP to conduct its business.  
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3.5 The complementary enforcement provisions of the EU Action Plan on 
Counterfeiting and Piracy 
The recently released Commission Action Plan on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights contains no specific provisions on the enforcement of copyright in the 
digital environment. It refrains from supporting enforcement strategies at the final 
consumer level based on civil injunctions and generally endorses the ‘follow the money 
approach’ targeting intellectual property rights infringement on a ‘commercial scale’ by 
means of self-regulatory instruments aimed at advertisers and payment providers. 273 It 
represents, therefore, one more example of the Commission’s general positive attitude 
towards self-regulation by means of Codes of Conduct in the digital environment. 
The approach has already materialised in a Memorandum of Understanding274 on 
counterfeited goods online and aims at depriving intellectual property infringers of their 
revenue streams by fostering contractual cooperation agreements between right owners 
and payment services and by promoting the development of related codes of conduct. This 
is in line with Article 17 of the IPRED provision that Member States should encourage the 
development of codes of conduct by trade associations or organisations, aimed at 
contributing to the enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
The protection of creative content online is expected to follow the same approach, although 
here the business model of copyright infringers is usually based on advertisement and 
malware dissemination. 
A study commissioned by the Digital Citizen Alliance275 shows that 60% of copyright 
infringing websites finance themselves by disseminating various forms of malware, but as 
high as 30% provide links to primary brands and another 40% to so-called ‘secondary’ ones 
(legitimate gaming, online gambling and content aggregation sites). 
The advertising industry has long, independently, taken steps to address the concerns 
around advertising misplacement by means of self-regulation, in particular, through the 
Digital Trading Standards Group (DTSG) and compliance with the related provisions. In 
December 2013 the DTSG, representing brands, media agencies, intermediaries and ad 
companies, published its latest voluntary code of Good Practice Principles to be 
independently verified by a third party. 
The code, although a strong reputational deterrent for advertisers themselves, has, however, 
remained a purely voluntary initiative with limited links and interaction with content 
owners and other public enforcement bodies. 
                                                   
273 For a review of the rationale and concrete experiences so far, see Manara (2012). 
274 The Commission intends to establish new Stakeholder Dialogues in 2014 and 2015, involving 
advertising service providers, payment services and shippers, with the objective of achieving in 2015 
further Memoranda of Understanding that would help keep intellectual property-infringing products 
off the Internet. 
275 See Digital Citizen Alliance ‘Good Money Gone Bad’ (http://media.digitalcitizensactionalliance.org 
/314A5A5A9ABBBBC5E3BD824CF47C46EF4B9D3A76/4af7db7f-03e7-49cb-aeb8-ad0671a4e1c7.pdf). 
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3.5.1 The ‘follow the money’ approach  
The so-called ‘follow the money’ approach is an approach aimed at complementing the 
purely voluntary standards above with Memoranda of Understanding or administrative 
provisions aimed at also involving other stakeholders, and namely the right owners, into 
the identification of infringers for advertisement banning purposes, thereby moving from 
a tool to correct misplacements to a more active instrument of copyright enforcement. A 
key problem here is the lack of any conclusive definition or guidance that explains what an 
‘infringing website’ actually is, its operating modalities or the features through which it can 
be identified. The lack of a credible and authoritative definition on which the industry can 
rely upon has therefore represented an obstacle in making informed decisions and 
cooperative agreements intended to bridge this gap. 
This is an alternative approach to the possibility of adding a new legislative provision to the 
InfoSoc Directive or IPRED extending the ‘notice-and-takedown’ mechanism from ISP to 
other online operators (e.g. payment system operators, advertisers, etc.). In its 
Communication accompanying the action plan, the Commission does not rule out the 
possibility of moving to a legislative proposal, once the results of self-enforcement are better 
known and if they should prove insufficiently effective. The follow the money approach is 
still at an embryonic stage in Europe and various models are being attempted in Member 
States. Member States’ experience with actions aimed at commercial exploitation by 
targeting advertisers is therefore limited and so far hardly based on spontaneous cooperation 
with content owners only. 
For instance the UK has launched the experimental programme ‘Operation Creative’, with 
apparently positive results in the period when it was monitored (-12% illegal traffic),276 but 
the Infringing Website List compiled by right owners and industry sources was overseen in 
cooperation with the City Police of London. Moreover, Operation Creative had to rely on an 
external provider for the assessment of the degree of online intellectual property 
infringement risk. Italy has also begun to engage in its own ‘follow the money’ initiatives 
where the advertising industry and the content industry have recently entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding. The agreement lays the foundation for a self-regulatory 
mechanism that aims to block advertising on pirate sites in a similar way to Operation 
Creative in the UK, but without police oversight. Right-holders are to report to a joint 
committee, which will then communicate with agents and advertisers. Similar initiatives are 
also underway in Germany and Finland. Spain, conversely, has opted for including action 
aimed at advertisers in ad hoc legal provisions administered under the Ley Lassalle. 
The expert group on the enforcement of intellectual property rights set up to strengthen 
cooperation between Member States and facilitate the exchange of regulatory experience and 
good practices between Member States still has little to draw lessons from when it comes to 
assessing the impact and effectiveness of the various follow the money approaches and 
creating a EU-wide consensus on their feasibility or, conversely, moving from a self-
regulatory approach to hard legislation, as already happened elsewhere in similar instances 
(for instance, the US first tried payment services self-regulation of revenue flows to illegal 
poker services online, before taking legislative action). 
                                                   
276 See ‘Follow The Money: Financial Options To Assist In The Battle Against Online IP Piracy’, 
Discussion Paper by Mike Weatherley, MP, Intellectual Property Adviser to the Prime Minister, 2014. 
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There are two main concerns that have been voiced on this kind of initiative. First, targeted 
websites would be offered few remedies for improper or erroneous action or not be given 
a right to a fair trial. Second, concerted action from advertisers or payment services can be 
construed as discriminating behaviour in antitrust proceedings against them. This is the 
reason why similar initiatives being attempted elsewhere in the world have also sought 
preliminary approval from regulators (e.g. Australia). On the positive side the approach – if 
successful – could make copyright enforcement in the digital environment even smoother 





Box 4. Complementary enforcement provisions of the Strategy for Enforcing Intellectual Property rights in 
Third Countries 
The EU Strategy for Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights in Third Countries recognises that 
forcing ISPs to act against infringing sites in third countries lacking appropriate legislation 
and/or willingness to take action is especially problematic. Actually, migration of websites to 
such countries often represents a last resort defence against enforcement action at the EU level 
and requests to shut down ‘structurally infringing’ sites.277 Since the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement has not been ratified, the measures envisaged in the strategy (negotiation of 
intellectual property rights in bilateral trade agreements and recourse to dispute settlement 
mechanisms at the international level) are generic in scope and not necessarily focused on civil 
enforcement of copyright in the digital environment, but eventually more on criminal 
enforcement aspects. 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights plus clauses generally 
included in the Free Trade Agreement negotiated since 2006 or in the Eastern Partnership 
Treaties with Georgia and Moldova have mainly focused on other intellectual property rights 
enforcement aspects, because it is relatively easy for infringers to move from one host country to 
another. Past evaluations of the strategy have also highlighted how lack of harmonisation within 
the EU itself affected the credibility of the messages addressed to third countries and how the 
lack of reliable and comprehensive data on sources of infringements online made it difficult to 
prioritise redressing policies through diplomatic action as the US extensively does.278 
However, in a notable alignment between its external strategy and the internal action plan, the 
Commission has endorsed in its latest version of the strategy – in addition to traditional public 
policy measures in its relations with third countries – support for voluntary industry-led soft law 
initiatives such as codes of practice for Internet operators and enhanced collaboration with right 
                                                   
277 Again for a review of the most egregious cases of website migrations to avoid prosecution, 
reference can be made to the US Out-of-cycle Review of Notorious Market. 
278 Ade (2010), Evaluation of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Strategy in Third Countries, Final 
Report, Volume I, November, at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/november/tradoc_147053.pdf. 
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owners through Memoranda of Understanding. It has to be noted that in a couple of notable 
cases courts in third countries have ruled against action taken by payment service providers.279 
 
3.6 Effect of the current provisions on the level of infringements 
Since in many Member States the EU legal framework on copyright enforcement has been 
transposed with substantial delay and related implementation reports were far from 
detailed, there are little public updated data to draw detailed conclusions on their level of 
implementation and impact. 280 
However, already back in 2010, based on the findings reported in the Staff Working Paper 
accompanying the Commission Report on the Application of the IPRED, the Commission 
had concluded that the legislative and non-legislative instruments in place could not be 
considered powerful enough to combat online infringements of intellectual property 
rights effectively.281 
This overall assessment has also been confirmed by the Commission’s latest preferred policy 
approach, which consists in focusing policy initiatives on criminal instruments and 
promoting Codes of Conduct and the ‘follow the money’ approach as the first line of defence 
to deal with the problem and leave civil injunctions as a second-best residual remedy. 
Most of the more recent quantitative evidence available at the EU level comes from the 
statistics of the 2012 public consultation on civil enforcement of intellectual property rights: 
efficiency of proceedings and accessibility of measures, and hardly any pan-European 
                                                   
279 See for instance Steadman, I. (2013), ‘Icelandic court declares WikiLeaks donation ban “unlawful”’, 
Wired, available at: www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-04/26/wikileaks-wins-visa-case; and with 
reference to the 2006 AllOfMP3 case, see Russian Pirates get Visa in Court 
http://eng.cnews.ru/news/top/indexEn.shtml?2007/07/13/258719. 
280 Few Member States transposed the Enforcement Directive on time, i.e. by the agreed deadline only 
five Member States (Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia and the UK) were compliant. Most Member 
States were late. As a result, 20 infringement procedures for non-communications had to be started, 
namely against Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Spain and Sweden. A referral to the CJEU was made for Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden, France and 
Portugal. The last Member States to implement the Directive were Germany (July 2008), Sweden 
(April 2009) and Luxembourg (June 2009), after a decision confirming an infringement had been taken 
by the CJEU. When the Commission in 2010 reported about status of transposal Greece seemed not to 
have implemented the Directive in its entirety, but only in respect of copyright and related rights. 
Source: Commission Staff Working Document, Analysis of the application of Directive 2004/48/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights in the 
Member States. However, as late as end-2010 details on concrete implementation at the national level 
were often missing or provided with very limited details so that the Commission could not reach a 
conclusion on the implications the Directive had on the development of the information society 
particularly in Cyprus, France, Luxembourg, Malta, the Slovak Republic and the UK. No further 
reports on implementation were envisaged. 
281 See Staff Working Paper accompanying the Commission Report on Application of Directive 
2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights SEC(2010) 1589 
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comparative study has been specifically dedicated to the topic of copyright enforcement 
online.282 
Anecdotal evidence on operations targeting major infringers is available from the US 
Government 2014 Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets Report, but its data seem to 
confirm that most enforcement is actually carried out by means of criminal proceedings, 
whereas civil injunctions play a relatively minor role in enforcing copyrights online across 
the EU, possibly with some notable exceptions. But since the data presented in the US Report 
are not systematic it is difficult to draw strong conclusions. 
In many EU Member States where monitoring of online copyright enforcement takes 
place, it usually refers to activities carried out outside the scope of the InfoSoc Directive 
and IPRED, as these are deemed residual and scarcely relevant compared to other means 
of enforcement in the countries concerned. As a result, regular statistics are available on 
HADOPI operations in France, or on AGCOM-managed activities in Italy, or on the special 
operations of the Ley Lassalle in Spain.  
Much in the same vein, the Netherlands keeps regular track of notice and take down 
procedures and injunctions managed within the framework of the BREIN Code of Conduct. 
This is the only policy instrument the country has long relied upon, as infringement at the 
subscriber level was not deemed actionable until recently. 
The UK used to have a comprehensive monitoring scheme in place in the form of quarterly 
surveys, but this was subsequently discontinued due to lack of funding. In the UK, due to 
delays in transposition, InfoSoc provisions have become actionable since 2011 and right-
holders have been relatively active at targeting the supply-side through court injunctions 
which to date have required ISPs to block subscriber access to around 100 infringing 
websites. But there are reports that the country is also moving towards code of conduct-
based approaches to simplify procedures and make them more expedient and user-friendly. 
Accordingly, the UK has also felt the need to streamline the blocking of infringing websites 
by other extrajudicial means than Section 97A of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act. 
Whenever governments are not involved with a supervisory function, there is patchy 
information available about the coverage and level of activity of private Memoranda of 
Understanding or codes of conduct. To fill this gap, the European Observatory on 
Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights is reportedly planning a study on voluntary 
collaboration practices in the online enforcement of intellectual property rights, but they are 
at a very early stage and it is unclear what degree of focus the study will have on 
quantitative analysis. 
The proposals tabled so far envisage both a mapping of existing voluntary collaboration 
practices and the analysis of several selected cases. OHIM has also presented a proposal for a 
study that would focus on a detailed analysis of the functioning, funding and popularity of 
copyright-infringing websites with a focus on commercial-scale copyright infringements 
only. 
The limited effectiveness of current InfoSoc provisions is proven by the fact that many 
countries have felt the need to encourage extrajudicial procedures, not only to decrease 
                                                   
282 The notable exception is represented by the UK Intellectual Property Office (2015), International 
report on the Comparison of Approaches to Online Copyright Infringement, from which most of the 
information reported in this Section is drawn on. 
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costs but to speed up implementation. This has led to the emergence of codes of conduct 
or administrative-based notice and take down procedures, which have proven to be rather 
quick (e.g. 2-5 days in the Netherlands; 12 to 35 days in Italy as managed by AGCOM, 15 
days in Spain) and relatively inexpensive – in contrast with existing legal options to pursue 
offenders through the courts. 
In addition to quicker action, the lower cost (a HADOPI administrative notification would 
cost around €1 plus an additional €2 for the ISP, although these data are controversial283) and 
increased simplicity for rights owners means that even small and medium enterprises can 
engage with the process in some countries, e.g. Italy, where this was reported not to be the 
case in the past because of the complexity of getting injunctions from courts. 
In the EU, there are few studies on the effectiveness of civil injunctions in curbing 
infringement at the consumer level. To the contrary, in the US a substantial amount of 
economic literature has been made available about the theoretical assumptions under which 
an action undertaken upon an anticipated loss could be justified with a view to its expected 
deterrent effect (Litman, 2005; Hughes, 2005). The industry decision of moving to 
Memoranda of Understanding with ISPs as soon as these became possible and refraining 
from taking further civil injunctions seems to indicate that undertaking a loss-generating 
civil injunction was considered a second-best strategy by right-holders themselves.284   
3.7 The difficulties in estimating online infringements 
Any empirical assessment of the effect of these provisions in working as a deterrent and 
actually curbing copyright infringement online is made difficult by the lack of reliable data 
to quantify the level of infringement in the first place. The Hargreaves (2011) report noted, 
already back in 2011, that the evidence available for a clear picture of the scale and dynamics 
of online copyright infringement is surprisingly thin, and that most surveys on the subject 
are not statistically robust due to the illegal nature of the activities themselves. Moreover, the 
extent to which illegal access to content online actually amounts to lost sales is a highly 
contentious issue in making these estimates because it implies counterfactual considerations 
of what consumers would have done otherwise. 
The Commission has acknowledged this state of affairs and commissioned an ad hoc 
innovative methodology to assess real levels of intellectual property rights infringements 
(RAND, 2012), based on the relationship between ‘physical’ indicators of infringement 
and unexpected differences between firms’ revenue forecasts and actual sales. This raised 
concerns among copyright owners that criticised the proposed approach as inadequate to the 
media industry on both theoretical and practical grounds. While theoretical arguments did 
not seem insurmountable, the methodology when proposed could not be pilot tested in the 
online environment, because industry objected to the reliability of their own estimates and 
the fact that these would already somehow incorporate anticipated infringements so as to 
make the proposed methodology circular.  
                                                   
283 HADOPI, «Réponse graduée – Les chiffres clés», June 2014 (www.hadopi.fr/sites/default/ 
files/ChiffresRGjuin14.pdf). 
284 See on the subject M. Masnick (2010), ‘RIAA Spent $17.6 Million in Lawsuits … To Get $391,000 in 
Settlements?’, Techdirt (www.techdirt.com/articles/20100713/17400810200.shtml). 
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On the contrary, industry insisted on relying on its own calculations consisting of 
multiplying the total number of infringements by the number of lost sales per infringement 
(the so-called ‘substitution rate’) in order to derive the overall impact of illegally 
downloaded files on its sales. This, however, creates some critical issues as regards the 
neutrality of the monitoring techniques used to estimate infringements and the very 
controversial substitution rate between illegally accessed contents and sales lost. Therefore, 
proponents of the innovative methodology did not change their minds as to the validity of 
their proposed approach. 
Point 10 of the Commission action plan actually envisages the publication starting from 
2014 of a biennial report on Intellectual Property in the EU economy for more effective 
monitoring of the impact of the EU’s intellectual property enforcement policy that should 
be based on the proposed methodology and incorporate online copyright as well, if 
industry cooperates in the assessment and makes available its ex ante estimates. Still, the 
first such report has not materialised yet but is expected soon. 
On top of these methodological disagreements, it is worth recalling that the physical metrics 
of infringing behaviour remain controversial. In response to the Hargreaves report the UK 
OFCOM commissioned more robust surveys (5,000 respondents) based on best practice self-
reporting approaches (Mazziotti, 2013) to this aim, but monitoring was then discontinued 
and few conclusions can therefore be drawn on underlying trends. The intrinsic limitation of 
survey data stems from the fact that respondents are unlikely to truthfully report purchases 
of pirated goods. As happened in the UK case randomised response design techniques can 
help overcome some of these concerns, but cannot fully address the possible lack of 
awareness of consumers when committing an infringement. Therefore, these types of survey 
are deemed more reliable as a measure of the variation in the geographical and sectoral 
scope of unauthorised access, as well as of trends over time rather than of the exact 
quantities. They also offer valuable information on consumer attitudes to and degree of 
awareness of the phenomena, as well as on distribution channels. 
Given the difficulties in assessing the levels of infringement and their evolution over time, it 
goes without saying that any assessment of the impact of enforcement in curbing these very 
same levels represents a real challenge. If two opposite approaches are assessed – the Dutch 
one where illegal downloading was not prosecuted, and the French one which thoroughly 
attempted to fight illegal downloading – some impacts have been demonstrated in both 
cases. At the same time, the assessments  suffer from the usual methodological limitations 
(the metrics used, the substitution rate, availability of panel data over time and space, the 
weight attributed to other context factors) and face difficulties in quantifying infringing 
behaviours as a judgment criterion.  
The French, for instance, refer to the number of HADOPI notifications as a success criterion, 
which tends to overlook the problem of possible consumer changes in illegal content fruition 
modalities. It would be a matter worth further investigation whether there is a trade-off 
between propensity to act at the Internet subscriber level and recourse to civil injunctions 
towards commercial scale infringers, as France reports a total of two such commercially-
oriented injunctions in the period. 
In other countries, such as the Netherlands, some interesting and quite rigorous one-off 
studies have been undertaken of the illegal online consumption of cultural products and 
related determinants, but none of them uses a repeatable methodology on a longitudinal 
basis to allow comparisons between different points in time. 
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A recent empirical study carried out in the Netherlands (Poort & Leenheer, 2012), would 
suggest that the short-term impact of website-blocking injunctions in copyright cases, and 
thus the overall effectiveness of injunctions that underlie its justification, might be in the 
region of some 5% of total infringement. In fact, according to the study, only 5.5% of all 
customers (approximately 20% of all infringing customers) of affected Internet access 
providers downloaded less, or stopped downloading altogether, due to the blocking of The 
Pirate Bay in the Netherlands. In comparative terms, if data were confirmed, this would 
make the ‘follow the money’ approach experiment in the UK (-12%) a big success. 
However, from the point of view of enforcement measured in terms of output, the Dutch 
research suggests that targeting the suppliers of infringing content is certainly more 
difficult than identifying and notifying individual users. So while France can point to 
millions of email notifications and several hundred thousand registered delivered letters sent 
to individual subscribers, as mentioned before in the Netherlands only concerning one in 
five of the sites that are suspected of infringement could the actual infringer be traced. 
Similarly, Spain was only able to clear 30 disputes in the first year of operations of its scheme 
out of the 213 requests that were received in just the first month. Moreover, website blocking 
would come at a cost of some €5,000 each, plus another €100 for any subsequent notification 
(Husovec, 2012). 
Finally, and possibly most important, it is extremely hard to disentangle analysis of 
effectiveness and efficiency of enforcement provisions from other broader context factors. 
For instance, there is a growing body of studies285 – admittedly not always from independent 
sources – showing that as legal online alternatives become known and available in the 
Member States and consumer satisfaction with their quality and reduced transaction costs 
improves, demand for illegal services decreases. HADOPI statistics in France would seem to 
confirm this. Awareness of the legal offer in music is quite high among French Internet users 
(68%) and is also considered easy to find (77% of users). In comparison, legal offers of TV 
series and films have slightly lower awareness (64% for both) and are also equally 
considered harder to find. These are also the two cultural product categories that are most 
likely to be consumed illegally, with 30% of users stating that they consume them via means 
that infringe copyright as compared to 23% for digital cultural products overall. 
3.8 Concluding remarks 
There are several elements that no longer make IPRED fit for purpose in the digital 
environment. These largely pertain to the lack of a clear distinction between commercial 
operations and infringement at the consumer level and the problems this creates in the 
                                                   
285 Spotify, for instance, has published their own ‘Spotify’s impact on piracy’ research, which reviews a 
small number of country studies that suggests that legal streaming services are turning the tide 
against piracy, with previously illegal users migrating to legal consumption (Spotify, 2013, 
https://www.spotifyartists.com/spotify-explained/#spotifys-impact-on-piracy). Other studies that 
look at the levels of traffic to individual legal services compared with traffic to sites known to contain 
very high levels of copyright infringing content suggest similar conclusions. For instance, a 2012 
Sandvine report covering North America reported that Netflix represented 24.4% of total Internet 
traffic volume in North America over one 24-hour period, well ahead of BitTorrent, at 14.2%. See: 
https://www.sandvine.com. 
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management and quantification of damages and legal expenses that can be considered prone 
to abusive, strategic litigation or insufficiently dissuasive. 
The sheer recourse to the instrument of civil injunctions has made implementation very 
heterogeneous across Europe. This is not a specific issue of copyright enforcement in the 
digital environment, but extends to intellectual property rights in general. What makes the 
situation peculiar in the digital environment is that this creates an uneven competitive field 
in terms of business risks and potential liability across Europe and creates incentive for 
regulatory shopping. 
In a number of cases the implementation of IPRED in the online environment at the 
consumer level has been made impossible by different national interpretations of privacy 
law, and the CJEU has substantially endorsed this cujus regio eius religio regime by giving EU 
Charter of Human Rights protection to the different national understandings of prevailing 
provisions, which has in turn fostered the creation of a number of administrative regimes 
replacing enforcement of IPRED and the InfoSoc Directive online with ad hoc provisions. 
Likewise, to ensure a right balance between the conflicting needs of enforcing copyright 
online and protecting the specificity of the Internet’s architecture as foreseen in the e-
Commerce Directive, the Commission is called on to manage a correct interpretation of the 
Directive’s liability exemptions. In particular, the CJEU has recently shown that, as things 
stand, the only insurmountable barrier for copyright holders wishing to enforce copyright 
is the principle that restricts Member States and national ISPs with general obligations to 
monitor online content, but that no obstacle should be created by national courts on other 
types of injunctions that do not conflict with the aforementioned principle irrespective of 
ISP liability considerations, including website blocking orders. Filtering apart, this leaves 
open the issue of what can technically be done, as technology rapidly evolves, who should 
bear related costs, and whether these are reasonably proportionate to the value of the rights 
being enforced. 
As a result, the concrete modalities this exoneration applies as well as the modalities through 
which costs can be imposed on ISPs in the other cases have been so poorly defined that codes 
of conduct have been produced to reduce legal uncertainty. This has further contributed to a 
very fragmented enforcement scenario across Europe. 
For different reasons the impact of IPRED and the InfoSoc Directive on copyright 
enforcement in the online environment can therefore be deemed residual when compared 
to other instruments available at the Member State level and related provisions are being 
increasingly replaced by administrative and criminal instruments and codes and conduct 
including the recently appearing ‘follow the money’ approaches. 
These developments create the parallel problem of ensuring an equal right to access and 
uniformity in the requirements Member States follow in allowing simple and informal 
notices (i.e. not through judicial orders) and on how to ensure a right to a fair trial before a 
judicial authority to parties that might be affected by abusive or mistaken notices and 
content removals in the context of code of conduct-based proceedings. 
Very limited data are available on the actual impact of the various provisions and strategies 
in curbing copyright infringement online, and comparisons between different approaches 
face notable methodological limitations, not least because of still unsolved underlying 
uncertainties and disagreements on how to measure the economic value of online copyright 
infringement itself. This difficulty in making comparisons is compounded by the fact that 
stakeholders’ enforcement choices seem to be influenced by the features of the 
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administrative and legal systems they operate in and the implicit subsidies they provide. As 
a result, no clearly preferable approach has appeared. The conduct of operators themselves 
and the ongoing debate seem to show that there are great expectations of the potential 
effectiveness of the newly introduced ‘follow the money’ approaches, which however remain 
relatively untested. And instances of expectations not met by results have already been 
experienced in the field of online copyright enforcement in the past. 
Most important, preliminary evidence shows that contextual factors and the availability of 
high quality legal content online appear to be even more important than enforcement in 
influencing the level of infringement. 
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4. Remuneration and compensation of authors and performers  
4.1 Economic analysis of legal provisions on remuneration and compensation 
The EU acquis on copyright is broadly silent concerning the issue of an ‘adequate 
remuneration or compensation’ for authors and performers, with some exceptions that 
will be discussed below. Generally speaking, on the one hand Member States are free to 
set norms affecting remuneration and compensation that go beyond the EU acquis; on the 
other hand, remunerations and compensations for authors and performers are, in most 
cases, left to market equilibria.  
This is not to say the EU policymaking and acquis are not concerned with authors and 
performers’ remuneration and compensation. In several policy documents, the Commission 
acknowledges that “authors and other creators expect a fair return for the use of their work” 
and that “it is often the case that performers, including professional ones, are not duly 
recognised and rewarded for their creative input to an artistic work”.286 At the same time, the 
Commission Work Programme for 2014, where the review of the copyright regime was 
included among the incoming legislative initiatives, lists the effective remuneration of right-
holders among the regulatory objectives.287 Still, the Commission falls short of identifying 
specific legal means through which to achieve these objectives, apart from the general 
consideration that a more solid copyright framework would be beneficial for authors and 
performers, as well as to every right-holder. Interestingly, the Commission suggests that 
improving the Single Market for creative content is one way to increase authors’ and 
performers’ revenues, if not the only one.288 In a nutshell, the Commission’s attitude 
towards remuneration and compensation can be grossly summarised as acknowledging 
the issue, though adopting a ‘market-knows-best’ approach. 
In terms of legal provisions, the InfoSoc Directive acknowledges that the copyright legal 
framework per se provides the legal and economic basis for ensuring a remuneration or 
compensation of creative work. This is enshrined in Recital 10, where it is stated that: 
[i]f authors or performers are to continue their creative and artistic work, they have 
to receive an appropriate reward for the use of their work, as must producers in 
order to be able to finance this work…Adequate legal protection of intellectual 
property rights is necessary in order to guarantee the availability of such a reward… 
Besides, Recital 31 of the InfoSoc Directive calls for the safeguarding of a “fair balance of 
rights and interests between the different categories of right-holders” as well as between 
users and right-holders. However, it is fair to state that, with the exception of the issue of 
                                                   
286 Communication from the Commission, A Single Market for intellectual property rights, 
COM(2011)287. 
287 Annexes to the Communication from the Commission, Commission Work Programme 2014, 
COM(2013) 739 final. 
288 For instance, in the Impact Assessment accompanying the document ’Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the collective management of copyright and related rights 
and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the Internal Market’, 
SWD(2012)204. Cf. also European Commission, Green Paper on the only distribution of audiovisual works 
in the European Union: opportunities and challenges, COM(2011)427. 
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fair remuneration, the Directive does not provide for any actionable legal means to pursue 
these principle claims. 
Indeed, the InfoSoc Directive does not directly address the issues of authors and performers’ 
remuneration and compensation. Equilibrium prices for remunerations or compensations are 
largely determined by i) market mechanisms, and ii) national legal contexts. The mix 
between these two drivers depend on Member States, i.e. on the specific choices that have 
been made at national level on this subject. The InfoSoc approach to authors’ and 
performers’ remuneration and compensation can be defined as ‘hands-off’. 
Obviously, it is to be mentioned that in one case the InfoSoc Directive does regulate the 
remuneration or compensation of right-holders, including authors and performers. It does so 
when, in Article 5, it mandates ‘fair compensation’ against certain exceptions and limitations 
to the rights of reproduction, communication and distribution. The following considerations 
apply: 
1. As discussed in Section II.1.2.5 above, most of exceptions and limitations are optional for 
the Member States.289  
2. Hence, Member States shall determine what exceptions should be granted to the rights of 
reproduction, communication and distribution, and only then shall determine when fair 
compensation is due. 
3. For some exceptions, fair compensation is mandatory, namely: 
a. reprography (par. 2, lett. (a));  
b. private copying (par. 2 lett. (b));  
c. reproductions of broadcasts made by social institutions for non-commercial purposes 
(par. 2 lett. (e)). 
In legal terms, the rationale for introducing fair compensation mechanisms seems to be the 
need to protect specific categories of users or certain users’ prerogatives, because an 
excessively strict interpretation of the copyright would otherwise prevent the full enjoyment 
of the good (Helberger & Hugenholtz, 2007). In economic analysis terms, the rationale for the 
introduction of fair compensation seems related to the need to avoid transaction costs, rather 
than equitable compensation (Hadke & Towse, 2007). Indeed, fair compensation also applies 
to non-meritorious and non-protected activities, such as reprography or caricature. 
However, in this case fair compensation is deemed efficient because it would be too costly – 
read: impossible – for the right-holder or the collecting society to track every single use. 
Hence, a sort of per-use tax, or levy, compensates for the impossibility of measuring uses. 
Fair compensation is not economically negligible in some cases. For instance, in the period 
2004-09 between €400 million and €600 million accrued to right-holders in the EU only 
thanks to the fair compensation levy for private copying (Kretschmer, 2011). Where data is 
available at national level, it represented between 4% and 9% of total collecting society 
revenues. WIPO (2013) reports that the trend is now decreasing: its 2012 data, which cover 
                                                   
289 The only exemption from this principle is the exception for transient and incidental reproductions 
which are an integral part of a technological process whose purpose is to enable a transmission of 
content in a network for lawful use and with no independent economic significance. For transient and 
incidental reproductions, the exception from the reproduction right is mandatory. Cf. Article 4.1 of the 
InfoSoc Directive. 
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most EU Member States, show revenues from private copying falling to slightly more than 
€300 million.290 
Private copying levies, as well as other remuneration rights, are an important support for 
authors’ and performers’ income, particularly for the latter. Data show that private copying 
rights represent about 5% of the collection of remuneration rights by collective management 
societies, and 35% for performers (AEPO-ARTIS, 2009). In more detail, distribution of private 
copying remuneration, which is largely collected by collective management societies, is 
based on a scheme determined either by right-holders’ organisations or public regulation. 
Private copying levies are usually split between audio-related and video-related levies. 
Authors enjoy about 43% of the former and 32% of the latter, while performers get about 
one-quarter for both audio- and video-private copying levies. It is finally to be noted that in 
many Member States part of these levies are redistributed for cultural purposes, up to 50% of 
the total (WIPO, 2009). 
However, while private copying represents a large share of performers’ remuneration 
rights, and a more limited one for authors, it is difficult to gauge the absolute weight over 
total remuneration and compensation. From an economic viewpoint, authors’ and 
performers’ remuneration and compensation also includes lump-sum payments (possibly 
annualised) received in exchange for copyright bundles, and the fees and salaries for, e.g. 
performance and provision of services. Taking into account these additional revenue streams 
for authors and performers, it is not possible to assess the weight of private copying 
remuneration out of the total remuneration rights. In one instance, it is claimed by Younison 
(2010), a European platform of music artists, that private copying levies currently represent 
less than 1% of total authors’ revenues, and hence do not substantially increase their 
remuneration levels. Similar conclusions are reached by an Oxera report (2011) for a 
manufacturing company, Nokia, where it is claimed that authors’ and performers’ incentives 
are only marginally affected by the private copying levy. 
All in all, fair compensation concerns only unauthorised but legitimate – in some loose 
sense – uses of an author’s or performer’s creative content. It is not aimed at ensuring a 
‘fair’ distribution of revenues along the value chain for legitimate uses of creative content, 
uses which generate the bulk of the revenues. This is why we consider the InfoSoc 
Directive largely neutral with respect to adequacy of authors’ and performers’ 
remuneration and compensation, even taking into account the provisions on fair 
compensation. 
The InfoSoc ‘hands-off’ approach is not the only one known by the EU copyright framework 
concerning authors’ and performers’ remuneration and compensation. Other EU provisions 
aim at directly interfering with market equilibria. This is the case of Directive 2011/77/EC, 
which trades off an extension of the copyright terms with the earmarking of 20% of the 
revenues originating from this extension as a supplementary royalty to certain categories 
of performers.291 
                                                   
290 As confirmed by other sources (e.g. SAA, 2015). 
291 See the Impact Assessment accompanying the Proposal for a Council Directive amending Council 
Directive 2006/116/EC as regards the terms of protection of copyright and related rights, 
SEC(2008)2287. Cf. also European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Contractual Arrangements 
Applicable to Creators: Law and Practice of Selected Member States, Study, January 2014. 
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Directive 2011/77/EC does not intervene ex ante in the market by changing the parties’ 
balance of power. It creates an ex-post redistribution mechanism to protect the weakest 
party, in this specific case performers, regardless of the market equilibrium. This still differs 
from the case of the Rental Directive, where a ‘paternalistic’ approach is adopted, 
meaning that the norms intervene to prevent certain undesired market equilibria, which 
would otherwise be determined by the free contractual relations among the parties. 
The Rental Directive stipulates certain mandatory rights to equitable remuneration. In 
particular, Article 5 mandates an “unwaivable right to equitable remuneration” for authors 
and performers that have transferred or assigned a rental right. Article 6 stipulates an 
exception for public lending, provided that some compensation is granted. Paragraph 2 of 
Article 8 provides again for the same right to performers concerning the wireless 
communication of phonograms. One could correctly argue that the economic significance of 
these rights in the whole copyright framework is, again, limited. However, in principle, this 
represents an alternative interventionist and paternalistic approach, in which parties cannot 
trade and waive their rights based only on their freedom to contract. 
Before going further with the comparison of the hands-off and paternalistic approaches, it is 
useful to discuss what the specific economic value of this right is, i.e. when a remuneration 
can be considered equitable under the Rental Directive. This issue was tackled by the CJEU 
in the ‘SENA’ case.292 At paragraphs 23-25, the Court states that the concept of equitable 
remuneration is an autonomous provision of Community law, which is to be interpreted 
uniformly in all Member States. However, in paragraph 34 it also states that the EU acquis 
does not prescribe any method to determine what constitutes uniform equitable 
remuneration nor the parameters on which it is based. The uniform interpretation of 
equitable remuneration implies that Member States should ensure a proper balance 
between the interests of performers and other right-holders, in relation with the economic 
value of the use under consideration. Hence, a general determination of when remuneration 
can be considered equitable does not strictly follow from the principle of equitable 
remuneration. 
After discussing the two possible approaches, this Section is concluded by assessing whether 
either of the two legal options – hands-off vs. paternalistic – is, from a theoretical 
perspective, superior to the other in terms of securing an adequate remuneration and 
compensation for authors and performers. Our conclusion is that both the hands-off and 
paternalistic approaches are likely to result in substantially similar market outcomes, once 
market mechanisms are factored in. Even when, under the paternalistic approach, authors 
and performers are granted unwaivable rights to equitable remuneration, the law does not 
determine when remuneration is equitable, except for excluding extreme – i.e. zero or near-
zero – revenues. As long as an EU or national provision does not stipulate what ‘adequate’ 
means, the revenue share accruing to authors and performers for their unwaivable rights is 
still left to individual or collective contract negotiations, i.e. to individual or collective market 
power. 
In a nutshell, market power, rather than the provisions of waivable versus unwaivable 
rights, remains the key determining factor of the remuneration and compensation of 
authors and performers. The norms regulating contractual mechanisms for authors and 
                                                   
292 Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 6 February 2003. Case C-245/00 Stichting ter Exploitatie 
van Naburige Rechten (SENA) v. Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS). 
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performers matter much more than the approach subsumed in the EU copyright framework. 
However, contractual mechanisms fall currently under national competence (in addition, 
they border labour regulation in some cases).293 Further to that, a uniform effectiveness of 
adequate remuneration and compensation provisions for all authors and performers is also 
prevented by the diversity in arrangements and parties’ market power across different value 
chains.294 
Finally, it is worth discussing that several contributions295 seem to link the concept of 
equitable remuneration to some kind of compensation-per-use, as opposed to lump-sum 
payments in exchange for authors and performers waiving (most of) their rights. This 
indeed ensures that best-selling authors and performers do enjoy a fairer share of their 
success, even if at the moment of concluding the contract they were in a weaker position. 
However, less-than-successful authors may not benefit, or indeed lose, from such a 
remuneration scheme. Further to the distribution of revenues between best-selling and other 
authors and performers, it is to be mentioned that compensation-per-use schemes also have 
drawbacks. First, compensation-per-use schemes shift the entrepreneurial risk from the 
publisher/producer to the author/performer, who may not want to bear this risk. For 
instance, it is often quoted that authors and performers having signed a contract in the non-
digital age are not fairly remunerated for the online use of the content. However, online 
distribution has been a positive demand shock that authors and performers have not 
benefited from; at the same time, lump-sum contracts also shield them from negative shocks. 
Secondly, pay-per-use schemes entail more transaction costs, in some cases significantly 
more, than lump-sum payments. Additional transaction costs represent an efficiency loss 
that needs to be distributed among the contracting parties. Especially in the online 
environment, monitoring uses can be costly and imply trust issues. Finally, adding an 
unwaivable right to per-use remuneration on top of buy-out clauses would unavoidably 
decrease the market value of such clauses, and it is not clear whether authors and 
performers, and which ones among them, would end up with a higher share of the creative 
content revenues. 
4.2 Literature review on market structure and revenue allocation in the creative 
content markets 
In this sub-Section, the focus shifts from the analysis of legal provisions to a literature review 
concerning the online creative content value chains and how resources are allocated therein. 
                                                   
293 This is also acknowledged by the authors’ contribution to the Public Consultation on the Review of 
the copyright framework. The German system is quoted as a positive example in this respect. It states 
that remuneration is adequate if it corresponds to what is customary and fair in business relations 
and, possibly most important, adequacy is presumed if remuneration is in line with collective 
agreements. Cf. European Commission, Report on the responses to the Public Consultation on the 
Review of the EU Copyright Rules, July 2014; European Parliament study, supra note 291. Cf. also the 
2011 Green Paper, supra note 288; European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Working Group 
on Copyright, Working Document: Copyright in the Music and Audiovisual Sectors, 29.06.2011. 
294 As acknowledged in European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Working Group on 
Copyright Territoriality, Collective Management and Remuneration, 15.09.2010. 
295 See European Commission, Report on the responses to the Public Consultation on the Review of 
the EU Copyright Rules, July 2014. 
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We try to report data and specific information that can be found in the available material, 
rather than interested parties’ claims. However, the evidence on revenue allocation remains 
scant and anecdotal.296  
Any study on revenue allocation would have to overcome two challenges. The first is the 
lack of transparency concerning intra-value chain transactions – something which is shared 
with most other value chains outside the creative content markets. Secondly, data 
concerning revenue allocations must be differentiated by both type of product – because 
though market participants are somewhat similar, the relative market power may very well 
not be comparable – and by Member State. The latter distinction is particularly relevant in 
the context of this ex post evaluation because national contexts do not only determine 
different market conditions (e.g. in cultural production, demand for cultural goods, 
Internet access), but also different legal frameworks, causing differences in distribution of 
market power among operators. 
A very good example is a study on copyright revenue streams in creative industries in 
Finland (Koskinen-Olsson & Mulkku, 2014). While it only covers the Finnish creative 
industries, and is thus an excessively thin basis for generalising about the whole Single 
Market, 297 it includes novel data and a comprehensive approach. For each creative industry 
including press and literature, music, audiovisual, radio, TV, software, video games, 
photography, visual arts and advertising, the authors estimate the overall revenue stream. 
Then, from public sources and interviews with stakeholders, they estimate the amount of 
revenues (or the share of revenues) that accrue to the right-holders, including royalties, fees, 
salaries, and rights collected by CMOs. While the results are underpinned by several 
assumptions, to fill data gaps, the analysis is comprehensive and the methodology 
transparent. According to these estimates, in 2012 direct copyright revenue streams in 
Finland amount to €2.9 billion, up from €2 billion in 2008. If such an exercise had to be 
replicated at EU level. Indeed, in each country primary information from stakeholders and 
secondary information from national-specific secondary sources should be retrieved to 
assess the allocation of revenues along the various value chains. As discussed, allocation of 
revenues depends on the national legal framework – since authors and performers’ 
remuneration and compensation are almost not regulated by EU-wide acts - and on parties’ 
market power, which in turns derives from country-specific factor, such as the negotiation 
mechanism or market demand features.   
Here below, we discuss three of the main creative content value chains in the online 
environment – audiovisual, music and books – to better understand the type and nature of 
market operators, their relationships and transactions. Secondly, we discuss online platforms 
and advertisers as new operators in the online markets for creative content. Finally, we 
present data on revenues per value chain. 
                                                   
296 For this reason, the European Commission has recently awarded two service contracts concerning 
research on this subject. The first is on the remuneration of authors and performers for the use of their 
works and the fixations of their performances; the second is on the remuneration of authors of books 
and scientific journals, translators, journalists and visual artists for the use of their works. Both 
contracts were awarded to European Economic Research, the former in February 2014 and the latter in 
November 2014. 
297 Based on Eurostat data, Finland represents only 1.5% of the Single Market GDP. 
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4.2.1 Audiovisual products 
In the online environment, several business models for the ‘sale’ of audiovisual products 
(e.g. movies, TV series) exist. Business models differ along two main dimensions: revenue 
generation and access conditions. 
Concerning revenue generation, audiovisual content providers may be:  
1. publicly funded, such as public broadcasters or some European movie productions; 
2. subscription-based, such as satellite broadcasters or Netflix; 
3. advertisement-based, such as private TV broadcasters; 
4. supported via pay-per-view systems (i.e. payments of single accesses/downloads to 
media content), such as movie theatres or Apple’s iTunes; 
5. cross-subsidised, for example when public or commercial broadcasters also offer part of 
their content online. 
An audiovisual platform may also finance itself through a mix of the above-mentioned 
strategies. 
Online audiovisual platforms may also opt for different access regimes. There are Internet 
platforms with direct and free access (e.g. Google’s YouTube) and closed platforms, both 
based on a pay-per-view system (e.g. Apple’s iTunes) or on subscription-based access (e.g. 
Netflix). The CRA (2013a) report distinguishes between two categories of online on-demand 
audiovisual services:  
1. interactive services that offer a catalogue of titles based on subscription or pay-per-view 
system, termed video on-demand services; and 
2. services consisting of the time-delayed extension of existing linear TV broadcasters, 
termed on-demand television services. 
Video on demand services in Europe are growing quickly, though they represent only a 
small share of the market. According to the European Audiovisual Observatory (2014), in 
2013 video on-demand services generated €800 million in revenue. Audiovisual digital retail, 
rental and subscriptions generated €1.2 billion, overtaking video on-demand for the first 
time. Albeit from a small base, annual growth for audiovisual digital retail and rental has 
been in the double digits for the last three years; audiovisual digital subscriptions have 
recorded three-digit annual growth rates since 2010. 
A possible online audiovisual value chain consists of the following operators (for further 
details on the licensing value chain see Section II.2.2.1): 
1. Authors and performers, who create the audiovisual content under the producer’s 
management. The definition of who should be considered authors of a complex creative 
product, such as a movie, varies across national legal regimes. 
2. Production societies, which develop the project, organise the shooting, take care of pre-
financing and financing, and purchase the necessary rights from authors and performers. 
3. Distributors, which deliver the audiovisual product to the final user and/or to the online 
platform, possibly through a content aggregator when they are small. 
4. Online platforms, which provide the content to the final user (CRA, 2013a). 
The value chain is more compact when the distributor is also the producer of the creative 
content, such as when broadcasters or online platforms produce their own TV series. 
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4.2.2 Music 
Online music services may belong to two large categories: those offering music 
downloads (e.g. Apple’s iTunes) and those offering music streaming (e.g. Spotify). 
Business models can also encompass features of both families. Similarly, revenue generating 
strategies are either based on song (or album) purchases, as in the old brick and mortar 
environment, or on subscription fees. Streaming services are typically subscription-based 
(CRA, 2013a). Advertising also plays a role in financing music services, though a minor one 
compared to the audiovisual sector, because of the more limited attention that the consumer 
of music products pays at the screen. 
The music value chain is split into two main segments (for further details on the licensing 
value chain see Section II.2.2.2): 
1. artists and repertoire activities, focusing on discovery, development and promotion of 
artists and music recordings; 
2. distribution and commercial exploitation, including distribution of sound recordings to 
wholesalers and retailers (Leurdijk & Nieuwenhuis, 2012). 
In general, large music publishers (the so-called ‘majors’) do both activities; smaller labels 
tend to focus on artists and repertoire, while outsourcing distribution and commercial 
exploitation to third parties. 
Analogous to other creative content value chains, the music industry is characterised by high 
upfront investment, low marginal costs (even lower in the online environment) and high 
risk, in terms of sorting out successes from failures. The market structure is dominated by a 
small number of vertically-integrated record companies, which operate from authors to final 
users or online platforms, and a large number of small and medium enterprises (Leurdijk & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2012). 
Internet platforms mostly act as online distributors and hence function like new distribution 
channels, rather than additional steps in the value chain. Authors enter into contact, and 
contract, with the companies, or company divisions, carrying out artistic and repertoire 
activities.298 
4.2.3 Books 
The book market is the only one, among media and entertainment markets, where EU 
companies are still in the lead. In 2009, the EU market accounted for 40% of the global 
market for books, a share larger than that of the US. However, the US has a larger share of 
the e-book market, with 57% of global revenues in 2010. Furthermore, the largest player, 
Amazon, indeed an American company, controls about two-thirds of the e-book market. In 
any case, e-books still represent a minor share of the publishing market, i.e. 9% of total 
revenues in the EU’s five largest Member States (Simon & de Prato, 2012). 
The structure of the book and e-book online value chain is very similar to that found in the 
music industry. The main operators in the value chain follow (for further details on the 
licensing value chain see Section II.2.2.3): 
                                                   
298 Cf. Decision of the European Commission, CASE COMP/M.6456 Universal Music Group/EMI 
Music. 
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1. Authors (e.g. writers, artists, illustrators). 
2. Publishers, which select authors and organise the production of books and e-books. 
Publishers can obtain the creative work directly from authors or via an agent. 
3. Distributors, which include both wholesalers and retailers. 
Publishers are the main operator of the value chain. They perform several activities, such as 
aggregation of supply, presentation of creative content, pricing, marketing, and dealing with 
support technical activities. They also bear the entrepreneurial risks and the upfront costs 
(Simon & de Prato, 2012). Online platforms play the role of mass retailers (CRA, 2013b), as 
well as venturing into the publishers’ turf by directly contracting authors. 
Unlike the music industry, the most common revenue generating strategies consist of a pay-
per-access strategy, i.e. book sales. Recently, subscription-based models have also been 
introduced, such as Amazon’s Kindle Unlimited, but they still play a more limited role 
compared to other media industries. As far as authors’ remuneration and compensation are 
concerned, bestsellers receive an advance payment in exchange for their copyright, and once 
the advance is covered by sale revenue, the author receives additional royalties (e.g. per-unit 
of content sold) (Simon & de Prato, 2012). This does not apply to minor authors, who may 
only receive a per-unit payment, i.e. no advance; they may even have to bear upfront costs. 
Amazon adopts a revenue system, so that authors receive between 30-35% of revenues from 
any e-book sold on its platform, regardless of sales performance, without bearing any 
upfront cost and receiving no support in terms of, e.g. marketing. The higher share of 
revenue that Amazon grants depends on the stiff reduction of publishers’ costs (e.g. logistics, 
production costs, scouting).299 
4.2.4 Online platforms 
Online platforms is the new category of players across all online creative content markets. 
They mostly act as intermediaries between final consumers and the ‘old’ creative industries. 
In some cases, they cut out old parts of the creative industry, mostly by substituting brick 
and mortar retailers, but also by acting as publishers, record labels or news aggregators. In 
the latter, less common, case, online platforms put consumers and authors directly into 
contact. 
These platforms have very different features and span industries and business models. It is 
interesting to compare them to the old creative industry players. Some platforms, such as 
Amazon or Apple’s iTunes, are similar to very big retailers. However, successful online 
platforms often combine both an online catalogue and dedicated hardware for content 
enjoyment, such as Amazon’s Kindle or Apple’s iPod, thus being ‘walled gardens’, within 
which the whole consumer experience takes place. YouTube has a different origin, having 
been born as a free platform for sharing UGC; it then transformed into a platform for sharing 
copyrighted content, before becoming a legitimate player, where copyright norms are 
enforced to a significant extent. Rather than an online shop, its revenue generating strategy 
resembles that of a classic broadcaster: advertisers pay for consumers’ attention. Other more 
recent platforms, such as Spotify’s streaming service, function as a subscription-based radio; 
by contrast, Netflix’s business model is similar to that of the old video rental companies, and 
                                                   
299 Cf. ‘Take Control with Self-Publishing’, available at: http://www.amazon.com/gp/seller-
account/mm-summary-page.html?topic=200260520, last accessed on June 2015. 
IMPLEMENTATION, APPLICATION AND EFFECTS OF THE EU DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT | 117 
indeed was born as a distance-based DVD rental service, well before broadband connectivity 
allowed for a satisfactory quality of video streaming. 
What all these platforms have in common: 
1. Being online rather than brick and mortar businesses, they are affected to a more 
limited extent by physical constraints, such as logistics, location, rental, etc. Hence, 
they enjoy very large economies of scale in distribution of creative content. 
2. Being Internet-based, they potentially face a global market, even though the creative 
content industry is still segmented at national level for many product segments. For 
this reason, online platforms largely adopt a global strategy. Again, this triggers very 
large economies of scale. 
3. Being user interfaces, they are best-positioned for knowing and exploiting demand 
features. Most important, they know consumers to an unprecedented extent, thanks to 
the amount of personal data that they collect, process and store whenever an individual 
buys a product or just visits their website. 
All in all, these online operators have further globalised creative content markets, and 
displaced other operators’ activities, thus compressing their share of revenues. While 
obviously acknowledging the innovation and gains for consumers brought about by these 
platforms, they most probably represent the single most important reason why all other 
players on the value chain lament the reduction of revenues and profit margins. Revenues 
have indeed shifted, to a variable extent, from the creative industry to these new forms of 
global mass distributors.  
4.2.5 Advertisers 
As discussed above, online platforms capture both consumer attention and personal data. 
This makes them perfect candidates to run ad-based business models.  
When consumers interact with online intermediaries, they release, voluntarily or not, a flow 
of personal information. This information is collected, processed and used to ‘profile’ 
consumers. Profiling can be very simple, such as in the case of retargeting ads, where 
consumers who have looked in the past for a certain product are retargeted with ads of the 
same product. In other cases, profiling can be more complex and try to infer future purchase 
paths from consumers’ past history. Profiling and connecting users with the ‘right’ ad, and 
thus with the right product, can either be done by the platform itself, that is through ‘first-
party advertising’, or be outsourced to specialised firms, such as ad networks, through ‘third 
party advertising’ (Luchetta, 2013). 
Advertisers thus buy the right to deliver an ad to a certain class of profiled users. The ad 
can be bought based on two pricing schemes: cost per impression or cost per click. The 
former scheme, analogous to the case of old media, requires advertisers to pay a fixed price 
per quantity of viewers (usually expressed as ‘cost-per-million’). The latter scheme, born in 
the online environment where consumer behaviours can be tracked, provides for the 
advertisers to pay a sum each time a viewer clicks on the ad – the so-called ‘cost-per-click’ 
(Ratliff & Rubinfeld 2010). This is disruptively innovative, because for the first time the 
advertiser can know which consumers are attracted by what ad. In the offline world, 
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companies “waste half of the money spent in advertising, but do not know which half”.300 In 
the online world, companies know the effectiveness of every single euro they spend on ads. 
In 2013, expenditures on online advertisement in the EU reached €22 billion, which is coming 
closer to expenditures on TV ads (€26.3 billion). In 2009, online and TV ads generated, 
respectively, €13 billion and €26.7 billion: while online ads revenues have doubled in four 
years, TV ads have slightly decreased. Today, online ads represent about 27% of total ad 
expenditures in the EU, a share higher than that of ads on newspapers, magazines, radio, 
cinema and outdoor advertising (European Audiovisual Observatory, 2014). 
4.2.6 Data on revenues 
While data on the allocation of revenues across the value chain are scant, data on the 
economic value of the creative content industry and of the copyright revenue streams 
could be identified.  
First of all, defining creative industries and the activities included therein is not easy. WIPO 
(2002) defines creative industries, or copyright-based industries, as those “wholly engaged in 
creation, production and manufacturing, performance, broadcast, communication and 
exhibition, or distribution and sales of works and other protected subject matter”. In addition 
to this definition, it is also appropriate to include ‘digital delivery’ as a separate phase, given 
the subsequent market developments (Koskinen-Olsson & Mulkku, 2014). 
Creative industries – though the exact definition varies from study to study – represent a 
significant part of EU GDP. In 2012, Ernst & Young (2014) reports that they generate over 
€500 billion in revenues, or 4.2% of the EU economy. The largest segments are visual arts, 
advertising and television. At the same time, these industries employ more than 7 million 
people, the largest segments being performing arts, visual arts and music. According to SAA 
(2015), the European audiovisual industry generates €122 billion in revenues, €90 billion of 
which are generated by TV broadcasters (data refer to 2013). In the same year, box office 
revenues amounted to €6.3 billion, and the number of European movies reached about 1,550 
units, collecting about a quarter of box office revenues. 
The total collection of authors’ rights royalties in 2013 amounted to €4.7 billion, 83% of which 
was for the musical repertoire. The audiovisual repertoire triggered a revenue collection of 
€431 million, or 9.1% of the total copyright revenue. For the audiovisual industry, including 
TV broadcasting, authors’ right royalties represented about 0.4% of its total revenues. In 
2009, the digital sector accounted for 1.6% of total collections for all the repertoires combined 
(Simon, 2012). 
These aggregate data do not show how much each value chain part gains (Simon, 2012). The 
same is true for the scant data reflecting individual and aggregate authors’ revenues (such as 
Kretschmer, 2005), which are far from sufficient to paint any kind of picture of their share of 
profits over total revenues. Unsurprisingly, as in any value chain, each party claims that their 
slice of the cake is too small. This is not to say that authors and performers’ claims for a 
larger share of the profit are not reasonable. It is just to highlight how there is hardly any 
independent evidence that may justify any claim in a way that can justify an evidence-based 
policy cycle.  
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IMPLEMENTATION, APPLICATION AND EFFECTS OF THE EU DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT | 119 
The reason why there is such little evidence is not peculiar to the creative content markets. In 
all value chains, one of the most important industrial secrets is how much value each 
counterpart is able to extract from other operators. And indeed, most copyright contracts 
do include non-disclosure clauses. Since most value chains are non-transparent concerning 
contractual conditions, prices, and thus market power, the case for granting special treatment 
to copyright holders seems thin. Of course, the need to protect cultural creation may be a 
solid ground to invoke reinforced protection. The issue would then become whether 
transparency provides authors and performers with a stronger or weaker market position. In 
economics, it is known that information flows have an unclear effect on market conditions: 
on the one hand, they may be used to limit competition, and facilitate collusion, while on the 
other a very transparent market can also be very competitive. Therefore, depending on 
which counterparts become more or less competitive, authors and performers may either 
benefit or lose from any additional transparency provision. 
4.3 Techno-economic analysis 
In the digital environment, and even more in a both digital and globalised market for 
creative content, two natural laws work at an unprecedented scale: the Power Law and the 
Law (Taleb, 2007) of the Fat Tails (Anderson, 2006).  
‘Success’, i.e. the number of copies of creative content sold, increasingly approximates a 
Power Law distribution. It means that the market will feature a very small number of 
extremely successful authors, who ‘absorb’ most of the market, and increasingly numerous 
cohorts of ‘small’ authors selling a limited number of copies. In the words of Taleb (2007), 
authors will be a population with “a very small number of giants and a huge number of 
dwarves”. The Power Law depends on the fact that authors and performers work in a 
scalable environment. Scalability is induced by the ‘winner-takes-all’ nature of success in 
larger and larger digital markets for creative content, combined with self-reinforcing trends, 
in a feedback loop. Scalability creates a small league of global viral phenomena, whether R.J. 
Rowling’s Harry Potter or Psy’s ‘Gangnam style’, that can arise at any point on the global 
market. Scalability also implies a very unequal environment, where one single author can 
have a disproportionately high share of the market. While comprehensive data are not 
available, a recent media report claims that 1% of authors generate about 77% of global artist 
revenues.301 
However, the Law of the Fat Tails compensates, to some extent, the effect of the Power 
Law: even though minor authors become (relatively) more minor, they are not kicked out 
of the market, because the progressively lower significance of physical constraints, such 
as warehousing and shelf space, allow online platforms to maintain a very diverse and 
deep catalogue of works. In a nutshell, small niches, which would have been unprofitable in 
the brick and mortar economy, can now thrive and survive in the online environment 
(Anderson, 2006). This fosters protection of cultural and linguistic diversity. 
While these two laws to some extent compensate for each other, by keeping the giants from 
kicking dwarves out of the market, at the same time they create a population of authors 
                                                   
301 VICE News, ‘Why Artists Don't Make Money - The Business of Life (Episode 3)’, available at: 
http://news.vice.com/video/the-value-of-creativity-the-business-of-life-episode-3, last accessed on 
June 2015.  
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whose median remuneration or compensation is constantly decreasing. Indeed, even 
assuming for sake of simplicity that the increase in supply is matched with a corresponding 
increase in demand, in the online market for digital content the Power Law makes the rich 
richer, while the Law of the Fat Tails increases the number of minor authors. Hence, even 
assuming constant mean remuneration or compensation, a larger group of authors will enjoy 
lesser benefits and the very few will enjoy much greater ones. For example, the median 
income for a European screenwriter was €22,000 in 2012, while for UK screenwriters 
amounted to €11,000 (SAA, 2015). In the research team’s opinion, this explains, possibly to a 
larger extent than that of the copyright legal framework, why a constantly higher number of 
authors feels their position is threatened to the point of not earning enough to live off their 
creative production. 
The revolutions taking place in the digital and global market for creative content do not 
only affect authors and performers, but also the industrial players of the old value chains. 
The balance of power in the digital market for creative content is moving downstream, from 
authors and ‘old’ publishers to online platforms that have direct contact with consumers’ 
eyeballs. Access to consumers seems to be the new key asset in the creative content industry, 
protected by brands, patents and trade secrecy rather than by copyright. To the contrary, the 
main asset of authors and legacy players’ was, indeed, content. For this reason, legacy 
players are trying to get direct access to consumer markets (Simon, 2012a). 
Indeed, content markets are facing both a disintermediation from old publishers, be they 
music labels, book publishers or newspapers, and a re-intermediation via new online 
distribution platforms (such as the big four, otherwise called GAFA: Google, Amazon, 
Facebook and Apple), that seem to become additional gravity centres of the industry, also 
in terms of value extraction. While in the old world, intermediation was necessary because 
each player performed a core activity and relied on other operators along the value chain, 
now activities intermingle and large players tend to occupy a large part of the value chain. 
At the same time, re-intermediation via these platforms is compelling because they possess 
the new key asset, that is, access to consumers and consumer data. This asset also gives 
online platforms a certain, though variable, degree of market power to impose revenue 
sharing conditions on legacy players (Simon, 2012b). To the contrary, fully disintermediated 
business models, in which authors and performers directly contact consumers, thus 
acquiring larger revenue shares, have so far remained marginal, especially relative to the big 
online platforms. Indeed, building and maintaining an audience requires investment, which 
only companies, be they online platforms or legacy intermediaries, can undertake (Leurdijk 
& Nieuwenhuis, 2012). 
As anticipated in the previous sub-section, on the one hand these new platforms may 
disintermediate authors from publishers. As such, they are able to offer significantly better 
conditions to the large cohort of minor authors. By cutting the number of intermediaries, the 
shares for the bottom and top steps of the value chain increase. On the other hand, by 
working as retailers within the old value chain, online distributors, because of their size and 
their knowledge of consumers, can extract a larger share of revenues than brick and mortar 
retailers. Finally, they are able to create new streams of revenues from advertisers, and 
capture the old streams, thanks to their deep knowledge of consumer profiles (Oliver & 
Ohlbaum Associates, 2013). This has led to a progressive disintegration of the old vertically 
integrated big legacy players, and at the same time to a progressive disruption of copyright-
based business models. 
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All in all, the current techno-economic situation is far from optimal, for both content 
creators and legacy entrepreneurs, such as newspapers, music companies or book 
publishers, which have been cut out of large revenue streams. Both content creators and 
content entrepreneurs are necessary for the copyright environment to flourish; at the same 
time, both are constrained by the new features of markets and technical contexts. Once these 
largely exogenous factors are taken into account, what is the role for the EU copyright 
framework in supporting a ‘desirable’ allocation of revenues along the copyright value 
chains? On the one hand, ensuring some form of fair distribution is a significant need for 
authors but a true challenge in a ‘Power Law’ environment. On the other hand, the ‘Law of 
the Fat Tails’ ‘automatically’ helps in achieving other objectives, such as the promotion of 
cultural and linguistic diversity. At the same time, protection of innovation, i.e. of publishers, 
needs to take place in a radically different, i.e. disintermediated and re-intermediated, 
market structure, where old legal tools can hardly deliver the desired outcomes. 
 






Part III. General Ex-Post Evaluation 
  
IMPLEMENTATION, APPLICATION AND EFFECTS OF THE EU DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT | 123 
1. Introduction: The framework of our evaluation  
In what follows, we provide the main findings of our evaluation exercise, with specific 
reference to the questions asked by the European Parliament in its tender specifications. The 
overall framework for evaluation is illustrated by Figure 6 below, which specifies the key 
criteria that should be adopted in order to evaluate a given piece of legislation, namely the 
effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and relevance of the rules under evaluation. An 
additional criterion, EU added value, is not considered here as required by the European 
Parliament.  
Figure 6. Overall framework for ex-post evaluation 
 
Source: European Commission’s 2015 Better Regulation Guidelines - Toolkit. 
More specifically, the four criteria relevant to the present Study are defined as follows: 
 Effectiveness analysis considers how successful EU action has been in achieving or 
progressing towards its objectives. The EU better regulation guidelines clarify that the 
evaluation should form an opinion on the progress made to date and the role of the EU 
action in delivering the observed changes. If the objectives (general, specific, operational) 
have not been achieved or progress is not on track, an assessment should be made of the 
extent to which progress has fallen short of the target and what factors have influenced 
successes and failures. Consideration should also be given to whether the objectives can 
still be achieved on time or with what delay. The analysis should also try to identify if 
any unexpected or unintended effects have occurred.  
Typical examples of effectiveness questions: 
o To what extent have the objectives been achieved? 
o What have been the (quantitative and qualitative) effects of the intervention? 
o To what extent do the observed effects correspond to the objectives? 
124  RENDA, SIMONELLI, MAZZIOTTI, BOLOGNINI & LUCHETTA 
o To what extent can these changes/effects be credited to the intervention? 
o What factors influenced the achievements observed? 
o To what extent did different factors influence the achievements observed? 
 Efficiency considers the relationship between the resources used by an intervention and 
the changes generated by the intervention (which may be positive or negative). 
Differences in the way an intervention is approached and conducted can have a 
significant influence on the effects, making it interesting to consider whether other 
choices (e.g. as demonstrated via different Member State interventions) achieved the 
same benefits at less cost (or greater benefits at the same cost). Efficiency analysis can 
differ depending on the type of intervention being evaluated. Typical examples of 
efficiency questions include: 
o To what extent has the intervention been cost effective? 
o To what extent are the costs involved justified, given the changes/effects that 
have been achieved? 
o To what extent are the costs proportionate to the benefits achieved? What factors 
are influencing any particular discrepancies? 
o What factors influenced the efficiency with which the achievements observed was 
attained?  
o How affordable were the costs borne by different stakeholder groups, given the 
benefits they received? 
o If there are significant differences in costs (or benefits) between Member States, 
what is causing them? 
 Relevance looks at the relationship between the needs and problems in society and the 
objectives of the intervention. Things change over time – certain objectives may be met or 
superseded; needs and problems change, new ones arise. Relevance analysis is very 
important – because if an intervention does not help to address present needs or 
problems, then it does not matter how effective, efficient or coherent it is – it is no longer 
appropriate. This is why there is a strong link between relevance analysis and the criteria 
of EU added value – which assesses whether action continues to be justified at the EU 
level. Typical examples of relevance questions include: 
o To what extent is the intervention still relevant? 
o To what extent have the (original) objectives proven to have been appropriate for 
the intervention in question? 
o How well do the (original) objectives (still) correspond to the needs within the 
EU? 
o How well adapted is the intervention to subsequent technological or scientific 
advances? 
o How relevant is the EU intervention to EU citizens? 
 Coherence. Checking internal coherence means looking at how the various internal 
components of an EU intervention operate together to achieve its objectives. Similar 
issues can arise externally at different levels: for example, between interventions within 
the same policy field (e.g. a specific intervention on drinking water and wider EU water 
policy) or in areas which may have to work together (e.g. water policy and chemicals 
policy, or chemicals and health and safety). At its widest, external coherence can look at 
compliance with international agreements/declarations. The focus on coherence may 
vary depending on the type of evaluation and is particularly important in Fitness Checks, 
where coherence analysis will look for evidence of synergies or inconsistencies between 
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actions in a related field which are expected to work together. Even when evaluating an 
individual intervention, it can be important to check coherence with (a limited number 
of) other interventions. Typical examples of coherence questions include the following: 
o To what extent is this intervention coherent with other interventions that have 
similar objectives? 
o To what extent is the intervention coherent internally? 
o To what extent is the intervention coherent with wider EU policy? 
o To what extent is the intervention coherent with international obligations? 
Below, we apply these four main criteria to our evaluation of the InfoSoc Directive and 
related legislation. 
2. Main evaluation questions 
2.1 How effective is the current InfoSoc Directive? 
As observed in Part I above, the InfoSoc Directive had the following major operational 
objectives: 
 To align EU legislation with international law, especially after the 1996 WIPO Treaties 
that, inter alia, introduced the three-step test and addressed the issue of TPM. 
 To strengthen intellectual property protection in light of the emerging technological 
developments that led to the emergence of the Internet as a major distribution channel 
for content. 
 To reduce the existing disparities between national legal systems in terms of the basic 
definition of copyright, the scope of the rights to reproduction, communication, and 
distribution, the allowed exceptions and limitations, and the enforcement methods and 
practices.  
 To ensure an adequate level of remuneration and compensation of authors and 
performers. 
More than a decade down the road, it is fair to state that the first objective has largely been 
achieved, with the other objectives having only been partially achieved, and in some 
instances, arguably not achieved at all. The InfoSoc Directive managed to introduce, at least 
partially and not without exceptions,302 the three-step test into the legal system of the EU 
Member States, and led to a very broad definition of intellectual property rights coupled 
with the effective endorsement of TPMs as a viable way to enforce copyright, at the same 
time enabling a system of copyright protection through the prosecution of actors that 
circumvent TPMs. 
The same cannot be said for the other objectives, however. First, while rights were defined 
very broadly in the InfoSoc, this is by itself not a guarantee that protection will be stronger. 
                                                   
302 For instance, whereas in some Member States the three-step test is recognised as an instrument in 
judicial revisions of the copyright law, in others it is addressed to the legislator only and cannot be 
used by courts. The adoption of the ‘new public’ criterion for hyperlinking by the CJEU in both the 
Svensson and Bestwater International cases represents another example of inconsistencies with 
international copyright law. 
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There are three essential elements to the protection of a property right: i) the scope of the 
protection; ii) the mode of protection (property rules, liability rules); and iii) the effectiveness 
of enforcement. In the case of the InfoSoc Directive, the weak part of the protection system 
envisaged by the EU legislator was, without doubt enforcement, compounded by an 
excessive reliance on TPMs that in the end did not develop into the predominant 
approach for protecting online content, contrary to expectations when the InfoSoc Directive 
was first enacted. This led to a situation in which the remaining enforcement option in the 
InfoSoc Directive was Article 8(3), which provides for the possibility of filing injunctions 
against online intermediaries for the takedown of infringing content from their networks. 
This remedy, however, ended up being inconsistent with the ‘mere conduit’ principle 
established in Articles 12-15 of the 2000 e-Commerce Directive, and was gradually 
marginalised in particular due to difficulties in access to justice and in identifying infringers. 
Member States have then gradually relied on other methods, including regulations based on 
administrative remedies (e.g. HADOPI) and codes of conduct (e.g. BREIN). All in all, the 
level of protection for copyright holders today cannot be considered high enough, which in 
turn leads to the conclusion that the overall objective to strengthen copyright protection was 
not achieved, and even less so if one looks at the original remedies envisaged by the InfoSoc 
Directive to protect copyright in the online world. 
Likewise, it is possible to conclude that the objective of reducing fragmentation in the 
copyright regimes of the Member States was not fully achieved. This is due to a number of 
factors. First and foremost, as we already noted, despite the fact that the legal basis of the 
InfoSoc Directive was rooted in Article 114 TFEU (then Article 95 TEC), the Internal Market 
goal of the InfoSoc ended up being subordinated to the necessity of adapting EU legislation 
to reflect the WIPO treaties, and to strengthening copyright protection: as a result, the EU 
today is still characterised by 28 different copyright systems. To be sure, some progress was 
made in that exceptions and limitations were limited in number: however, most of them 
have remained optional, and fragmentation was only partly avoided by the decisions 
provided by the CJEU in recent years. As we have shown in Part II, Section 2 above, the 
implementation and scope of exceptions and limitations in a selected number of Member 
States portrays a widely fragmented picture, which still harms both copyright holders and 
end-users.  
Finally, it is widely recognised that the InfoSoc Directive was not successful in securing an 
adequate level of remuneration and compensation for the majority of authors and 
performers. Not only was the Directive largely silent as regards possible means of achieving 
this goal; the re-intermediation observed in most content markets has led to the emergence of 
new, powerful online intermediaries, who represent necessary interlocutors for right-
holders. The balance of power between authors and performers on the one hand and 
distributors on the other hand is such that reliance on market forces for the determination of 
a fair remuneration and compensation is likely to be a desirable choice only for those ‘happy 
few’ whose works enjoy a significant degree of success; the vast majority likely to be under-
remunerated. 
To sum up, only one out of the four initial objectives of the InfoSoc Directive can be 
considered achieved. A remaining issue is whether subsequent legislation has remedied this 
underachievement. Without any doubt, IPRED does not seem to have significantly 
contributed to the effectiveness of copyright protection online: if anything, its Article 3 has 
created a constraint for the application of aggressive injunctions and the imposition of 
filtering techniques to ISPs and other online intermediaries. Some of the recent legislation 
adopted a more ‘paternalistic’ approach, which aimed at securing that a minimum share of 
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the revenues be attributed to authors and performers, but this is only a small exception to the 
rule, i.e. reliance on market forces and freedom of contract in the determination of the 
remuneration and compensation of authors and performers. And while the CJEU has 
certainly played a major role in trying to promote the consistent interpretation of main rights 
and exceptions provided for by EU copyright legislation, its role has become very complex 
and controversial over time.  
2.2 How efficient is the present EU copyright framework structure? 
Concerning the efficiency of the intervention, there are serious doubts about cost-
effectiveness, where the assessment is negative overall, since the level of effectiveness was 
found to be extremely low in the previous Section. Another important aspect is that the 
InfoSoc Directive has not solved the problem of having to negotiate licences under 28 
different legal regimes, and has created a situation in which costs borne by consumers for 
the remuneration and compensation of artists (e.g. through levies) are significantly 
diverging across Europe. As already mentioned, a recent study estimated that commercial 
users that provide services in more than one country and offer more than one million titles 
face transaction costs of up to €260,000 per year and require about six employees to deal with 
licensing issues; in particular, the identification of relevant right-holders may require up to 
six months and negotiations to clear rights may take up to two years. This costly and 
bureaucratic process, in a context that is still dominated by micro-enterprises, might be 
considered as a serious shortfall on the legislative objectives of EU copyright law. 
Furthermore, the failure of Member States to implement a consistent set of copyright 
exceptions and limitations, at least for those that have a significant impact on cross-border 
activities, has also led to a system that is inefficient for specific categories of users, 
affecting research and innovation in particular, namely the viability of new products and 
services that could target the whole EU Internal Market (e.g. social networks).  
But even more than the costs, it is the benefits side that deserves careful consideration. The 
current acquis on copyright seems to have secured very few benefits for authors and 
performers and end-users, for a variety of reasons (ineffectiveness of enforcement, absence 
of provisions on fair remuneration and compensation, technological development that 
deviated from the use of TPMs, availability of technical measures to circumvent copyright 
protection without incurring liability). This means that, as things stand, the InfoSoc 
Directive and related legislation are, when taken together, limited in terms of their 
measurable general positive effect on industry and consumers, and lack overall efficiency 
(see Section 2.5.2 below for more details).  
2.3 On the effectiveness of monitoring and evaluation  
2.3.1 Have the existing implementation and monitoring tools been sufficient? 
Policymakers can learn from the evolution of the market if they make use of suitable 
monitoring and evaluation arrangements throughout the life of a given piece of legislation. 
An emerging way of securing this type of ‘maintenance’ of the legal rules is to select 
adequate indicators for monitoring and evaluation already when the piece of legislation is 
being adopted, and selecting a suitable time frame for evaluation (typically four to five 
years from implementation). This did not occur for the InfoSoc Directive, which was 
adopted before the European Commission started introducing these practices in its impact 
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assessments (introduced as of 1 January 2003). Another, increasingly used method of 
monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, coherence and EU added 
value of existing legislation, especially when it comes to enforcement, is the setting up of 
specific cross-country groups or a dedicated agencies in charge of producing 
implementation reports (e.g. in the case of e-communications, the creation of national 
regulatory authorities, the ERG and later BEREC has greatly facilitated the comparison of 
implementation practices in Member States). But also in this case, this did not happen with 
the InfoSoc Directive. In the case of copyright the European Commission has limited itself 
to the release of two implementation reports, in 2004 (but in this case without covering the 
InfoSoc Directive) and in 2007. 
2.3.2 Is the available evaluation work on the Copyright Directive sufficient? 
As a result, and as already observed, today there is a remarkable lack of data on a number of 
important aspects related to the effectiveness and efficiency of the InfoSoc Directive. These 
include data on the allocation of revenues along the value chain in different sectors, on the 
relative diffusion of legally consumed versus infringing content, on the effectiveness and 
diffusion of TPMs, and on many other aspects relevant to the effectiveness of the copyright 
acquis.  
A lot of work has been done on the evaluation of the InfoSoc Directive. The European 
Commission has relied on a large number of studies dedicated to many aspects of the 
Directive. These, altogether, created a large information basis for the analysis of the impact of 
specific rules in Member States, including the impact of diverging implementation and 
interpretation of optional exceptions and limitations.  
As a result, it is possible to observe that despite the relatively large amount of resources 
spent in collecting information on the implementation of the InfoSoc Directive, little has been 
done to collect data on the actual effects and impacts of the EU acquis on copyright. A few 
studies have focused on specific sectors, with a view to assessing transaction costs and other 
costs generated by the fragmentation of existing legislation, but all in all it is very difficult to 
explore the impact of re-intermediation on the redistribution of revenues along the value 
chain in a number of sectors. In this respect, the recently launched Fitness Check on the 
creative content sector (DG GROW) and the sectoral inquiry into the e-commerce sector (DG 
COMP) are likely to shed more light on the impact of this process on the sustainability of 
existing business models, as well as on incentives to engage in creative content creation in 
the years to come.  
2.4 On implementation gaps 
2.4.1 ‘Internal’ coherence: what are the main gaps and fragmentation in the 
application of the existing EU InfoSoc Directive and related broader 
framework?  
The ‘internal coherence’ criterion refers to the degree of coherence between the various legal 
instruments that compose the EU legal framework on copyright. This is different from 
“effectiveness”, since it does not entail any assessment of the extent to which the legal rules 
achieve their intended objectives.  
The major gaps that emerge from our analysis are related to: 
IMPLEMENTATION, APPLICATION AND EFFECTS OF THE EU DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT | 129 
 absence of clarity as regards the compatibility of the InfoSoc Directive and IPRED with 
other legislation, most notably on fundamental rights, data protection, e-commerce; 
 absence of a clear legal framework for the remuneration and compensation of authors 
and performers, due to the absence of clear provisions in the InfoSoc Directive;  
 uncertainty as regards the responsibility of online intermediaries, which have today 
became central in the distribution of content online, and who are increasingly able to 
monitor traffic flowing through their servers; 
 absence of clear rules on geo-blocking practices, characterised by a sound distinction 
between practices that respond to a lawful and legitimate business need, and practices 
that should be considered as discriminatory and detrimental to end-users (e.g. the 
deliberate geo-blocking of service portability);  
 uncertainty over the applicability of private international law such as on which criteria 
apply to the determination of the applicable law in the case of copyright infringements 
occurring online;303   
 uncertainty as regards the applicability of the exhaustion principle to making content 
available on intangible media, in particular for what concerns borderline cases such as 
‘download-to-own’ (see the UsedSoft decision and, to some extent, the Premier League 
decisions of the CJEU); 
 lack of flexibility and adaptability to new uses (e.g. mass digitisation, text and data 
mining, e-lending, e-learning, UGC); 
 lack of clarity on the implementation of specific exceptions (e.g. the exception covering 
parody, caricature, and pastiche, the exceptions for the purpose of libraries and similar 
institutions); 
 lack of clear rules on access to justice and collection of evidence to be used in civil 
proceedings. 
  
The main sources of fragmentation are summarised below. 
 Divergent definitions on key aspects of copyright law, including the definition of 
originality (elaborated by EU case law and based on the ‘author’s intellectual creation 
standard’); the definition of derivative works/transformative uses (left to Member States’ 
discretion and increasingly central in the digital environment); the authorship of 
copyrighted works (left to Member States’ discretion and with potential impact on both 
the demand and supply side of the Internal Market). 
 Divergent implementation and interpretation of exceptions and limitations across EU 
Member States, with some countries now even introducing new exceptions not originally 
envisaged by the InfoSoc Directive. For example, as far as text and data mining is 
concerned, UK law allows researchers to copy any copyrighted works for the purpose of 
computational analysis if they have already accessed the copyright work lawfully, 
                                                   
303 Interestingly, on the assumption that a copyright enforcement action can be brought in each 
Member State where the infringed work can be accessed, the ‘accessibility’ criterion recently selected 
by the CJEU paves the way for a multiplication of courts and applicable national rules.  
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without having to obtain additional permission to make the necessary copies from the 
copyright holder. 
 Limited consideration of the cross-border effects of specific exceptions. These include 
inter alia the already-mentioned exceptions for private copying, but also the exceptions 
for teaching and scientific research, and also in relation to certain cases concerning the 
freedom of panorama exception. 
 Divergent enforcement practices in Member States, with some countries relying on 
administrative procedures to counter infringing behaviour, and others relying on codes 
of conduct and other voluntary measures, and others relying on neither of the two. 
 Different approaches to the remuneration and compensation of authors through 
private copying levies. As we already observed, the disparate national treatment of 
exceptions, as a well as the related levy systems, have so far raised significant barriers to 
and created distortions of cross-border trade within the Internal Market. 
2.4.2 What are the economic and other quantified costs incurred by citizens, society 
and stakeholders due to these gaps and fragmentation?  
There are several sources of costs that can be identified in the case at hand.  
 While authors often manage to reduce their transaction costs by relying on collective 
rights organisations, distributors face in some circumstances direct costs in the form of 
substantive compliance costs and transaction costs due to the need to negotiate licenses 
on a country-by-country basis with one or more counterparties. The absence of a one-
stop shop for licensing in specific sectors is clearly an additional cost that can, over time, 
discourage creation and circulation of content.  
 Against this background, limited content availability generated by the territoriality of 
copyright offerings generates costs (better, foregone opportunities) for end-users: the 
same applies for losses of consumer surplus generated by limitation of the portability of 
content access across borders. Portability issues may potentially affect about 5 million 
Europeans per day (Plum Consulting, 2012). In addition, in the audiovisual sector up to 
120 million EU citizens are potentially interested in content available in another Member 
State, and long-term migrants (13 million European) generate a potential demand for 
subscription-based cross-border services of between €760 million to €1.61 billion per year 
(Plum Consulting, 2012). The limited cross-border availability of content can adds costs 
for end-users in the form of higher retail prices. This form of market inefficiency limits 
price competition and as such leads to suboptimal quantities sold on the market.  
 Another source of direct costs is the existing uncertainty about the rights and 
obligations of different types of industry players, as well as over-enforcement 
mechanisms.  
 Inefficiency is generated by a confusing and contradictory interpretation of certain 
exceptions and limitations, as well as by the interaction between the use of TPMs and 
available exceptions and limitations. In particular, to the extent that the current 
situation leads to the impossibility for libraries to fully engage in e-lending, or for 
researchers to engage in productive data processing for research and teaching purposes, 
this will lead to foregone benefits for society as a whole. 
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 In the era of big data, data-driven innovation and new business models, the absence of 
legal certainty on text and data mining can also be hugely detrimental to the 
development of new offers and services, which in turn limits benefits to society through a 
direct negative impact on so-called dynamic efficiency (e.g. innovation and the 
development of new welfare-enhancing products and services). 
 Furthermore, the lack of a level playing field between ‘traditional’ distributors and 
online intermediaries (especially in the audiovisual sector) can lead to insufficient 
incentives for the creation of content from the outset, which in turn would translate into a 
lack of dynamic efficiency. This problem can also account for a lack of adequate funding 
and exposure for ‘niche’ content. 
 The existence of dominant positions of specific players, if proven, could lead to 
unequal bargaining strength and consequently undesirable welfare losses in the 
contracts concluded between authors and intermediaries.  
 Finally, the absence of a fully integrated Single Market for creative content 
dramatically reduces the value end-users derive from Internet access. This is a direct 
corollary of the so-called ‘Metcalfe’s law’, which postulates that in an end-to-end 
network, the value of the network increases exponentially as the number of end-users 
increases linearly. Likewise, the richer the amount of content that can be circulated 
among all users in the EU, the greater the value of the EU Digital Single Market as a 
whole.  
It is difficult to estimate these costs in terms of GDP. However, available data sets show that 
a fully integrated Digital Single Market could contribute between €260 billion and €520 
billion to European GDP (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2014)). The long term 
growth impact of the digital reform effort already undertaken has been estimated to be at 
above 1%, and further efforts in line with the Digital Agenda for Europe targets are expected 
to generate an additional 2.1% of GDP growth (Lorenzani & Varga, 2014).  
2.4.3 What are the existing gaps that could be addressed through better application 
and implementation of the existing Directive and wider legislative 
framework? 
Among the main gaps we identified in Section 2.4.1 above, only a narrow subset could be 
partly filled if the existing acquis were clarified and made more consistent both in terms 
of interpretation and implementation. This is perhaps the case for the compatibility of the 
InfoSoc and IPRED Directives with other legislation, most notably on fundamental rights, 
data protection and e-commerce, for which non-legislative documents and clarification 
efforts could probably address some outstanding problems without requiring legislative 
reform. Similarly, the lack of flexibility and adaptability of exceptions and limitations to new 
uses (mass digitisation, text and data mining, e-lending, e-learning, UGC) could be partly 
remedied if, for example, text and data mining were directly included in the scope of the 
mandatory exception for transient copies. And the lack of clarity on the implementation of 
specific exceptions (e.g. the exception covering parody, caricature and pastiche) could be 
remedied, at least partly, through more coordinated and consistent implementation. 
That said, there are many gaps that would require legislative intervention. These include 
the absence of a clear legal framework for the remuneration and compensation of authors 
and performers, which is due to the absence of clear provisions in the InfoSoc Directive; the 
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existing uncertainty as regards the responsibility of online intermediaries; the lack of clear 
rules on geo-blocking practices; the uncertainty as regards private international law aspects 
such as the criteria to apply for the determination of the applicable law in case of copyright 
infringements occurring online; the partial uncertainty as regards the applicability of the 
exhaustion principle to the making available of ‘download-to-own’ content on intangible 
media; and the lack of clear rules on access to justice and collection of evidence to be used in 
civil proceedings. As apparent from the ongoing debate on copyright reform at the EU level, 
all these are issues that only legislative intervention could begin to remedy effectively. 
2.5 Relevance 
2.5.1 To what extent has the EU legislative framework been able to keep up with 
technological developments, in particular with the digital transformation? 
As already clarified throughout this report, the EU legislative framework, and in particular 
the InfoSoc Directive, can be considered increasingly out-dated in light of technological 
developments: not only are the exceptions and limitations included in the closed list under 
Article 5 now increasingly misaligned with technological developments; they also potentially 
limit the development of welfare-enhancing uses of information. Moreover, enforcement 
mechanisms outlined in the InfoSoc and IPRED Directives have been largely overtaken by 
technology, and countries today hardly ever rely on civil litigation to enforce copyright laws. 
Most notably, the lack of certainty over the application of a number of exceptions, including 
the one on text and data mining, represents an outstanding oversight of the EU acquis on 
copyright. For example, when it comes to libraries and similar institutions the current set of 
exceptions and limitations does not cover e-lending and hamper mass digitisation projects, 
let alone new options for the ‘online’ consultation of digitised content. Similarly, unevenly 
implemented exceptions for teaching and research potentially impinge on the provision of 
pan-European e-learning services as well as on the creation of a truly integrated European 
Research Area. The creation of UGC and more simply the sharing of pictures on social 
networks encounter substantial obstacles in the fragmentation and uncertainty of the current 
EU copyright framework. 
Interestingly, a recent report for the European Commission clearly highlights that text and 
data mining “is useful to researchers of all kinds, from historians to medical experts, and its 
methods are relevant to organisations throughout the public and private sectors”. In 
addition, text and data mining lowers research costs, and as such can lower barriers to entry 
in a number of markets for small and medium-sized enterprises and micro-enterprises. 
Europe’s uncertain legal treatment of text and data mining is even more serious in light of 
the emerging automation of service industries (automation of thinking), as well as the 
widespread use of data-driven analytics in the Internet of Things and its industrial 
applications (Industry 4.0). The above-mentioned report confirms that European researchers 
“may be falling behind, especially with regard to researchers in the United States” in this 
field, and that such a lag “results, at least in part, from the nature of Europe’s laws with 
regard to copyright, database protection and, perhaps increasingly, data privacy” (European 
Commission, 2014). 
In summary, the relevance of the overall approach adopted by the InfoSoc Directive and 
its subsequent legislation deserves urgent and careful adaptation to address the problems 
and gaps identified in the scope of the rights and exceptions, the existing emphasis on 
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‘copy’ rights rather than authorship and also to address the insufficiencies concerning 
enforcement.  
2.5.2 What are the likely efficiency losses associated with the current inadequacy 
of the InfoSoc Directive?  
Section 2.2 above already identified a number of inefficiencies associated with the current 
inadequacy of the InfoSoc Directive. Generally speaking, such inefficiencies can be divided 
into the following categories: 
 Productive inefficiency. Current legislation in the field of copyright increases costs for 
content producers and distributors, and also limits the availability of content for end-
users. In particular, inefficient enforcement limits incentives to produce and distribute 
new valuable content for right-holders. In addition, current rules do not incentivise those 
users who would make use of such content to create UGC or to engage in text and data 
mining based activities. This means that the overall content production is hampered by 
an unnecessarily complex and restrictive acquis, and this might explain differences in the 
relative performance of the EU vis-à-vis its global competitors in specific areas (e.g. as 
reported by the recent Report on a Commission High Level Group, in the area of text and 
data mining, in which European researchers seem to be lagging behind their US 
counterparts, who reportedly benefited from the existence of the more flexible ‘fair use’ 
doctrine as opposed to the more rigid and still unevenly implemented set of exceptions 
and limitations existing in the EU-28). Although any attempt to quantify the relative 
weight of the InfoSoc Directive and related legislation on Europe’s digital content 
production are necessarily doomed to inaccuracy, there are good reasons to believe that 
both the production of knowledge (e.g. through exceptions for teaching purposes and 
text and data mining) and its dissemination (e.g. through clearer and more future-proof 
rules on panorama exceptions, e-lending) would greatly benefit from the availability of 
more up-to-date rules, which would couple greater effectiveness in enforcement with 
more user-friendly rules on content consumption, reuse and transformation.  
 Allocative inefficiency. This effect refers to the inefficient allocation of resources through 
the market mechanism. As already mentioned throughout the report, legal fragmentation 
and limits to the availability of content in the Internal Market fundamentally reduce the 
value of the Internet for European end-users, because the end-to-end design of the 
Internet (i.e., the ability of each user to communicate and exchange files with every other 
user) cannot be fully exploited to share and access all sorts of content. This is, to some 
extent, also a violation of basic users’ rights as typically included in net neutrality 
legislation, normally aimed at preserving users’ possibility to access any content, any 
time, through any device and anywhere (and thus also, inevitably, from any Member 
State). The untapped consumer and producer surplus brought on by the lack of 
availability of content and by widespread copyright infringement account for reductions 
in allocative efficiency that reverberate on the value of digital content available online, 
and hence also on the value of Internet access for end-users. Nevertheless, this does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that all price discrimination in the Single Market 
should be prohibited: as noted throughout this Study, there are several instances of price-
discrimination, even those based on geo-blocking practices, which can be considered as 
welfare-enhancing, not welfare-reducing. The difficulty in the reform exercise consists 
precisely in singling out welfare-reducing practices and curbing them while treating pro-
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competitive, welfare-enhancing forms of price discrimination as perfectly viable business 
solutions.  
 Dynamic inefficiency. This type of inefficiency refers to the negative impact that an 
inadequate copyright acquis can exert on innovation and the production of new content. 
Again, typical examples are the dissuasive effects of piracy and ineffective enforcement, 
and also the impact of current uncertainty and existing legal constraints on fast growing 
new forms of content production such as UGC and text and data mining based activities. 
Crucially, the reduction in quantity and quality of content available to end-users can also 
lead to a reduction in the demand for improved Internet connectivity and bandwidth, 
and could thus also end up stifling incentives to deploy broadband networks due to a 
sustained slowdown in demand from end-users. As a matter of fact, greater incentives to 
deploy ultra-high speed broadband have been attributed by experts not only to a more 
favourable regulatory treatment (e.g. the absence of network access obligations for 
broadband networks that characterises the Federal Communications Commission 
regulatory approach since 2003), but also to greater user demand triggered by greater 
availability of content of interest for end-users. 
Finally, and even more important, it is undeniable that, whatever the negative impact 
associated with the sources of inefficiency identified, it is only likely to increase over time as 
the Internet permeates a growing number of activities and carries an even larger share of 
copyrighted creative content. As already mentioned in the previous Sections, the growth of 
Internet content markets has been consistently stronger than that of traditional media 
markets in recent years, and the trend is likely to continue in the coming years. The advent of 
the Internet of Things and the growing deployment of ultra-fast broadband networks is 
expected to further boost this trend, leading Internet-based content dissemination, 
production and consumption to dominate the market in the years to come.  
3. Summary table 
The table below summarises the results of our ex post evaluation on the InfoSoc Directive 
and its related instruments and is based on four key criteria, namely effectiveness, efficiency, 
coherence and relevance. Table 5 provides a score from • (lowest) to ••••• (highest) to each 
evaluation criterion, while the cell on the right end of the table includes a brief illustration of 
the motivation behind the decision to attribute a specific score.  
Table 5. Summary ex-post evaluation 
Criterion Score (1 to 5) Motivation 
Effectiveness •• 
Of the four main operational goals pursued by the InfoSoc, only one 
can be said to have been fully achieved (alignment with international 
legislation), and even in that case there are exceptions and 
divergences (e.g. on the three-step test, on the ‘new public’ criterion 
for hyperlinking).  
The goal to strengthen copyright and broaden its scope fell short of 
identifying a suitable enforcement framework, and ended up colliding 
with equally important policy principles.  
The specific goal to achieve a fully integrated Internal Market was 
not fully pursued by the InfoSoc, and this is reflected in the many 
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Criterion Score (1 to 5) Motivation 
areas of legislation in which no harmonisation was achieved, from 
the basic definition of the right (e.g. standard of originality) to the 
adoption and interpretation of exceptions and limitations. 
Competitiveness-related goals were hampered by the rigidity and 
uncertainty generated by the system, especially for what concerns 
exceptions on text and data mining and the overall framework for 
UGC.  
The goal of achieving a fair remuneration and compensation for 
authors and performers was stated but not actively pursued by any 
specific provision in the InfoSoc Directive and also in most related 
legislation. 
Efficiency • 
Not only the copyright framework is inefficient because it does not 
achieve its goals in the first place (i.e. lack of intended benefits means 
very low cost-effectiveness). The framework generates costs that can 
exert an inhibiting factor for content production, distribution and 
creation. Specific sources of inefficiency include transaction costs (e.g. 
having to negotiate licences under 28 different legal regimes) and 
fragmentation costs (e.g. divergences in the scope of legislation and 
the failure to implement a consistent set of copyright exceptions and 
limitations, at least for those that have a significant impact on cross-
border activities and create inefficiencies in particular in the case of 
teaching and research, but also for the viability of new products and 
services such as social networks, streaming services, ‘online’ libraries, 
etc.).  
More generally, inefficiency takes the form of: 
- Productive inefficiency. Current legislation increases costs for 
content producers and distributors, and limits availability of 
content for end-users. Inefficient enforcement limits incentives to 
produce and distribute new valuable content. Current rules do not 
incentivise users who would make use of such content to create 
UGC or to engage in text and data mining based activities.  
- Allocative inefficiency. The foregone consumer and producer 
surplus generated by lack of availability of content and by 
widespread copyright infringement, respectively, constitute 
reductions of allocative efficiency that reverberate on the value of 
digital content available online, and hence also on the value of 
Internet access for end-users.  
- Dynamic inefficiency. Besides hampering production and 
consumption in the first place, the reduction in quantity and 
quality of content available to end-users reverberates on the 
competitiveness of Europe’s Internet markets as a whole. For 
example, it can lead to lower demand for Internet connectivity, 
and could therefore end up stifling incentives to deploy 
broadband networks. 
Some instruments, such as the Directives on Orphan Works and 
Collective Rights Management, are too recent to evaluate in full. 
Coherence ••• While the InfoSoc has achieved an unprecedented level of coherence 
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Criterion Score (1 to 5) Motivation 
in the European Union’s legislation on copyright and has been 
complemented by additional instruments (e.g. Orphan Works and 
Collective Rights Management Directives), several problems remain. 
In terms of internal coherence, gaps and sources of fragmentation are 
numerous and range from the absence of common basic definitions to 
the wide variety of practices in the areas of exceptions and limitations, 
to the even wider variety of enforcement approaches. Problems have 
emerged over time also in terms of external coherence: the 
enforcement provisions contained in the InfoSoc Directive and IPRED 
have gradually collided with other, equally important EU legal 
provisions, e.g. the protection of fundamental rights (privacy, freedom 
to run a business) and the ‘mere conduit’ principles contained in the e-
Commerce Directive.  
Relevance •• 
Despite its overall importance and relevance as a domain of legislation 
in the field of content and media, the EU copyright framework is 
increasingly outdated in light of technological developments. 
Exceptions and limitations are increasingly misaligned with 
technological developments, and potentially limit the development of 
welfare-enhancing uses of information. Enforcement modes foreseen 
in the InfoSoc Directive and IPRED have been largely surpassed by 
technology, and countries hardly rely on civil litigation today to 
enforce copyright laws. Most notably, the absence of certainty as 
regards a number of exceptions, including the one on text and data 
mining, is an important gap in the EU acquis on copyright. In 
summary, the relevance of the overall approach adopted by the 
InfoSoc Directive and its subsequent legislation would deserve a 
careful, but urgent, update.  
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Annex A: National implementation of selected copyright exceptions and limitations in a sample 
of Member States 
Table 6. Transient and incidental copies (Article 5(1)) 
France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
Formulation similar to 
the InfoSoc Directive 
Formulation similar to 
the InfoSoc Directive 
Formulation similar to 
the InfoSoc Directive 
Formulation similar to 
the InfoSoc Directive 
Formulation similar to 
the InfoSoc Directive 
Formulation similar to 
the InfoSoc Directive 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on Queen Mary (2007) and national legislation. 
Table 7. Three-step test (Article 5(5)) 
France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
Implemented Not implemented Not implemented Implemented A two-step test 
(without reference to 
certain special uses, i.e. 
the first step) is in 
force 
Not implemented 
The test applies to 
copyright, related 
rights, and ‘sui 
generis’ databases 
The test is addressed 
to the legislator only 
The test is 
incorporated in a fair 
dealing test based on 
the ‘unreasonable 
prejudice’ principle 
(prejudice to the right-
holder) 
The test applies to 
copyright and related 
rights 
As the list of 
exceptions and 
limitations is closed, 
also the third step is 
assumed to be in force 
The test is addressed 
to the legislator only 
The test is adopted in 
judicial revisions of 
exceptions and 
limitations 
The test is recognised 
as an instrument in 
judicial revisions 
   It cannot be used as a 
means to introduce ‘re-
exception’ to the 
benefit of right-holders 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on Queen Mary (2007) and national legislation. 
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Table 8. Libraries, educational establishments, archives and museums (Article 5(2)(c)) 
France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
The exception enables 
publicly accessible 
libraries, museums and 
archives to perform acts of 
reproduction for 
preservation and on-site 
consultation without 







reproductions made by 
public and scholastic 
libraries, museums and 
public archives for their 
own services and without 
direct or indirect 
commercial purposes is 
permitted 
Research centres as well 
as information and 
documentation centres 
may make single, short 
copies of fragments of 
copyrighted published 
works under the ‘paper 
reproduction’ exception. 
Fair remuneration is 
required if these copies 
are made available for 
payment 
Libraries (publicly 
accessible or part of an 
educational 
establishment), archives 
and museums can make 
copies of all types of 
works permanently 
included in their 
collections in order to 
preserve or replace works 
or to supply them to other 
libraries to replace 
discarded, lost or 
destroyed works without 
any commercial 
advantage 
The exception applies to 
copyright and related 
rights 
The reproduction and 
distribution, for non-
commercial purposes, of 
works of art and of 
photographs, in 
catalogues published by 
public libraries, museums 
or educational 
establishments in 
connection with a public 
exhibition or for the 
purpose of documentation 
of a collection is permitted 
Copying (analogue and 
digital) in educational 
establishments (i.e. 
schools, not universities) 
made by persons giving 
or receiving instructions 
(or by a third party on 
behalf of the privileged 
persons) is covered by 
very detailed provisions 
In public libraries, levies 
apply 
Research and educational 
institutions are allowed, 
for teaching purposes or 
in order to conduct their 
own research, to use 
published works in 
original and in 
translation, and to make 
copies of fragments from 
the disseminated work for 
the same purpose 
This exception is subject 
to several conditions. For 
instance: the work should 
not be available for loan to 
the public; it is not 
reasonably practicable to 
purchase a copy of the 
work; libraries, archives 
and museums are not 
conducted for profit 
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France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
The exception does not 
apply to education 
establishments 
The reproduction of 
works for inclusion into 
‘own’ archive is covered 
by the private copying 
exception. This 
reproduction is allowed 
only on paper or similar 
medium. Archive must 
not be accessible by third 
parties and not intended 
for direct or indirect 
commercial purposes 
Libraries and archives 
(and universities) can 
make copies only if they 
act on behalf of a person 
fulfilling the requirement 
of research and private 
study (without 
‘unreasonable prejudice’ 
to the right-holder). 
Online delivery is possible 
as long as libraries and 
archives act as agents 
supplying works to other 
persons covered by 
exceptions and limitations 
Digital copying is 
explicitly excluded from 
the scope of this exception 
Libraries, archives and 
schools may prepare or 
order the preparation of 
single copies of 
disseminated works for 
the purpose of 
completing, maintaining 
or preserving their 
collections and for making 
them available free of 
charge 
Any contract term which 
prevents or restricts 
making these copies is 
unenforceable 
  Libraries and archives can 
make copies for 
preservation purposes or 
to replace lost works 
(which cannot be 
purchased) in other 
libraries or archives 
 No explicit restriction to 
non-commercial uses 
Librarians or archivists 
can make copies (of a 
reasonable portion) of all 
types of published 
copyrighted works on 
behalf of other persons for 
commercial purposes, 
provided that such 
persons fulfilled the 
requirements for research 
and private study for non-
commercial uses 
  Uses by libraries and 
archives are subject to 
ministerial regulations 
that may impose specific 
provisions for different 
libraries and archives 
 The exception does not 
apply to museums 
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France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
  The exceptions listed 
above do not apply to 
museums 
   
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on Queen Mary (2007), De Wolf (2013) and national legislation. 
 
Table 9. Libraries, educational establishments, archives, and museums (research or private study, Article 5(3)(n)) 
France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
No specific 
implementation 
The exception is limited to 
dedicated electronic 
terminals in libraries, 
museums and archives, 
for private use and 
research, without any 
commercial purpose 
The exception applies 
only to copying and does 
not cover making 
available works on 
dedicated terminals 
Allows communication or 
making available to 
individual members of the 
public for purposes of 
research or private study 
by dedicated terminals on 





Libraries, archives and 
schools may make 
available without charge 
copies of disseminated 
works or make their 
collections available for 
research or study 
purposes using terminals 
located in their premises 
Educational 
establishments, libraries, 
archives and museums 
are permitted to offer 
access to copyrighted 
works and other subject 
matter on their premises 
at dedicated terminals 
The exception applies 
only to establishments in 
charge of the legal deposit 
of works (e.g. National 
Library) 
Right-holders may claim 
reasonable compensation 
to be administrated by 
collecting societies 
The exception allows also 
the showing or 
performance of sound 
recordings, films, 
broadcast or cable 
programmes before a 
school audience for 
purposes of instruction 
Copyrighted works 
should be included in the 
collections of these 
establishments 
The exception is not 
limited to individual 
members of the public 
Works have to be lawfully 
acquired by the institution 
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France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
The exception applies 
only to authorised 
researchers 
The number of copies 
made simultaneously 
available cannot exceed 
the number of copies 
owned by the concerned 
institution 
Any use for research and 
private studies should not 
lead to ‘unreasonable 
prejudice’ for the right-
holder. Hence, right-
holders establishing a 
licensing scheme may 
claim for compensation 
Copyrighted works 
should not be subject to 
purchase or licensing 
terms for these uses 
The exception applies also 
to work subject to 
purchase or licensing 
terms for these uses 
Works are not subject to 
purchase or licensing 
terms for these uses 
The exception applies to 
copyright and related 
rights, and database ‘sui 
generis’ rights 
    Works have to be 
communicated or made 
available to individual 
members of the public for 
the purposes of research 
or private study 
Nonetheless, on-site 
consultation is also 
covered by the exceptions 
on reproduction made by 
libraries, museum and 
archives 
     
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on Queen Mary (2007), De Wolf (2013) and national legislation. 
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Table 10. Teaching or scientific research (Article 5(3)(a)) 
France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
The exception allows 
communication or 
reproduction of excerpts 
of works for the purpose 









(in original or in 
translation) can be 









Fair dealing with a work for the 
sole purpose of illustration for 
instruction does not infringe 
copyright, provided that: it is 
for non-commercial purposes; it 
is made by a person giving or 
receiving instruction (or 
preparing for giving or 
receiving instruction); and it is 
accompanied by a sufficient 
acknowledgement (if possible) 
Works made for 
educational purposes, 
sheet music, and digital 
editions of literary works 
are excluded 
Making available works to 
the public for the purpose 
of illustration, teaching, 
and scientific research for 
non-commercial purposes 
is permitted 
Partially covered by 
exception for educational 
establishments and for 
research or private studies 
purposes 
This exception is included 
in the quotation exception 
The full name of the 
author of the work 
and the source, 
when it is possible, 
should be indicated 
Any contract term which 
prevents or restricts these uses 
is unenforceable 
The public can include 
only pupils, students, 
teachers or researchers 
The exception is limited to 
small parts of works, 
small works and single 
contributions to journals 
and newspapers 
 The exception allows 
abridgment, quotation, 
communication or 
reproduction of excerpts 
of works for the purpose 
of illustration for teaching 
or for scientific research 
and without commercial 
purposes 
The purpose of 
illustration is not 
mentioned 
A recording of a broadcast, or a 
copy of such a recording, may 
be made by or on behalf of an 
educational establishment for 
the educational purposes of that 
establishment without 
infringing copyright, provided 
that: the educational purposes 
are non-commercial; and it is 
accompanied by a sufficient 
acknowledgement (if possible) 
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No commercial 
exploitation is possible 
The public must include a 
limited number of 
students or scientists 
(limited access) 
 The making available on 
the Internet is permitted 
only for didactic or 
scientific uses and only for 
certain types of works 
(music works and pictures 
at low resolution or low 
quality) 
There is no reference 
to non-commercial 
purposes 
The recording of a broadcast 
can be communicated by or on 
behalf of the educational 
establishment to its pupils or 
staff also outside the premises 
of the establishment, if that 
communication is made by 
means of a secure electronic 
network accessible only by the 
establishment’s pupils and staff 
Right-holders are entitled 
to receive fair 
compensation 
The acts of reproduction 
connected to the making 
available of rights are 
allowed 
 The purpose of 
illustration is mandatory 
also for scientific research 
 The recording of a broadcast is 
not covered by this exception 
when licensing agreements are 
available 
The exception applies to 
copyright and related 
rights, and database sui 
generis rights 
The purpose of 
illustration is not 
mandatory for scientific 
research 
   The copying of extracts (up to 
5%) of a relevant work by or on 
behalf of an educational 
establishment does not infringe 
copyright, provided that: the 
copy is made for the purposes 
of instruction for a non-
commercial purpose; and it is 
accompanied by a sufficient 
acknowledgement (if possible) 
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The purpose of 
illustration is mandatory 
also for scientific research 
Right-holders are entitled 
to receive fair 
compensation 
   The copy of the extract can be 
communicated by or on behalf 
of the educational 
establishment to its pupils or 
staff also outside the premises 
of the establishment, if that 
communication is made by 
means of a secure electronic 
network accessible only by the 
establishment’s pupils and staff 
The exception is further 
regulated by sectoral 
agreements 
Reproduction for uses in 
schools and educational 
establishments (excluding 
universities) is permitted 
under the private copying 
exception 
   The copying activity is not 
covered by this exception when 
licensing agreements are 
available as long as these 
agreements allow to copy at 
least 5% of the work 
     These exceptions apply to 
copyright and related rights 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on Queen Mary (2007) and national legislation.  
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Table 11. Reporting of current events (Article 5(3)(c)) 




and newspaper articles 
may be reproduced in 
newspapers and 
communicated to the 
public if they concern 
current political, economic 
or religious issues, unless 




The exception allows 
making copies and 
communication to the 
public of articles 
published in magazines or 
newspapers as well as of 
articles broadcast or made 
available to the public and 
other subject-matter of the 
same character 
Press, radio and television 
may disseminate already 
disseminated reports on 
current events, updates on 
political, economic or 




statements and reporter’s 
photographs, short 
excerpts of the works 
listed above, reviews of 
publications and 
disseminated works, 
speeches delivered at 
public meetings and 
hearings, brief summaries 
of disseminated works 
No specific 
implementation 
Press reviews are 
permitted 
Authors are entitled to a 
fair remuneration to be 
administrated by 
collecting societies in case 
reproduction goes beyond 
a short part of the article 
Fair dealing applies to 
quotations for purposes of 
criticism and review 
The exception only 
applies with respect to 
their uses in other 
magazines or newspapers 
or to be broadcast in news 
programmes 
Fair remuneration should 
be paid to authors of 
updates on political, 
economic or religious 
issues and current 
statements and reporter’s 
photographs 
The exception allows the 
use of works for the 
purpose of criticism or 
review of that or another 
work or a performance of 
a work provided that 
there is acknowledgement 
and that the work has 
been made available to 
the public 
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The exception allows also 
whole or partial 
reproduction for strictly 
limited information 
purposes of a work of 
graphical, plastic or 
architectural art. News 
reports cannot be 
reproduced. 
Copyrighted works can be 
used in connection with 
the reporting of current 
events by broadcasting 
institutions and by press 
for information purposes 
Uses cannot lead to an 
‘unreasonable prejudice’ 
for the right-holder 
The limitations does not 
apply if these uses are 
expressly reserved 
Works made available 
during current events can 
be quoted in reports of 
current events for 
informational purposes 
and without remuneration 
Based on public interest 
also the publication of 
non-published works may 
be allowed 
The author’s name and 
the source have to be 
indicated 
The author’s name and 
the source have to be 
indicated 
The source is required Source, date and the 
author’s name need to be 
indicated 
The full name of the 
author of the work and 
the source, when it is 
possible, should be 
indicated 
The source should be 
indicated except for cases 
of news reporting where 
such acknowledgement 
would be impossible 
   The exception allows 
reproduction or 
communication to the 
public of works or 
protected subject matter 
made during current 
events for the purposes of 
reporting current events 
and to the extent justified 
by informative purposes 
  
   Source and the author’s 
name need to be indicated 
  
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on Queen Mary (2007) and national legislation. 
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Table 12. Quotations (Article 5(3)(d)) 
France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
The exception allows 
short quotations of 
lawfully divulged works, 
justified by the critical, 
polemic, pedagogical, 
scientific, or informational 
nature of the work where 
they are incorporated 
The exception allows 
quotations for the 
illustration of the content 
of the quoted, published 
work 
Quotations including a 
non-substantial part of the 
work do not infringe 
copyright 
The exception allows 
quotations, abridgments 
or reproductions of 
fragments or parts of a 
work for the purpose of 
criticism or discussion 
Fragments from 
disseminated works or 
minor works in full can be 
quoted in independent 
works to the extent 
justified by explanation, 
critical analysis, teaching 
or requirements of a 
certain creative activity 
The exception allows the 
use of a quotation from a 
work made available to 
the public (in compliance 
with fair dealing), for 
criticism or review or 
other purposes and to the 
extent that the quotation 
is no longer than what is 
required by the specific 
purpose for which it is 
used 
Short quotations generally 
cannot involve works of 
visual arts 
For musical works the 
quotation is limited to a 
few passages 
Fair dealing applies to 
quotations for the purpose 
of criticism or review 
These acts should not 
conflict with the 
commercial exploitation 
of the work 
The full name of the 
author of the work and 
the source, when it is 
possible, should be 
indicated 
The quotation should be 
accompanied by sufficient 
acknowledgement 
 The source should be 
indicated 
The source should be 
indicated 
The exception applies also 
to purposes of illustration 
in teaching or research 
activities having a non-
commercial nature 
 Any contract term which 
prevents or restricts 
quotations is 
unenforceable 
   Quotations, abridgments 
or reproduction have to 
be accompanied by a 
mention of the title of the 
work, the names of the 
authors, the publisher, the 
translators (if any) 
 The exception applies to 
copyright and related 
rights 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on Queen Mary (2007), De Wolf (2013) and national legislation.  
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Table 13. Caricature, parody or pastiche 
France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
Caricatures, parodies and 
pastiches are permitted 
Parodies and caricatures 
are possible and can be 
based on the free use of 
another work as long as 
they do not constitute 
reproductions or 








The exception enables (in 
compliance with fair 
dealing) uses for the 
purposes of caricature, 
parody or pastiche 
  Fair dealing applies to 
caricatures and pastiches 
for the purpose of 
criticism or review 
Partially covered by the 
quotations exception, 
provided it does not 
conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work 
Partially covered by the 
quotations exception in 
the passage referring to 
quotations to the extent 
required by a certain 
creative activity 
Any contract term which 
prevents or restricts uses 
for the purposes of 
caricature, parody or 
pastiche is unenforceable 
  Parodies and caricature 
are possible as long as 
they do not use a 
substantial part of the 
original work they are 
based on 
Partially covered by the 
fundamental right of 
‘freedom of expression’ 
enshrined in Article 21 of 
the Italian Constitution 
 The exception applies to 
copyright and related 
rights 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on Queen Mary (2007), De Wolf (2013) and national legislation. 
  
162  RENDA, SIMONELLI, MAZZIOTTI, BOLOGNINI & LUCHETTA 
Table 14. Freedom of panorama (Article 5(3)(h)) 
France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
Not implemented Reproduction of works 
located permanently in 
public roads and byways or 
public open spaces is 
permitted. The copies can be 
distributed and/or made 
available to the public 
Making of paintings, 
drawing, diagrams, maps, 
charts, plans, engravings, 
etchings, lithographs, 
woodcuts, prints or similar 
things as well as 
photographing or filming or 
broadcasting or including in 
a cable programme of certain 
artistic works (buildings, 
sculpture, models, etc.) which 
are permanently situated or 
placed in a public place or in 
premises open to the public is 
permitted 
Not implemented Works permanently displayed 
on public roads, streets and 
squares or in gardens can be 
disseminated, but not for the 
same use 
Making of a graphic work, 
photograph, film, broadcast, 
or visual image of buildings, 
sculptures, models for 
buildings and works of 
artistic craftsmanship which 
are permanently situated in 
a public place or in premises 
open to the public is 
permitted 
 In the case of buildings, the 
exception applies only to the 
façade 
The results of such uses can 
be made available to the 
public 
 The full name of the author of 
the work and the source, when 
it is possible, should be 
indicated 
Such copies can be 
distributed or made 
available to the public 
  The exception may not apply 
to graphic works, i.e. 
paintings, drawings, 
diagrams, maps, charts or 
plans, engravings, etchings, 
lithographs, woodcuts or 
similar works permanently 
situated or placed in a public 
place or in premises open to 
the public 
  The exception does not 
apply to graphic works, i.e. 
paintings, drawings, 
diagrams, maps, charts or 
plans, engravings, etchings, 
lithographs, woodcuts or 
similar works permanently 
situated or placed in a 
public place or in premises 
open to the public 
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on Queen Mary (2007), Lobert et al. (2015) and national legislation. 
IMPLEMENTATION, APPLICATION AND EFFECTS OF THE EU DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT | 163 
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Table 15. Private copying: Exceptions (Article 5(2)(b)) 
France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
Copies are allowed for 
strictly private purposes 
and only for the private 
use of the person making 
it. This exception applies 
only to natural persons 
Copies are allowed for 
domestic and personal 
purposes and to be strictly 
used in the private sphere. 
In this case, copies can be 
made also by third parties 
on behalf of the privileged 
person, absent any 
commercial gain. This 
exception applies only to 
natural persons 
There is no general 
private copying exception 
Copies of phonograms 
and videograms, for 
personal use and without 
any intent to make profit 
or any other direct or 
indirect commercial 
purpose, are allowed. This 
exception applies only to 
natural persons 
Personal uses are allowed, 
without asking 
permission to the author 
and without paying 
remuneration 
Personal copies of a 
copyrighted work (with 
the exclusion of computer 
programmes) are 
permitted. The work must 
be lawfully owned by the 
privileged person. Copies 
are made for the 
privileged person’s 
private use and for ends 
which are neither directly 
nor indirectly commercial 
The exception does not 
apply to file-sharing 
Singular copies are 
allowed also for other 
‘own’ uses beyond the 
private sphere (e.g. 
scientific purposes, ‘own’ 
archive, information 
about current events). In 
this case, limitations are 
restricted to non-
commercial uses and 
apply also to legal entities 
and to entities making 
copies on behalf of the 
privileged person 
Natural persons and 
certain establishments are 
allowed to record 
broadcasts for purposes of 
time shifting (later 
viewing) 
Copies on paper or similar 
medium are covered by 
the reprographic 
exception, even when 
made for personal use 
Personal uses includes 
single copies used by a 
circle of persons having 
personal relationships 
(e.g. consanguinity), 




 Private copying refers to 
both analogue and digital 
copies thus including 
reprographic copying 
Natural persons are 
allowed to make copies of 
performances for private 
and domestic uses 
Private copies cannot be 
made by third parties on 
behalf of the privileged 
person 
 Contract terms aiming at 
preventing or restricting 
the private copying 
exception are 
unenforceable 
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 The exception does not 
apply to file-sharing 
 The private copying 
exception can be 
overridden by contractual 
arrangements 
 Recording of broadcasts 
for purposes of time 
shifting (later viewing) is 
permitted. Recording 
must take place in 
domestic premises and 
copies cannot be used for 
any other purpose 
 Private copying is not 
allowed from an illegal 
source or if it is made by 
circumventing TPM 
 Private copying is not 
allowed from an illegal 
source 
  
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on Queen Mary (2007), WIPO (2013) and national legislation. 
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Table 16. Private copying: Compensation systems (Article 5(2)(b)) 
France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
A levy scheme for private 
copying is in force 
A levy scheme for private 
copying is in force. It 
covers also copies for 
other ‘own’ uses beyond 
the private sphere 
No levy scheme is in force A levy scheme for private 
copying is in force 
Levies for reproduction No levy scheme is in force 
Levies are applied to 
media and equipment 
with internal storage 
capacity, according to the 
capacity 
Levies are applied to 




users can set fair 
remuneration for certain 
private uses 
Levies are applied to 
blank carriers and devices 
enabling recording of 
audio and video 
Levies are applied to 




users can set fair 
remuneration for certain 
private uses 
Levies are paid by 
manufacturers, importers 
or intra-EU acquirers 
Levies are paid by 
producers of devices, 
producers of data carriers, 
importers of devices and 
data carriers, dealers of 
devices and data carriers 
(above a certain threshold 
of transactions), 
producers, importers, and 
dealers of photocopying 
machines, certain 
operators of photocopying 
machines 
Reprographic copies for 
research and private 
studies by universities 
and schools are covered 
by collective licensing 
agreements 
Levies are paid by 
manufacturers and 
importers when they put 
bank carriers and devices 
on the market. The 
importer is: i) a company 
buying foreign products 
subject to levies and 
selling them to Italian 
distributors; or ii) a 
foreign company selling 
products directly to final 
users (e.g. via e-
commerce). Fair 
remuneration is required 
also for reprographic 
copies to be paid by those 
who provide the means 
for copying (e.g. copy 
centres, libraries) 




schemes are to a large 
extent regulated by law 
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France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
Exports are exempted. 
The national collecting 
society ordered several 
foreign-based websites to 
stop selling to French 
consumers without levies 
and to report all deliveries 
to the French market 
Exports are exempted. In 
cross-border sales: the 
German party is 
responsible, if the 
recipient is a commercial 
entity; the foreign party is 
responsible if the German 
recipient is a private 
consumer 
 Exporters can claim a 
refund for paid levies 
  
Levies are determined by 
a commission comprising: 
12 representatives of 
right-holder 
organisations; 6 of 
manufacturers and 
importers; and 6 of 
consumer organisations 
Levies are determined by 
national collecting 
societies after negotiating 
with associations of 
manufacturers and 
importers of blank carriers 
and devices. Parties are 
free to negotiate in 
relation to the amount of 
levies with caps for 
certain media 
 Levies are determined by 
a decree of the Minister of 
Culture and the National 
Heritage after hearing 
stakeholders represented 
in the Permanent 
Consulting Committee for 
Authors’ Rights 
Levies are determined by 
a decree of the Minister of 
Culture and the National 
Heritage 
 
Levies are collected by a 
national collecting society, 
appointed by law 
Levies are collected by 
several national collecting 
societies, on the basis of 
the type of copied work 
(i.e. audio, video, text, 
picture) 
 Levies are collected by a 
national collecting society, 
appointed by law 
Levies are collected by 
several national collecting 
societies, on the basis of 
the kind of right-holders 
(i.e. authors, performers, 
producers) and of the 
sector (i.e. audio and 
video) 
 
TPM and individual 
licensing scheme should 
be taken into account 
when determining levies 
TPM should be taken into 
account when 
determining levies 
 TPM should be take into 
account 
Levies do not apply to 
carriers or devices 
acquired for professional 
use 
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France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
Levies do not apply to 
carriers or devices 
acquired for professional 
use and which are not 
presumed to be used for 
private purposes. 
Professionals have the 
right to a refund, and they 
may apply for an 
exemption agreement 




 For professional uses, 
both a refund system and 
upfront exemptions are 
available 
  
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on Queen Mary (2007), WIPO (2013) and national legislation. 
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Table 17. Private copying: Distribution of revenues (Article 5(2)(b)) 
France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
Three-step process: i) 
splitting the levies into 
four parts, i.e. audio, 
video, written works and 
visual artworks; ii) 
splitting each of the four 
parts, according to the 
law, among authors, 
performers and 
producers/publishers; iii) 
distributing the revenues 
to organisations 
representing different 
right-holders and in turn 









members of each 
collecting society). Each 
organisation distributes 
revenues to right-holders 
according to contractual 
arrangements 
No levy scheme is in force The national collecting 
society distributes 
revenues to audio and 
video authors, producers 
and performers. 
Distribution schemes are 
set by law 
Collecting societies 
distribute revenues to 
relevant right-holders. 
Distribution schemes are 
set by law 
No levy scheme is in force 
According to the law, for 
‘audio’ the levies are split 
as follows: 50% authors; 
25% performers; 25% 
phonogram producers 
There are no deductions 
for social or cultural 
purposes 
 According to the law, for 
‘audio’ the levies are split 
as follows: 50% authors; 
25% performers; 25% 
phonogram producers 
According to the law, for 
‘audio’ the levies are split 
as follows: 50% authors; 
25% performers; 25% 
phonogram producers 
 
According to the law, for 
‘video’ the levies are split 
as follows: 33% authors; 
33% performers; 33% 
videogram producers 
  According to the law, for 
‘video’ the levies are split 
as follows: 30% authors; 
23% original producers of 
audiovisual works; 23% 
videogram producers; 
23% performers 
According to the law, for 
‘video’ the levies are split 
as follows: 35% authors; 
40% producers; 25% 
performers 
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France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
According to the law, for 
‘written works and visual 
artworks’ the levies are 
split as follows: 50% 
authors; 50% publishers 
  Half of the video 
distribution scheme 
assigned to performers is 
dedicated by law to study 
and research activities as 
well as to the promotion, 
training and professional 
support for artists and 
performers 
Deductions for social or 
cultural purposes are 
applied by collecting 
societies. These 
deductions are not 
determined by law, but 
determined within the 
statutes of each collecting 
society 
 
A social and/or cultural 
deduction (25%) is 
determined by law. 
Authors’, producers’ and 
performers’ organisations 
are responsible for 
applying this deduction 
     
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on Queen Mary (2007), WIPO (2013) and national legislation. 
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Table 18. Balance between technological protection measures and copyright exceptions and limitations (Article 6(4)) 
France Germany Ireland Italy Poland UK 
Safeguard is provided for: 
private copying; 
illustration of teaching; 
benefit of disabled 
persons; exceptions for 
libraries 
Obligations to provide 
means for circumvention 
apply to limitations in 
relation to: public security 
and judicial 
administration; disabled 
persons; collection for the 
use in schools and for 
illustration of teaching; 
broadcasts for educational 
purposes in schools; 
making available for 
research and private 
study; reproductions 
made by broadcasters 
Right-holders are entitled 
to claim licence fees for 
any use, thus narrowing 
down the scope of any 
safeguard measures 
Right-holders are obliged 
to remove TPM on request 
of the competent 
authorities for public 
security purposes 
Not implemented Remedies against TPM 
have to be provided for 
certain specifically 
designated acts. In 
particular, against the 
application of any 
technology, device or 
component that has the 
effect of preventing a 
copyright work from 
being copied (in whole or 
in part) or restricting the 
number of copies which 
may be made 
A special authority is 
competent to rule any 
conflict between 
exceptions and limitations 
and TPM 
Safeguard is provided 
also for private copying 
for other ‘own’ uses 
beyond the private sphere 
(e.g. scientific purposes, 
‘own’ archive, 
information about current 
events). No safeguard is 
provided for private 
copying for personal 
domestic uses 
Beneficiaries of exceptions 
and limitations have 
access to a dispute 
resolution mechanism 
before courts 
Right-holders are obliged 
to adopt ‘proper 
solutions’ including the 
provisions of means to 
gain access on specific 
request of certain 
beneficiaries or after the 
conclusion of specific 
collective agreements 
with users associations 
 Remedies should be based 
on voluntary measures or 
agreements between 
parties 
172  RENDA, SIMONELLI, MAZZIOTTI, BOLOGNINI & LUCHETTA 
 The provision is limited to 
users having lawful access 
to works 
The recourse by 
beneficiaries to self-help is 
still controversial 
Safeguard is provided for: 




libraries, museums and 
archives; reproduction, 
quotation and 
communication to the 
public for purposes of 
review, teaching and 
scientific research; benefit 
of disabled persons 
 Remedies do not apply to 
work made available to 
the public by interactive 
services 
The provision does not 
apply to works made 
available on demand 
  The provision can be 
limited to users having 
lawful access to works 
 The provision is limited to 
users having lawful access 
to works 
   The provision does not 
apply to works made 
available on demand 
 Absent any voluntary 
measure or agreement 
between parties, 
beneficiaries must serve a 
notice of complaint to the 
Secretary of State who 
may in turn direct an 
order (statutory duty) to 
the right-holders 
   The access can be 
dependent upon payment 
of fair compensation 
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   If negotiations among 
stakeholders and end-
users fail, a mandatory 
dispute resolution will be 
conducted before the 
Permanent Copyright 
Consultation Committee 
and only afterwards 
normal courts will be 
entitled to rule 
  
   Safeguard is provided 
also for the private 
copying exception that 




between right-holders and 
users may override 
safeguard measures 
  
Sources: Authors’ own elaboration on Queen Mary (2007), Mazziotti (2008) and national legislation. 
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 An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Finance 
Regulation 
Rights 
Europe in the World 
Energy and Climate Change 
Institutions 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Energy Climate House (ECH) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
